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The first essay examines the impact of asset growth rates on the future stock performance of 
real estate investment trusts (REITs). The results show that slow growing REIT (“tortoises”) 
tend to outperform fast growing REIT (“hares”) over a longer horizon. Compared to common 
stocks, the growth effect is weaker in REIT markets due to the constrained environment in 
which REITs operate. On the asset investment side, the negative asset growth effect is 
associated with growth in non-real estate assets. This is consistent with the notion that firms 
that grow outside of their competency areas are penalized by the market. On the asset financing 
side, growth activities funded by taking on more debt are associated with negative stock 
performance over the next 12 to 36 months. Further analysis indicates that the negative effect 
is associated primarily with the issuance of long-term unsecured debt to fund asset growth. This 
suggests that the provision of collateral associated with secured debt and the refinancing 
frequency associated with short-term loans are effective in restricting firms from engaging in 
sub-optimal growth. 
The second essay examines the role of corporate watchdogs in preventing REITs managers 
from pursuing value-destroying growth. While REITs have expanded rapidly over the last two 
decades, not all corporate growth is beneficial to shareholders. Tracking the growth of a sample 
of public US REITs since their IPO, this essay observes that 44.5% of the growth between 1992 
and 2012 resulted in the firms operating at decreasing returns to scale. The effectiveness of 
monitoring by three corporate watchdogs were examined subsequently, including the 
institutional investors, the independent directors, and the external creditors. The evidence 
suggests that institutional investors are the most effective watchdog in disciplining the 
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managers from undertaking bad investments. The results are robust to alternative ways of 
identifying good and bad growth, and to different strategies to control for possible endogeneity 
and reverse causality. 
The last essay focuses on the downsizing of real estate operating companies (REOCs) in 
the market China. The third essay, “A Relook into the Impact of Divestitures in the Presence of 
Agency Conflicts: Evidence from Property Subsidiary Sell-Offs in China”, examines the stock 
market’s response to property subsidiary sell-offs in China. Although, the overall response from 
the stock market is neutral, detailed analysis reveals that the market reacts differently to 
property subsidiary sell-off announcements by state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and non-SOEs. 
Non-SOE sell-off announcements are associated with statistically positive market returns, 
while, SOE sell-off announcements are associated with statistically negative market returns. 
This divergent market reaction is consistent with the high agency costs associated with state 
ownership. Further analysis suggests that the agency issue with SOEs during property 
subsidiary selloffs is related to the use of fund after the sale and can be alleviated through 
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Chapter 1    Introduction 
1.1 Firm Growth as an Important Research Topic  
Firm growth has been a topic of keen interest in the literature of economics and finance. For 
example, economists have been trying to explore the underlying mechanisms behind firm 
growth. In year 1931, Robert Gibrat, a French econometrician, proposed “a law of proportionate 
growth”, which describes fir growth as a random process that is irrelevant to firm size. 
Alternatively, a study on US manufacturing firms by Evans (1987) shows that the growth rate 
of firms decreases with firm size and firm age. This suggests that, instead of a random process, 
firm growth is a learning process in which firms uncover their true efficiencies. Apart from size 
and age, firm growth is also shown to be related to some other factors, such as firm leverage 
(Lang, Ofek and Stulz, 1996), innovations (Coad and Rao, 2008), and the legal and financial 
systems of a country (Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1998).  
In addition to exploring the underlying mechanisms behand growth, researchers have also 
been examining the impact of firm growth. According to Moeller, Schlingemann and Stulz 
(2005), announcements of corporate acquisitions are often associated with insignificant (or 
even negative) reaction of stock prices. Conversely, announcements of corporate divestitures 
are often shown to have positive reaction of stock prices (Jain, 1985; John and Ofek, 1995; 
Rosenfeld, 1984). Recently, Cooper, Gulen and Schill (2008) documents a pervasive “asset 
growth anomaly”, where firms with higher growth rates significantly underperform those with 
lower growth rates in the subsequent year.  
The topic of growth is crucially important to real estate firms. Real estate, as the largest 
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investible asset class, is of interest to a wide range of investors in the capital market. Abundant 
research efforts have been paid to the growth of real estate firms. Noticeably, the boom of the 
US real estate industry in recent decades has inspired various studies on whether real estate 
firms can benefit from growth. The unique operating environment of certain real estate 
companies, particularly REITs, also necessitates an intra-industry study on the growth of real 
estate firms. 
1.2 Literature Review on the Growth of Real Estate Firms 
To explore whether REITs can benefit from expansions, some studies have tested the relation 
between REIT growth and various aspects of firm performance. Using data of 41 multifamily 
REITs during 1990 and 1997, Ambrose et al. (2000) examine the impact of growth of REITs 
on firm profitability, measured with NOI growth. No evidence of economies of scale is found 
in their study. In a subsequent study, Ambrose, Highfield and Linneman (2005) use a long 
sample period from 1990 to 2001 and suggest that economies of scale is available in REITs 
with evidence that larger REITs have lower G&A expenses and a lower cost of capital. 
In another strand of literature, some researchers opt to evaluate firm growth using direct 
measurements of scale efficiency. Bers and Springer (1997) provide the earliest study on the 
efficiency of REITs by estimating a translog cost function with a sample of REITs from year 
1992 to year 1994. They conclude that economies of scale is available in REITs. Anderson et 
al. (2002) adopt the data envelopment analysis (DEA) to calculate economies of scale for a 
sample of US REITs during years 1992-1996. They suggest that most REITs are operating at 
increasing return to scale and can improve performance through expansion. Using data from 
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year 1995 to 1997, Lewis, Springer and Anderson (2003) also conclude that REITs can benefit 
from expansions. Miller, Clauretie and Springer (2006) estimate a stochastic frontier model 
employing a longer sample period of 1995-2003. Contrary to previous studies, they find little 
evidence of scale economies but some evidence of diseconomies of scale. According to 
Ambrose et al. (2005), variations in findings on economies of scale in REITs are attributable to 
the time-dependent market cycle.  
There are also some researchers looking at the wealth effect of mergers and acquisitions 
among real estate firms. Prior to 1990s, acquirer returns are often shown to be insignificant or 
positive, while the more recent studies often find insignificant or negative acquirer returns. 
Using a sample of 52 mergers by US REITs during 1977 to 1983, Allen and Sirmans (1987) 
find a positive and significant return of 5.78% during the event window (-1,0). Looking at a 
sample of 70 acquisitions of real estate assets from 1981 to 1986, Glascock, Davidson and 
Sirmans (1989) find no significant abnormal returns for buyers of the real estate assets. Using 
a sample of 54 property acquisitions during 1968 to 1990, Mcintosh, Ott and Liang (1995) also 
find insignificant wealth effects from the announcement of acquisitions. And according to 
Campbell, Ghosh and Sirmans (2001), acquirer shareholders sustain small negative returns 
when the target firm is publicly traded. Based on a sample of 132 mergers and acquisitions from 
1997 to 2006, Campbell et al. (2011) report an average of acquirer return of െ0.04% during 
a two-day event window (-1,0). 
Looking at the reverse side of firm expansion, there is also a strand of literature exploring 
the wealth effect of selling real estate assets. Sell-offs are often found to increase shareholder 
wealth. Looking at a sample of 9 property level selloffs in the US market during 1981 and 1989, 
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Glascock et al. (1989) find no abnormal gains for the sellers. Based on a sample of 150 selloffs 
of real estate properties and subsidiaries, Glascock, Davidson and Sirmans (1991) find positive 
and significant abnormal return of 1.23% on day -1 for the sellers. Myer, He and Webb (1992) 
use a sample of 48 selloffs of properties by real estate operating firms in the US market during 
1964 to 1990 and find a significant abnormal return of 1.46% during interval (-1, 0) for the 
sellers. As to the experience of REITs, Mcintosh et al. (1995) use a sample of 38 property level 
selloffs in the US market during 1968-1990, but find no significant wealth effect for the seller. 
A more recent study by Campbell, Petrova and Sirmans (2006) uses a large sample of 139 
property level selloffs by US REITs during 1992 and 2002, and find significant positive CAR 
of 0.75% during days (-1,1). 
Despite the great research efforts paid in studying the growth of firms in the real estate 
industry, this field remains attractive with the emergence of interesting topics that are worthy 
of exploration. First, the well-documented negative “asset growth effect” motivates a study on 
REITs given the unique operating environment of this industry, particularly the mandatory 
payout requirement, the transparent assets, and the heavy reliance on external financing.  
In addition, while many researchers have been exploring whether economies of scale is 
available in REITs, the role of managerial discretion is largely ignored in relevant studies. Given 
managers’ tendency of empire building, it will be interesting to explore how the role of 
managers may influence the scale efficiency of REITs. 
On the reverse side of growth, the literature on real estate selloffs largely documents a 
positive wealth effect for the sellers. However, the premise is that managers are not self-
maximizing during selloff transactions. It will be interesting to present a scenario when selloffs 
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are not positively valued. 
1.3 Scope of This Research 
The thesis presents three essays on the strategic growth of real estate investment trusts (REITs) 
and real estate operating companies (REOCs). Chapter 2 studies the impact of asset growth rate 
on subsequent stock market returns based on the experience of US REITs. While some REITs 
adopt a strategy of fast growth, some REITs may choose to grow at a slower pace. Importantly, 
the general finance literature has documented a strong and pervasive negative relationship 
between asset growth rate and subsequent stock market returns, which is widely referred to as 
the “asset growth effect”. Given the unique operating environment of the REIT industry, the 
“asset growth effect” is hypothesized to be weaker in REITs. Chapter 2 investigates the 
following research question: Does rapid asset expansion by REITs tends to be followed by 
periods of abnormally low returns? In other words, can investors use recent growth rates to 
predict future abnormal returns, after controlling for standard risk factors? Compared to 
common stocks, the growth effect is shown to be weaker in REIT markets due to the constrained 
environment in which REITs operate. On the asset investment side, the negative asset growth 
effect is associated with growth in non-real estate assets. This is consistent with the notion that 
firms that grow outside of their competency areas are penalized by the market. On the asset 
financing side, growth activities funded by taking on more debt are associated with negative 
stock performance over the next 12 to 36 months. Further analysis indicates that the negative 
effect is associated primarily with the issuance of long-term unsecured debt to fund asset growth. 
This suggests that the provision of collateral associated with secured debt and the refinancing 
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frequency associated with short-term loans are effective in restricting firms from engaging in 
sub-optimal growth.  
While REITs are considered passive investment vehicles, “whether to grow” is still under 
the discretions of REIT managers. Importantly, firm growth is susceptible to agency conflicts 
in that managers personally benefit from a larger firm size due to higher compensation and the 
ego for running a larger firm. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) say that, “diversification and growth 
are among the most commonly cited managerial, as opposed to shareholder, objectives”. 
Tracking the growth of a sample of US public equity REITs since their IPO, this chapter shows 
that around 44.5% of growth actually result in the REITs operating at decreasing returns to 
scale. This study further evaluates the question: Can the corporate “watchdogs” reduce the 
propensity of REITs to engage in sub-optimal growth decisions? The results suggest that 
institutional investors are the most effective watchdog in disciplining the managers from 
undertaking bad investments. 
While the first two essays focus the expansion of real estate business, the last essay looks 
at divestiture, which is a frequently observed corporate downsizing strategy. Divestitures are 
usually found to increase shareholder wealth provided that managers are acting in the best 
interest of shareholders. A recent divestiture wave of real estate subsidiaries in the market of 
China motivates a relook at the wealth effect of divestitures in this market. Especially, the 
unique institutional background of the Chinese economy, such as state owned enterprises 
(SOEs), warrants a new look at the conflict of “separation of ownership and control” during 
this divesture wave. Chapter 4 is guided by two questions: How does the stock market evaluate 
divestiture announcement of real estate subsidiaries? And will there be different market 
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reactions to the respective divestiture decisions by SOEs and non-SOEs? Empirical analysis 
suggests that the overall response from the stock market is neutral. However, sell-off 
announcements by non-SOEs are associated with positive market returns, while sell-off 
announcements by SOEs are associated with statistically negative market returns. Further 
analysis suggest that the divergent market reaction is consistent with the high agency costs 
associated with state ownership. 
1.4 Thesis Road Map 
The rest of this thesis is organized as follows: Chapter 2, “Asset growth and Stock Performance: 
Evidence from REITs”, investigates the impact of asset growth rate of REITs on subsequent 
stock market returns. Chapter 3, “Good Growth, Bad Growth: How Effective are the Corporate 
Watchdogs?”, evaluates the growth decisions of REITs and explores the determinants of good 
(bad) growth. Chapter 4, “A Relook into the Impact of Divestitures in the Presence of Agency 
Conflicts: Evidence from Property Subsidiary Sell-Offs in China”, studies the wealth effect of 
divestiture announcements by real estate operating companies in China. Chapter 5, “Closing 
Remarks”, summarizes the major findings and practical implications of this thesis.
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Chapter 2    Asset Growth and Stock Performance: Evidence from REITs 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) have expanded rapidly in the last two decades. As shown 
in Figure 2-1, the asset size of the average REIT have risen by eight times from approximately 
$500 million in 1993 to $4 billion in 2013.1 The rapid growth in REIT asset size can be 
attributed to several industry innovations, starting with the introduction of the UPREIT 
structure in 1992. The structure facilitated property sellers who opt to be paid in operating units 
of the acquiring REITs to defer the realization of capital gain taxes on sold properties. This led 
to an increase in the supply of properties injected into REITs. From the demand side, changes 
in the “Five or fewer rule” in 1993 made it easier for pension funds to invest in REITs.2 The 
REIT Modernization Act of 1999 also transformed REITs from a passive collective investment 
scheme to an actively-managed investment vehicle. The inclusion of Equity Office Properties 
Trust and Equity Residential Properties to the S&P 500 Index in late 2001 further attracted the 
attention of large institutional investors to REITs as an alternative investment.  
At the firm level, individual REITs do not grow at the same rate. Some REITs grew 
aggressively through acquisitions, while others choose to grow organically at a slower pace. 
Although the year-on-year growth rate of REIT assets averaged 16.5% from 1992 to 2013, the  
                                                     
1 Inflation rate averaged 2.5% per annum over the same period.  
2 The “five or fewer rule” prescribes that not more than 50 percent of a REIT’s stocks are held by five or fewer 
individuals. After 1993, pension funds are treated as a group of investors instead of as one single investor. 
Chapter 2                                                    Asset Growth and Stock Performance 
9 
 
Figure 2-1  The number and average size of REITs (by year) 
This chart tracks the number and average size of equity REITs publicly traded in the U.S. from year 1992 to 2013. A 
REIT must be on COMPUSTAT for 2 years before it is included in the sample. The average size of a REIT is defined 




Figure 2-2  Growth rate of Individual REITs (by year) 
This chart tracks the average growth rates of 309 equity REITs publicly traded in the U.S. between 1992 and 2013. 
A REIT must be on COMPUSTAT for 2 years before it is included in the sample. The growth rate of a REIT is defined 
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standard deviation was 36.4%. Given the heterogeneity, an interesting question is whether the 
asset growth rate can be used as a predictor of return performance of listed REITs. In other 
words, do fast growing REITs (the “hares”) outperform slower growing REITs (the “tortoises”) 
over different investment holding periods?  
Prior studies in the finance literature generally suggest that corporate growth does not 
always translate into better stock performance; in fact, a negative relation between asset growth 
rates and stock returns is observed by several recent studies, such as (Cooper et al., 2008; Fama 
and French, 2006; Fama and French, 2008; Lipson, Mortal and Schill, 2011). Cooper et al. 
(2008) find that portfolio of low growth firms outperforms the portfolio of high growth firms 
over a one-year horizon by 19.5% and 8.4% respectively on an equal-weighted and value-
weighted basis. Using data on Australian firms, Gray and Johnson (2011) similarly document 
that low growth firms outperform high growth firms by an average of 13% annually.  
The negative impact on stock prices also extends to other dimensions of firm expansion, 
such as growth in capital investment (Anderson and Garcia-Feijóo, 2006; Titman, Wei and Xie, 
2004), growth in accruals (Fairfield, Whisenant and Yohn, 2003; Sloan, 1996), growth in net 
operating assets (Fairfield et al., 2003; Hirshleifer et al., 2004), new share issuance (Pontiff and 
Woodgate, 2008), and new debt offerings (Spiess and Affleck-Graves, 1999). Cooper et al. 
(2008) and Lipson et al. (2011) nevertheless observe that growth in total asset dominates the 
negative growth effects of the different dimensions of firm expansion. Moreover, the asset 
growth effect dominates other conventional returns determinants, such as firm size, book-to-
market (B/M) ratio, and momentum in cross-sectional regressions of stock returns (Cooper et 
al., 2008).  
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The negative relationship between growth and future stock returns is known as the “asset 
growth” anomaly in the finance literature. In an efficient capital market, the persistent negative 
performance of fast growing firms is a puzzle because any abnormal returns should be 
eliminated by the trading activities of arbitrageurs. Lipson et al. (2011) therefore suggest the 
presence of arbitrage costs as an explanation for the persistence of the asset growth effect over 
time. Based on the finding that acquiring firms often earn negative returns during M&A 
announcements (Loughran and Ritter, 1995; Moeller et al., 2005), one explanation for the 
observed negative relationship between asset growth rate and future stock performance is the 
slow diffusion of information. As a result, the negative effect of asset growth is only gradually 
reflected in the stock price. However, this explanation is not supported by Agrawal, Jaffe and 
Mandelker (1992) finding of a lack of correlation between short-run and long-run 
underperformance. Another explanation suggested by Fama and French (2006) is that retained 
earnings are usually reinvested inefficiently, which leads to lower future stock returns.  
Another explanation proposed by CGS (2008) and LMS (2011) is that the long-run 
underperformance of fast growing firms is due to the market correcting investors’ over-reaction 
to past firm performance. In particular, they observed that high (low) growth firms tend to 
register better (worse) accounting performance prior to the growth incidents. However, 
subsequent earning announcements for high (low) growth firms are associated with negative 
(positive) abnormal returns.3   
 It is not certain whether the “asset growth” anomaly applies to REITs due to their unique 
                                                     
3 Their result is consistent with Lakonishok et al. (1994) extrapolation hypothesis which predicts a negative relation 
between pre- and post-formation profitability and returns of individual firms. The essence of the extrapolation theory 
is that investors naively extrapolate past growth rates of firms.   
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regulatory environment. First, REITs are required to disburse 90% of their net taxable income 
to maintain their tax transparency status; 4  thereby mitigating the adverse effect of 
“reinvestment of earnings.” Second, REIT stocks are relatively easier to value because they 
primarily buy and hold tangible real estate assets; thereby, reducing the potential for mispricing 
due to “overreaction” (Cooper et al., 2008; Lipson et al., 2011). Ooi, Webb and Zhou (2007) 
conclude that the extrapolation hypothesis plays a less significant role in the pricing of REIT 
growth stocks. Third, REIT managers are subjected to frequent monitoring from the capital 
markets because of their heavy reliance on external financing; thereby, counteracting the 
potential adverse effects of “weak governance”(Titman et al., 2004). Fourth, it has been argued 
that the asset growth effect is driven largely by small cap stocks (Fama and French, 2008; Gray 
and Johnson, 2011).5 In contrast to the asset holdings of the slowest growing firms ($20.86 
million) and the fastest growing firms ($66.69 million) in CGS (2008), the asset holdings of 
REIT “tortoises” and “hares” are $1.87 billion and $2.13 billion, respectively. For these reasons, 
REITs are conjured to suffer less from “growing pains” as compared to general industrial firms.  
Our empirical investigation is guided by the following research question: Does REIT asset 
expansion tend to be followed by periods of abnormally low returns? In other words, can 
investors use the asset growth rates of REITs to improve their predictions of future returns? 
                                                     
4 REITs often distribute more than 100% of their net taxable income. Ott, Riddiough and Yi (2005) note that only 
7% of the investments made by REITs are financed by retained earnings, as compared to industrial firms which fund 
70% of their investments through retained earnings.  
5 Observing an absence of the asset growth effect in their sample to large stocks, Fama and French (2008) suggest 
that the apparent asset growth effect is driven by small-cap stocks. They used the 20th and 50th percentiles of end-of-
June market cap for NYSE stocks as breakpoints for microcaps, small and big stocks. For perspective, at the end of 
June 2005 (their last portfolio formation point) the market cap breakpoints separating micro from small and small 
from big are $610 million and $2.3 billion, respectively.  
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This chapter also seeks to isolate the channels that lead to the negative asset growth effect. 
Although this chapter focuses on publicly-listed REITs, the findings have wider implications, 
such as the impact of asset growth strategy on the performance of private real estate equity 
funds. 
The sample includes all exchange-listed equity REITs followed by National Association 
of Real Estate Investment Trusts (NAREIT). The research strategy involves measuring the 
growth rates of a cross-section of 309 unique REITs from 1993 to 2013 and examines the 
correlation of asset growth their future stock performance. Asset growth is measured as an 
individual REIT’s year-on-year percentage change in total assets. The empirical tests are carried 
out in three stages. First, sorting the REITs by their asset growth rate in the preceding year, we 
construct five-equally sized REIT portfolios and track their returns moving forward over 
different investment holding periods (ranging from 1-year to 3-year). Raw and risk-adjusted 
returns of the different asset growth portfolios are then examined for evidence of an asset 
growth effect. Second, we estimate a series of Fama and Macbeth (1973) cross-sectional 
regressions on asset growth and other firm attributes to control for the effects of “size” (Banz, 
1981), “value”(Fama and French, 1992) and “momentum” (Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993) on 
stock performance. Finally, we decompose total asset growth into its major components from 
both the left-hand (investment) side and right-hand (financing) side of the balance sheet to 
isolate the channels driving the relationship between asset growth and stock performance.  
  It is shown that the portfolio returns of REIT hares are significantly lower than the returns 
of REIT tortoises in the following year. The mean 1-year equally-weighted return for the 
slowest growing portfolios is 18.7%, as compared to 12.9% for the fastest growing portfolios. 
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This return spread of -5.8% is statistically significant at the 5% level. The negative relationship 
between asset growth rates and future return remains after adjusting for firm size and risk. 
Specifically, there is no significant difference in the return volatility and systematic risk of REIT 
tortoises and REIT hares. The inverse relationship between asset growth rates and return 
performance strengthens when the subsequent holding period is increased to two, three, four 
and five years. Nevertheless, the magnitude of the asset growth effect on REITs (-5.8%) is 
smaller than the return spread of the fastest and slowest growing industrial firms (-22.8% in 
CGS, 2008).    
Extending the analysis to a multivariate framework using Fama-MacBeth (1973) cross-
sectional regressions, this chapter finds that the effect of the prior year’s growth rate on stock 
performance is stronger over the longer horizon of 36 months. Consistent with (Cooper et al., 
2008), the asset growth factor is shown to dominate the effects of conventional returns 
determinants, including firm size, the B/M ratio, and momentum in cross-sectional return 
regressions. Analyzing the effect of asset growth rates during the “crisis” periods, this study 
does not observe any significant difference in the future stock performances of REIT tortoises 
and hares. Thus, this study finds no evidence that REITs which adopted a “contrarian” 
investment strategy (by acquiring assets aggressively) during crisis periods produced superior 
returns over the next one- to three-year investment horizon. Our regression results are robust to 
a series of checks, including expanding the regression models by incorporating more 
explanatory variables; extending the sample period to include 1982 to 1993; omitting REITs 
with negative growth rates (contraction) from each annual sample; and redefining the asset 
growth rate by scaling growth in total assets on a per share basis.    
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Decomposing the year-on-year asset growth rates of REITs, it is not surprising to note that 
REIT growth is driven primarily by expansions in their real estate holdings (89.5%). Asset 
growth is funded primarily by additional debt (57.1%) and equity (39.6%) capital and, to a 
smaller extent, changes in minority interests (3.3%). On the asset investment side, the 
decomposition results show that the negative asset growth effect is driven by the expansion of 
non-real estate assets. The rate of growth in real estate assets does not appear to significantly 
affect future return performance. Our results are consistent with the notion that the stock market 
penalizes firms that grow outside of their core areas.  
On the asset financing side, the negative asset growth effect is not driven by growth in 
equity capital. Moreover, the market does not appear to differentiate between the alternative 
channels of equity expansion, namely preferred equity issuance, secondary equity offerings 
(SEOs), or retained earnings. The evidence instead shows that REITs which expand their asset 
base by employing more debt in their capital structure are associated with negative stock 
performance over the next 12 to 36 months. Further analysis suggests that the observed negative 
relationship between lagged one-year growth rates and REIT returns appears to be associated 
primarily with the issuance of long-term, unsecured debt.  This is consistent with agency cost 
of debt explanations in which the provision of collateral associated with secured debt and the 
refinancing frequency associated with short-term loans restrict managers and shareholders from 
engaging in sub-optimal investment activities. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the data used in 
this study. Section 3 discusses the empirical results of both the univariate sorts and the cross-
sectional regressions on the impact of asset growth rates on the future return performance of 
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REITs. Section 4 presents the research design and findings of the decomposition analysis used 
to isolate the effect of different asset growth channels. Section 5 concludes. 
2.2 Data 
Our study begins with the universe of publicly-listed U.S. equity REITs compiled by 
NAREIT from 1993 to 2013. The sample list is also supplemented with that of Feng, Price and 
Sirmans (2011) list of equity REITs from year 1993 to 2009. For completeness, we also follow 
Ling and Naranjo (2015) and use the CRSP-ZIMAN REIT dataset to identify firms that may 
have been omitted from the NAREIT sample. The sample also includes delisted REITs to 
reduce survivorship bias.  
The asset growth rate (ASSET_G) of individual REIT stocks is calculate as the year-on-
year percentage change in total assets. Specifically, the asset growth rate for the ith REIT in 
year t, is estimated as the percentage change in total assets from the fiscal year ending in 
calendar year t-2 to the fiscal year ending in year t-1, as below:  
ܣܵܵܧܶ_ܩ௜,௧ ൌ ்௢௧௔௟	஺௦௦௘௧௦೔,೟షభି்௢௧௔௟	஺௦௦௘௧௦೔,೟షమ்௢௧௔௟	஺௦௦௘௧௦೔,೟షమ                (1) 
 
A REIT must therefore have two consecutive years of valid data for total assets to be 
included in our study sample. This is to mitigate backfilling biases (Fama and French, 1993).6 
Observations with negative total assets or book equity value are dropped from our sample. After 
the filtering process, the final sample consists of 2,806 firm-year observations. The unbalanced 
                                                     
6 Backfilling refers to the practice of back-dating the coverage of a company during their initial years. As a result, 
the current dataset may contain more information than what could be actually observed back in time. Backfilling 
poses an issue for the sorting analysis because the firms selected may not have been covered by the dataset at time 
of portfolio construction.  
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panel contains 309 unique REITs with the average REIT remaining in the sample for 
approximately 10 years.  
Accounting data and stock returns were obtained from the COMPUSTAT annual industrial 
files and the CRSP monthly stock return files. Following standard practice in the literature, 
financial variables at the end of June in year t are obtained from accounting information from 
fiscal year-end t-1. To mitigate the impacts of extreme values, asset growth rates and financial 
information are winsorized at the 1% and 99% level.7  
Descriptive statistics of the sampled REITs are presented in Table 2-1. Total asset holdings 
(ASSETS) and the equity market capitalization (MV) of the average REIT are $2.1 billion and 
$1.5 billion, respectively. The book-to-market ratio (B/M) and total debt ratio (DEBT) of the 
average REIT are 0.83 and 0.47, respectively. The return on total assets (ROA) of the average 
REIT is 5.5%.  
The mean asset growth rate of the sampled REITs is 16.5%. The median asset growth rate 
of 5.9% indicates that the distribution of growth rates is skewed to the left. The 36.4% standard 
deviation signifies substantial variability in year-on-year growth rates across REITs and over 
time. Figure 2-2 shows that average asset growth varies substantially over time. During the 
1990s, average asset growth increased considerably, from less than 5% per year in 1992 to more 
than 50% in 1998. The asset unabated expansion was eventually halted by the bursting of the 
dot-com bubble during 1999-2001. In the following decade, the expansion of asset holdings 
                                                     
7 This means that extreme values below the 1th percentile are set to the 1th percentile level, and those above the 99th 
percentile are set at the 99th percentile. 
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Table 2-1  Sample Description  
This table summarizes the financial characteristics of the sample of 2,806 REIT-year observations between 1993 and 2013. Asset growth (ASSET_G) is defined as the percentage change in total 
assets from the fiscal year ending in calendar year t-2 to year t-1. The accounting variables, total assets (ASSETS), book-to-market ratio (B/M), DEBT, and ROA are based on figures as at year t-1. 
MV is market value of equity in June of year t in millions. BHR11 is the 11-month buy and hold return from August of year t-1 to June of year t.   
 
Variables  Definition Mean Median Min Max Std. Dev. 
ASSET_G Percentage change in total assets  0.165 0.0593 -0.366 2.273 0.364 
ASSETS Total asset ($ million) 2,119 926.9 9.183 21,131 3,461 
MV Market value ($ million) 1,461 562.0 4.341 15,923 2,633 
B/M Book-to-market ratio 0.834 0.651 0.0779 5.173 0.723 
DEBT Debt ratio 0.470 0.489 0.000 0.874 0.194 
ROA  Return on assets  0.0545 0.0569 -0.107 0.209 0.0440 
BHR11 Buy-and-hold return 11 months prior to portfolio 
formation 
0.134 0.121 -0.979 3.414 0.315 
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resumed, peaking at 20% during 2006-2007. The average asset growth rate of REITs was 
slightly negative (-0.4%) in 2009-2010 in the wake of the subprime credit crisis. The average 
rate of asset growth has since increased annually, reaching almost 20% in 2012-2013.   
At the end of each year, REIT stocks in the top 20% by asset growth rate are placed in 
Quintile 5, while those in the bottom 20% are placed in Quintile 1. The remaining REIT stocks 
are placed in the intermediate portfolios (Quintiles 2, 3 and 4). The number of REIT stocks in 
the quintile portfolios ranges from a minimum of 20 (in 1993) to a maximum of 34 (in 1997). 
The portfolios are reconstructed at the end of each year based on asset growth during the 
preceding fiscal year. For example, based on asset growth in fiscal year 1992, the first batch of 
portfolios are constructed and held from July of 1993 through June of 1994. The last batch of 
portfolios is constructed based on asset growth in fiscal year 2012, and held from July 2013 
through June 2014.  
Table 2-2 reports summary statistics for the key attributes of REITs by asset-growth 
portfolio. The difference between Quintile 1 and Quintile 5 are also reported. By construction, 
ASSET_G increases monotonically across the portfolios. Contrasting the average asset growth 
rate of 63.4% for REITs in quantile 5 versus -9.7% for REITs in quantile 1, the average annual 
spread between the fastest and slowest growing REITs is 73.1%. The wide range observed for 
the average asset growth rate of the REIT hares and REIT tortoises shows that REIT stocks are 
not homogenous.  
Panel A also reports the average growth rates of the portfolios 3 years pre- and post- 
formation. A strong persistence in the asset growth rates is observed prior to the annual sorting. 
In other words, REIT hares consistently record higher asset growth rates, relative to REIT 
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tortoises, over the preceding 3 years. Specifically, in years -1, -2, and -3, the spread in annual 
growth rates between the fastest and the slowest growing firms is 29.5%, 15.3% and 7.2%, 
respectively. A similar trend is observed over the 3 years following the portfolio formation. In 
years +1, +2, and +3, the spread in annual growth rates between the REIT hares and tortoises 
is 24.5%, 12.6%, and 7.9%, respectively. Further untabulated results reveal that, on average, 
34% of REITs remained in the same quintile portfolio the subsequent year.8 The regular 
constituents of Q1 and Q5 are presented in Appendix 1.   
 Panel B in Table 2-2 reports the attribute means for REITs in the different portfolios. Two 
proxies are used to represent firm size, namely the book value of total assets (ASSETS) and the 
market capitalization of stocks (MV). The latter is computed as the price per share multiplied 
by the number of outstanding shares of the constituent REITs at the end of June of year t. The 
positive spread (Q5-Q1) for these two proxies indicates that REIT hares tend to be larger than 
REIT tortoises, which suggests the necessity to control for firm size in our subsequent 
examination on portfolio returns.  
The average B/M ratio is negatively related to asset growth. Specifically, the B/M ratio of 
the hare portfolios and the tortoises portfolios are 0.74 and 1.07, respectively. Consistent with 
Gray and Johnson (2011), this indicates that REIT hares tend be “growth” stocks in the Fama-
French sense. The accounting performance (ROA) of hares is higher, but the relationship across 
quintiles is not monotonic. There is, however, no discernible difference in the debt ratios of 
hares and tortoises. With respect to momentum effects, REIT “hares” registered significantly 
                                                     
8 Of the remaining REITs that switched quintiles in the following year, 35% involved shifts to the adjacent quantile 
with less than 13% actually switching by more than two quintiles within a year. 
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Table 2-2  Asset Growth Quintiles: Growth Rate and Financial Characteristics  
At the end of June of each year t over 1993 to 2013, REITs are grouped into quintile portfolios based on asset growth rate (ASSET_G) from the fiscal year ending in calendar year t-2 to year t-1. 
The portfolios are held for 1 year from July of year t through June of year t+1 then reconstructed. Panel A reports average annual growth rates. In Panel A, the Year 0 row reports the asset growth 
rates from fiscal year ending in calendar year t-2 to t-1, while Year -1, Year-2 and Year-3 report the asset growth rates from fiscal year ending in calendar t-3 to t-2, t-4 to t-3, and t-5 to t-4, 
respectively. Year +1, Year +2, Year +3, reports the growth rates from fiscal year ending in calendar year t-1 to t, etc. Panel B reports the financial characteristics in the year prior to the portfolio 
formation date. The variables as defined in Table 2-1. BHR-36 is the buy-and-hold return over January (t-3) to June (t) where t is the portfolio formation year.    
 
Asset Growth Portfolios: 1 (“tortoises”) 2 3 4 5 (“hares”) Spread (5-1) t-stats 
Panel A: Asset Growth Rates        
  Year 0  -0.0970 0.0179 0.0851 0.197 0.634 0.731 30.85*** 
Before portfolio construction        
  Year -3 0.152 0.163 0.174 0.208 0.224 0.072 2.59** 
  Year -2 0.123 0.154 0.164 0.215 0.276 0.153 5.50*** 
  Year -1 0.0557 0.134 0.170 0.231 0.351 0.295 11.72*** 
After portfolio construction         
  Year +1 0.0410 0.0909 0.131 0.194 0.286 0.245 10.37*** 
  Year +2 0.0894 0.0957 0.122 0.158 0.215 0.126 4.91*** 
  Year +3 0.0961 0.0948 0.119 0.136 0.175 0.079 3.09*** 
Panel B: Financial Characteristics         
ASSETS 1,870 2,291 2,164 2141 2,134 264 1.26 
MV 1,153 1,514 1,581 1,562 1,496 343 2.19** 
B/M 1.073 0.876 0.779 0.700 0.740 -0.333 -7.15*** 
DEBT 0.460 0.459 0.473 0.489 0.470 0.010 0.83 
ROA  0.039 0.057 0.062 0.059 0.055 0.016 5.15*** 
BHR11 0.119 0.146 0.114 0.135 0.158 0.039 30.85*** 
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Table 2-3  Asset Growth Portfolios: Returns  
This table presents REIT stock returns across five quintiles sorted by their asset growth rate (ASSET_G) in the preceding year. The bottom 20% of the REITs ranked by asset growth rate are placed 
in Quintile 1 (“tortoises”), while the top 20% of the REITs by asset growth rate are placed in Quintile 5 (“hares”). The buy-and-hold returns for 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 years holding period are computed. 
Year 1 refers to July of year t through June of year t+1. The raw returns for the equally-weighted (EW) portfolios are reported in Panel A, while the corresponding returns for the value-weighted 
(VW) portfolios are reported in Panel B. The size-adjusted returns of the portfolios are reported in Panel C which first involves constructing five portfolios of REITs each year based on their market 
capitalization (in June of the previous year). The EQ returns for each portfolio are then computed. The size-adjusted return of the asset growth portfolios equals to their EW returns minus the 
corresponding size-quintile returns. *, **, and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.  
Asset Growth Portfolios: 1 (“tortoises”) 2 3 4 5 (“hares”) Spread (5-1) t-stats 
Panel A: Equally-weighted (EW) Returns         
  Return [0,1]   0.1870  0.1470  0.1545  0.1349  0.1292  -0.0578  -2.39**  
  Return [0,2]  0.4122  0.3373  0.3216  0.3015  0.2627  -0.1495  -3.51***  
  Return [0,3]  0.6201  0.5807  0.5222  0.4733  0.3832  -0.2369  -4.17*** 
  Return [0,4]  0.8238  0.8550  0.7520  0.6775  0.5283  -0.2955  -4.21***  
  Return [0,5]  1.1300 1.0358 0.9457 0.8480 0.6620 -0.4680 -5.20*** 
Panel B. Value-weighted (VW) Returns        
  Return [0,1]   0.1702  0.1345  0.1478  0.1166  0.1258  -0.0444  -1.46  
  Return [0,2]  0.3222  0.3032  0.3103  0.2747  0.2564  -0.0658  -1.62  
  Return [0,3]  0.4873  0.5045  0.4949  0.4404  0.3654  -0.1219  -2.04**  
  Return [0,4]  0.6339  0.6793  0.7447  0.6184  0.4778  -0.1561  -2.02**  
  Return [0,5]  0.8497 0.8195 0.8879 0.7912 0.5900 -0.2597 -2.64*** 
Panel C. Size-Adjusted Returns         
  Return [0,1]  0.1616  0.1529  0.1519  0.1462  0.1424  -0.0193  -2.25**  
  Return [0,2] 0.2010  0.1510  0.1479  0.1502  0.1153  -0.0857  -3.15***  
  Return [0,3]  0.2083  0.1813  0.1586  0.1412  0.0856  -0.1227  -3.62***  
  Return [0,4]  0.2030  0.2124  0.1630  0.1463  0.0770  -0.1260  -3.81***  
  Return [0,5]  0.2523  0.1725  0.1532  0.1408  0.0640  -0.1883  -4.72***  
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higher buy-and-hold returns over the 11 months preceding portfolio construction (BHR11), 
which is consistent with the extrapolation hypothesis that fast growing firms tend to over-
perform prior to portfolio formation (Lakonishok et al., 1994). In summary, Table 2-2 shows 
that large REITs with growth opportunities and a strong track record (in terms of either 
accounting or stock returns) are more likely to expand their asset base faster. 
2.3 Results 
2.3.1 Univariate Return Sorts 
To determine whether REIT hares produce inferior returns to tortoises, the total returns for 
each portfolio are calculated over next 12 months (from July of year t to June of year t+1) 
following their formation. This study also tracks the portfolio returns over two-to-five year 
horizons to examine the long-run return effects of portfolio sorting based on asset growth rates. 
To ensure our results are not driven by small firms, this study also reports the value-weighted 
(VW) returns of the respective portfolios.9 The difference in returns of the extreme portfolios 
(Q5-Q1) is also reported. This corresponds to an investment strategy of buying REIT tortoises 
and shorting an equal amount of REIT hares. The results are reported in Table 2-3. The figures 
presented are the average across all the portfolio formation periods in the sample. Time-series 
variation over the sample period are used to compute the significance level. The Newey-West 
procedure was applied to correct for serial correlation in returns induced by overlapping holding 
periods for return horizons greater than one year.  
                                                     
9 The market value of equity at the end of June of year t is used as weight to construct the time series returns of the 
VW portfolios. 
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Panel A of Table 2-3 shows that the mean 1-year equally-weighted (EW) return for the 
tortoises portfolios is 18.7% compared to 12.92% for the hares portfolios. This return spread of 
-5.78% is statistically significant at the 5% level. The negative relation between asset growth 
and REIT stock returns is also persistent. In particular, the cumulative 5-year average holding 
period return for slow growing REITs is 113% compared to 66.2% for the portfolios of REIT 
hares. The spread between the two portfolios is -46.8% (t-statistic = - 5.20), which suggests that 
asset growth is a useful predictor of future REIT returns, particularly over longer investment 
horizons. Panel B reports the returns on a VW basis. As expected, the VW portfolio returns are 
uniformly lower than EW portfolio returns. In addition, the negative asset growth effect is 
marginally weaker for the VW portfolios. In particular, the spread of mean returns between 
tortoises and hares over a holding period of less than two years is statistically insignificant. The 
negative return from adopting a growth strategy remains significant over investment horizons 
of 3-5 years. For example, the difference in 3-year holding period returns between the two 
extreme portfolios is -12.19% (t-statistic = - 2.04).  
Table 2-3 shows that asset growth rates are generally good predictor of a REIT’s future 
stock returns; however, the magnitude of the negative growth effect is less pronounced than 
what is typically found for common stocks. As an additional robustness check, this study 
computes the size-adjusted returns of each portfolio. Specifically, five portfolios of REIT stocks 
are constructed in July of each year based on their equity market capitalization at the end of 
June. The EW returns for each size-portfolio are then computed. The size-adjusted returns of 
our asset growth portfolios are measured as their raw EW returns minus the corresponding size-
quintile returns. The results, which are reported in Panel C, show that the return spread of the 
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“asset growth” investment strategy is still significant after adjusting for size effect. Over a 12-
month holding period, the buy hares – short tortoises investment strategy yields a -1.93% return, 
which is significant at the 5% level. As observed previously, the return spread of tortoises over 
hares increases with the investment horizon.  
A closer examination of the size-adjusted returns of Q1 and Q5 portfolios reveals that the 
cumulative returns of Q1 portfolio comprising REIT tortoises increases from 16.16% to 25.23% 
over the five-year horizon. Interestingly, the cumulative returns of REIT tortoises are fairly 
stable at around 20%-21% in years 2, 3 and 4. On closer examination, the divergent 
performance is due primarily to the returns of hares declining over time. In particular, the 
cumulative returns of Q5 portfolios falls steadily from 14.24% in year 1 to 6.4% in year 5.  
One reason why the tortoises win is the high transaction costs associated with trading in 
illiquid commercial real estate. Given two REITs with identical sizes, capital structure, property 
sector, and geographical footprints, the hare incur more transaction costs due to higher trading 
frequency as compared to tortoises. Another possible explanation for the observed negative 
growth effect is the hypothesis that expected returns should decline systematically in response 
to increasing investment (CGS, 2008). A number of theoretical papers have argued that the 
importance of growth options relative to existing assets declines as firm investment grows. 
These models point to a reduction in overall firm risk as investment increases, thereby inducing 
a negative relation between investment and expected return (Berk, Green and Naik, 1999). 
To examine whether our results are consistent with this hypothesis, Table 2-4 compares 
the risks of the different asset growth portfolios. Two conventional risk measures, standard 
deviation and the beta derived from a 3-factor model, are employed. If the risk-based 




Table 2-4  Asset Growth Portfolios: Risk-adjusted Returns  
This table presents the risks as well as risk-adjusted performance of REITs across five quintiles sorted by their asset growth rate (ASSET_G) in the preceding year. The bottom 20% of the REITs 
ranked by asset growth rate are placed in Quintile 1 (“tortoises”), while the top 20% of the REITs by asset growth rate are placed in Quintile 5 (“hares”). The constructed portfolios are held for 1 
year from July of year t through June of year t+1 and then reconstructed. Two risk measures are reported in Panel A, namely the standard deviation of the monthly returns and 3-factor beta of the 
respective portfolios. Two risk-adjusted performance are reported in Panel B, namely Sharpe ratio and 3-factor alpha. The risk-adjusted performance over a longer horizon, namely three years, is 
also computed. T-statistic and statistical significance is reported for spread in the values of Q1 and Q5 portfolios. *, **, and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.  
 
Asset Growth Portfolios: 1 (“tortoises”) 2 3 4 5 (“hares”) Spread (5-1) t-stats 
 
Panel A: Monthly Returns Volatility 
       
  Standard deviation  0.0546 0.0545 0.0518 0.0571 0.0536 -0.0010 1.04 
  3-factor beta 0.8201 0.7642 0.7044 0.7471 0.7264 -0.0936  -1.25 
 
Panel B. Risk-Adjusted Monthly Returns 
       
1-year holding period        
  Sharpe ratio  0.2251 0.1751 0.1968 0.1521 0.1537 -0.0714 -1.80* 
  3-factor alpha  0.0043 0.0016 0.0028 0.0006 0.0006 -0.0037 -1.72* 
3-year holding period         
  Sharpe ratio  0.2242 0.2030 0.1968 0.1586 0.1327 -0.0915 -4.10*** 
  3-factor alpha  0.0043 0.0031 0.0028 0.0013 -0.0004 -0.0047 -3.66*** 
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explanation to the inferior performance of fast growing firms is correct, portfolios of hares are 
expected to exhibit lower risk than tortoise portfolios. Although the data show the return 
volatilities and systematic risk of hares are lower than tortoises, the differences are small in 
magnitude and not statistically significant. For example, the average 3-factor beta for the fastest 
growing REITs is 0.7264, compared to 0.8201 for the slowest growing REITs. The difference 
is not statistically significant (t-statistic = -1.25). Although not separately tabulated, the same 
conclusion is reached when using weighted average, instead of simple average, to compute the 
standard deviation and beta of the asset growth portfolios. 
To account for the riskiness of the investment strategy, this study next compares the risk-
adjusted performance of the different portfolios (sorted by asset growth rate) over subsequent 
1-year and 3-year holding periods. Two risk-adjusted measures of portfolio performance are 
employed: the Sharpe ratio and the Fama-French 3-factor alpha. The Sharpe ratio is defined as 
the average portfolio return in excess of risk-free rate, per unit of total return volatility. The 3-
factor alpha captures the portion of returns in excess of the risk-free rate that is unexplained by 
the market risk premium (MRP), SMB, and HML risk factors.10 If the inferior performance of 
fast growing REITs can be attributed to lower risk, one would expect the performance disparity 
of the extreme portfolios to disappear after controlling for portfolio risk. As shown in Panel B 
of Table 2-4, the average risk-adjusted return performance of hares” continues to lag behind 
tortoises. Specifically, the portfolio of REIT tortoises produced a 1-year Sharpe ratio of 0.2251 
                                                     
10 Time series data on the Fama-French factors and risk-free rates of return were obtained from the webpage of 
French. SMB, which stands for Small Minus Big, measures the historic performance of small cap stocks over big 
cap stocks. HML, on the other hand, stands for High Minus Low. It measures the historic excess returns of value 
stocks over growth stocks. 
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compared to 0.1537 for the hare portfolio. The difference of -0.0714 is statistically significant 
at the 10% level. The analysis using the 3-factor model yields a similar conclusion. Excess 
return on the portfolio of tortoises averaged 0.43% per month compared to only 0.06% per 
month for hares. The difference of -0.37% is also statistically significant at the 10% level. 
Furthermore, the significance of the return spread increases with an investment horizon of three 
years. In summary, the unconditional risk-adjusted results are consistent with our earlier results 
using raw returns; that is, asset growth is a reliable predictor of future REIT returns. The results 
are robust to the exclusion of REITs with negative growth rates from the sample.  
 To examine how the asset growth effect varies over the study period, Figure 2-3 plots the 
one-year returns spread from buying REIT tortoises and simultaneously selling hares over a 
one-year investment horizon. Over the 21 year study period, this long-short trading strategy 
would have generated positive annual returns 15 times for the EW portfolios, and 14 times for 
the VW portfolios. The largest payoff, in terms of EW returns, would have been 27.5% in 2012. 
The same long-short investment strategy would have produced a loss of -13.3% in 2000. 
2.3.2 Cross-Section Regression of Stock Market Returns 
So far, the results of the raw and risk-adjusted univariate sorts indicate that the return 
performance of REIT hares has lagged behind the performance of tortoises; moreover, the 
conventional “risk-return trade-off” explanation cannot adequately explain these results.  In 
addition to firm size and risk in the portfolio sorting process, portfolio returns may be associated 
with firm characteristics, such as the B/M ratio and past returns. This section estimates the 
annual Fama-MacBeth (1973) cross-sectional return regressions to control for the potential  
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Figure 2-3  Time series of annual hedging returns  
This figure plots the annual hedging returns from buying REIT stocks in the lowest growth quintile (Q1) and sell 
stocks in the highest growth quintile (Q5). The returns for equal- and value-weighted portfolios are reported in Panel 
A and Panel B, respectively.  
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effects of these additional firm characteristics and to examine the marginal effect of asset 
growth on REIT stock returns.  
The estimation process is implemented in two steps. First, a cross-sectional return regression 
is estimated each year from July 1993 to June 2014 for a total of 21 annual regressions. The 
form of the regression is  
ܴܧܶ௜௡ ൌ ܥ௡ ൅ ߚଵ೙ܣܵܵܧܶܩ௜௡ ൅ ࡮૛࢔࡯࢕࢔࢚࢘࢕࢒࢏࢔	,									݊ ൌ 1, 2, 3…21          (2) 
The dependent variable, ܴܧܶ௜௡, is the total return of REIT i in year n and ࡯࢕࢔࢚࢘࢕࢒࢏,࢔ is a 
vector of control variables applicable to returns in year i. ܣܵܵܧܶ_ܩ௜,௡ and ࡯࢕࢔࢚࢘࢕࢒࢏,࢔ are 
updated annually at end of June using accounting information from year tെ1. The reported 
coefficient estimates are calculated as the time-series average of the first-step coefficient 
estimations. The corresponding t-statistics are the time-series averages of the first-step t-
statistics divided by the standard error.11 That is, 
ܥ ൌ ∑ ஼೙ଶଵଶଵ௡ୀଵ ;			ߚଵ ൌ ∑
ఉభ೙
ଶଵ ;		ଶଵ௡ୀଵ 	࡮૛ ൌ ∑
࡮૛࢔
ଶଵ
ଶଵ௡ୀଵ                         (3) 
To identify the marginal prediction power of lagged annual asset growth on future stock 
returns, standard predictors of cross-sectional stock returns have been controlled, including the 
market capitalization of equity (MV), the B/M ratio, and stock returns over the past 11 months 
(BHR11).12 According to Banz (1981) and Keim (1983), small-sized firms produce higher risk-
                                                     
11 The standard errors of time-series averages have been adjusted for first-order autocorrelations by multiplying the 
standard errors of the average parameters by ඥሺ1 ൅ ߩሻ/ሺ1 െ ߩሻ, where ρ is the first-order autocorrelation in yearly 
parameter estimates (Cooper et al., 2008). For return horizons of three years, ρ is the third-order autocorrelation in 
yearly parameter estimates.  
12 In Fama and French (2008), the momentum anomaly is tested with past 11 month returns from month j-12 to 
month j-2. Cooper et al. (2008), on the other hand, used the past 6 month returns and 36 months returns for a broader 
coverage of past returns. Our results are not sensitive to the alternative proxies for momentum.  
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adjusted returns than large-sized firms. Stocks with higher B/M ratio (value stocks) also tend 
to produce higher average returns (Fama and French, 1992; Rosenberg, Reid and Lanstein, 
1985). The inclusion of firm-level equity market capitalization and the B/M ratio is similar in 
spirit to the standard three-factor asset pricing model. The momentum theory suggests that past 
returns can be used to predict future returns (Chui, Titman and Wei, 2003; Jegadeesh and 
Titman, 1993).  
This study then extends the base cross-sectional regression model to incorporate three 
additional explanatory variables: ROA (firm profitability), ACCRUALS (accruals), and 
ISSUANCE (stock issuance). Haugen (1996), Cohen, Gompers and Vuolteenaho (2002) and 
Fama and French (2006) show that average returns are positively related to profitability. Sloan 
(1996) further shows that accruals are negatively related to future profitability and stock returns. 
Finally, the net issuance of equity is shown to have a negative impact on average stock returns 
(Loughran and Ritter, 1995; Pontiff and Woodgate, 2008). 
The regression results for the base and extended models are reported in Table 2-5. Model 
1A is the base model while Model 2A is the extended model. Both are based on a 12-month 
return horizon. Because the asset growth effect is stronger over longer investment horizons, this 
study also extends the horizon of the stock returns to 36 months and re-estimate the base and 
extended regressions models. These results are presented in Panel B of Table 2-5. In Panel A, 
the average estimated coefficient on ASSET_G is negative but insignificant in both the base 
model (1A) and the extended model (2A). None of the control variables is significant in the 
base model, although firm-size, MV and ACCRUALS are weakly significant in the extended 
model. Panel B however shows that the average coefficient on ASSET_G is negative and 
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Table 2-5  Cross-Section Regressions Results 
This table shows the average slopes and t-stats from annual cross-section regressions on REIT stock returns from July 1993 to June 2014. Accounting data (growth in total assets (ASSET_G), book-
to-market ratio (B/M), ROA, and ACCRUALS) are constructed at end of June of year t using account data of year t-1. MV is the natural log of market value of equity in June of year t. BHR11 is 11-
month buy and hold return from July of year t-1 to May of year t. ISSUANCE is net stock issuance in split-adjusted shares from end of year t-2 to end of year t-1. The dependent variable in Model 
1 and Model 2 (Panel A) is the 12-month stock returns in year t to year t+1, while the dependent variable in Model 3 and Model 4 (Panel B) is the 36-months stock returns from year t to t+3. The 
t-stats for the average regression slopes are reported in parenthesis.  
 
Panel A: 12-Month Stock Returns      
Model ASSETG MV B/M BHR11 ROA ACCRUALS ISSUANCE CONSTANT AVG_R2 
1A -0.0434 -0.00561 0.00938 0.0536    0.163*** 0.095 
 (-1.407) (-1.256) (0.680) (1.252)    (4.188)  
2A  -0.0589 -0.00883* 0.00664 0.0595 0.188 0.343* 0.00484 0.177*** 0.150 
 (-1.335) (-1.977) (0.494) (1.505) (0.904) (1.861) (0.0915) (4.475)  
 
Panel B: 36-Month Stock Returns 
 
   
 
 
Model ASSETG MV B/M BHR11 ROA ACCRUALS ISSUANCE CONSTANT AVG_R2 
1B  -0.148*** -0.00438 0.00710 0.0120      
 (-2.909) (-0.323) (0.208) (0.128)    (3.719)  
2B -0.178*** -0.00844 0.00978 -0.00711 0.845** 0.166 0.0246 0.421*** 0.127 
 (-3.379) (-0.611) (0.274) (-0.0729) (2.747) (0.636) (0.385) (3.378)  
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Table 2-6  Cross-Section Regressions Results (over different sub-periods) 
This table reports robustness checks by splitting the sample into crisis and non-crisis periods. The dependent variable in models 3A, 4A, 5A and 6A is the 12-month stock returns in year t to year 
t+1, while the dependent variable in models 3B, 4B, 5B and 6B is the 36-month stock returns from year t to t+3. In Panel A, the sample period are divided into the “non-crisis” periods and the 
“crisis” periods which include the burst of the internet bubble (1998 to 2001) and the subprime financial crisis (2007-2010). In Panel B, the study periods are divided into two sub-periods, namely 
July 2003-Jun 2014, and July 1993 – Jun 2003. In addition, this study also extends the study period to cover July 1982 – Jun 2003. Accounting data (growth in total assets (ASSET_G) and book-
to-market ratio (BM) are constructed at end of June of year t using account data of year t-1. MV is the natural log of market value of equity in June of year t. BHR11 is 11-month buy and hold return 
from July of year t-1 to May of year t. The coefficients are the average slopes from annual cross-section regressions on REIT stock returns. The t-stats for the average regression slopes are reported 
in parenthesis. 
 
Panel A: 12-Month Stock Returns 
Model  Sub-periods ASSET_G MV B/M BHR11 CONSTANT AVG_R2 
3A  “Crisis”  -0.0479 0.00712 0.0209 0.108 0.0176 0.099 
 (1998-2001; 2007-2010) (-0.566) (0.657) (0.966) (0.818) (0.295)  
4A  “Non-crisis”  -0.0405 -0.0134* 0.00229 0.0201 0.252*** 0.092 
 (1993-1997; 2002-2006; 2011-2014) (-1.573) (-1.884) (0.106) (0.480) (4.788)  
5A July 1993- Jun 2003 0.00876 -0.0106 -0.000897 0.109** 0.178*** 0.074 
  (0.231) (-1.678) (-0.0519) (3.176) (4.289)  
6A July 2003- June 2014 -0.0907** -0.00103 0.0187 0.00288 0.149** 0.114 
  (-2.359) (-0.162) (0.827) (0.0395) (2.272)  
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Panel B: 36-Month Stock Returns       
Model  Sub-periods ASSET_G MV B/M BHR11 CONSTANT AVG_R2 
3B  “Crisis”  0.0246 0.0221 -0.0241 -0.0924 0.237 0.160 
 (1998-2001; 2007-2010) (0.198) (1.270) (-0.495) (-0.513) (1.817)  
4B  “Non-crisis”  -0.264*** -0.0220 0.0279 0.0817 0.585*** 0.128 
 (1993-1997;2002-2006; 2011-2014) (-4.263) (-1.506) (0.728) (0.593) (4.784)  
5B Jul 1993 - Jun 2003 -0.110 -0.0299* -0.00630 0.224* 0.636*** 0.074 
  (-1.693) (-1.952) (-0.136) (2.216) (4.848)  
6B Jul 2003 - Jun 2014 -0.187** 0.0212 0.0205 -0.200 0.255 0.125 
  (-2.442) (1.314) (0.393) (-1.709) (1.555)  
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statistically significant at the 1% level for returns over a three-year holding period. Overall, the 
combined results suggest that while asset growth rate cannot predict REIT stock returns over 
12 months, it is still a good predictor of the future performance of REIT stocks over a longer 
horizon of 36 months.  
This study repeats the analysis across different time periods. First, the sample observations 
are divided into “crisis” and “non-crisis” periods. Specifically, the burst of the internet bubble 
(1998 to 2001) and the subprime financial crisis (2007-2010) are classified as “crisis” periods, 
while the remaining years are classified as “non-crisis” periods. Second, the sample years are 
split into two equal halves: July 1993 - June 2003; July 2003 - June 2014.  
The cross-sectional regression results for the sub-period analyses are reported in Table 2-6.13 
For the 12-month returns, the average estimated coefficient on ASSET_G continues to be 
insignificant in both the crisis and non-crisis periods. This suggests that the insignificant asset 
growth effect over 1-year investment horizons is not driven by market conditions. The 
contrasting results between model 3B (crisis period) and 4B (non-crisis period) indicate that 
the significantly negative relation between ASSET_G and future stock returns over a 3-year 
horizon is driven largely by asset growth occurring during the “non-crisis” period.  
Interestingly, the average coefficient on ASSET_G is insignificant in both models 3A and 3B, 
which suggests that REITs which adopted a “contrarian” investment strategy, i.e. aggressively 
acquiring assets during the crisis periods, do not appear to produce superior stock returns over 
the 1- and 3-year investment horizons. 
                                                     
13 Once again, the dependent variable in Panel A is the 12-month stock returns from year t to t+1, while the 
dependent variable in Panel B is the 36-month stock returns from year t to t+3. Only the results of the base models 
are reported because the results of the extended models are similar. 
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Model 5 and Model 6 reports the estimation results for the July 1993 to June 2003 and July 
2003 to June 2014 sub-samples, respectively. Although the asset growth effect is not significant 
during the first half of the study period, it is statistically significant in the later period, which 
coincides with the dramatic growth in the asset size and market capitalization of typical REITs 
(refer to Figure 2-1).   
Our cross-sectional findings are robust to alternative definitions of asset growth, such as 
adding back depreciation when calculating asset growth and scaling growth in total assets on a 
per share basis, and accounting for growth through capital investments (acquisitions) only. The 
results are also robust to deleting observations with negative values of ASSET_G.14  
2.4 Decomposition Analysis of Asset Growth 
So far, the growth rate of total assets is observed to have an adverse effect on REIT returns 
over the longer 3-year investment horizon. This section decomposes the growth rate of total 
assets by the different components of assets held by the individual REITs (the left-hand side of 
the balance sheet) as well as by how the asset growth was financed (the right-hand side of the 
balance sheet). The decomposition analysis seeks to provide a better understanding on the 
various channels influencing the negative relationship between asset growth rate and future 
stock performance.  
On the asset investment side, the year-on-year growth rate in total assets (ASSET_G) can 
be decomposed into growth in real estate assets (RE_G) and growth in non-real estate assets 
(NONRE_G):  
                                                     
14 For brevity, the results of these additional cross-sectional regressions are not reported. They are however available 
upon request from the authors.  
Chapter 2                                                     Asset Growth and Stock Performance 
37 
 
 ܣܵܵܧܶ_ܩ ൌ ܴܧ_ܩ ൅ ܱܴܰܰܧ_ܩ                            (4) 
Non-real estate assets consist of intangibles and current assets, such as cash and receivables. 
With respect to liabilities, REITs can finance asset growth by taking on more debt (DEBT_G), 
by expanding their equity base through retained earnings or secondary equity offerings 
(EQUITY_G), by increasing minority interests (MINORITY_G), or by a combination of the 
above. Minority interests represent non-controlling interests in consolidated subsidiaries and in 
consolidated operating partnerships in which the units can be converted into equity, which is 
applicable for UPREITs or DOWNREITs acquiring/deposing assets. 15  Accordingly, asset 
growth can thus be decomposed as follows:   
ܣܵܵܧܶ_ܩ ൌ ܦܧܤܶ_ܩ ൅ ܧܷܳܫܻܶ_ܩ ൅ ܯܫܱܴܰܫܻܶ_ܩ                 (5) 
The year-on-year growth in the individual components on both the right- and left-hand side of 
the balance sheet is defined as the change in their reported value from end of fiscal year t-2 to 
end of year t-1, scaled by the total assets of the REIT at end of year t-2. This allows ASSET_G 
to be specified as a linear combination of the year-on-year change in RE_G and NONRE_G on 
the investment side, and as a linear combination of year-on-year change in DEBT_G, 
EQUITY_G and MINORITY_G on the financing side.   
  Table 2-7 presents the descriptive statistics of the year-on-year growth of the various 
components of asset growth. As reported earlier in Table 2-1, the average year-on-year growth 
rate of total assets (ASSET_G) is 16.5%. On the asset investment side, this can be attributed to 
                                                     
15 In an UPREIT structure, property owners contribute their properties to an "umbrella partnership" in exchange for 
operating-partnership units. The operating-partnership units are the economic equivalent of the shares in a REIT 
itself. A DOWNREIT structure, on the other hand, is an expansion of an existing REIT or operating partnership by 
forming a new partnership. A REIT can have several DOWNREITs partners. See Singer (1996) for a detailed 
discussion on the UPREIT and DOWNREIT structures. 
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Table 2-7  Decomposition of Asset Growth Rates 
This table presents descriptive statistics for growth of various components of the balance sheet. The variables are updated at end of June of year t using accounting information on changes in an 
item from end of year t-2 to end of year t-1 scaled by total assets at end of year t-2. The variables have been winsorized at 1% and 99% percentiles. 
 
  Mean Median Min Max Std. Dev. Obs. 
        
ASSET_G Year-on-year change in total assets scaled by total assets  0.165 0.059 -0.366 2.273 0.364 2,806
Asset Investment        
RE_G Year-on-year change in real estate assets scaled by total assets 0.1450 0.0488 -0.4490 1.7740 0.3140 2,806
NONRE_G Year-on-year change in non-real estate assets scaled by total assets 0.0170 0.0051 -0.3420 0.7360 0.1080 2,806
Asset Financing        
DEBT_G Year-on-year change in total debt scaled by total assets 0.0922 0.0386 -0.3540 1.1650 0.2140 2,806
EQUITY_G Year-on-year change in equity capital scaled by total assets  0.0639 0.0108 -0.2350 1.1110 0.1770 2,806
MINORITY_G Year-on-year change in minority interests scaled by total assets 0.0054 0.0000 -0.0458 0.1780 0.0287 2,806
Debt Structure         
STDBT_G Year-on-year change in short-term debt scaled by total assets 0.0062 0.0006 -0.2280 0.2820 0.0701 2,030
LTDBT_G Year-on-year change in long-term debt scaled by total assets 0.0761 0.0322 -0.3510 0.9960 0.1920 2,806
SECDBT_G Year-on-year change in secured debt scaled by total assets 0.0469 0.0008 -0.3280 0.8440 0.1590 2,675
USECDBT_G Year-on-year change in unsecured debt scaled by total assets 0.0286 0.0016 -0.2680 0.4640 0.1050 1,921
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Table 2-8  A Decomposing Analysis of Asset Growth  
This table shows the average slopes and t-stats from monthly cross-section regressions on stock returns from July 1993 to June 2014 by substituting ASSET_G with various components of the 
balance sheet. Growth in total assets is decomposed into investment components (Panel A) and financing components (Panel B). Definitions of the variables are provided in Table 2-7. In each 
model, the components sum up to ASSET_G. The dependent variable in models 7A, 8A, 9A and 10A is the 12-month stock returns in year t to year t+1, while the dependent variable in models 7B, 
8B, 9B and 10B is the 36-month stock returns from year t to t+3. Though unreported, LNMV, BM, BHRET6, BHRET36, PROFITABILITY, ACCRUALS, and ISSUANCE have been controlled in 
all models. The variables are updated at end of June of year t using accounting information on changes in an item from end of year t-2 to end of year t-1 scaled by total assets at end of year t-2. 
The t-stats for the average regression slopes are reported in parenthesis.  
 
Panel A. Decomposition by Asset Investment Growth       
Model RE_G NONRE_G       Constant AVG_R2 
7A 0.0168 -0.164       0.176*** 0.166 
 (0.467) (-1.245)       (4.245)  
7B -0.116 -0.441**       0.421*** 0.147 
 (-1.462) (-2.264)       (3.421)  
           
  
Non-Real Estate Asset Decomposition 
Model RE_G  CASH_G OCURASSET_G OASSET_G    Constant AVG_R2 
A 0.0450  -0.0487 -0.378 -0.772*    0.181*** 0.204 
 (1.030)  (-0.297) (-0.876) (-1.767)    (4.520)  
B -0.0247  -0.253 -1.425* -1.295    0.447*** 0.169 
 (-0.288)  (-0.856) (-1.869) (-1.332)    (3.526)  
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Panel B. Decomposition by Asset Financing Growth       
Model  EQUITY_G MINORITY_G DEBT_G STDEBT_G LTDEBT_G SECDBT_G USECDBT_G NIBL_G Constant AVG_R2 
8A 0.125 -0.362 -0.110**      0.191*** 0.166 
 (1.228) (-0.507) (-2.110)      (4.872)  
8B 0.185 -2.605 -0.259***      0.471*** 0.146 
 (0.797) (-0.829) (-3.508)      (3.715)  
9A 0.110 -0.164  -0.205 -0.124*   -0.324 0.193*** 0.234 
 (1.015) (-0.255)  (-1.591) (-2.077)   (-1.572) (5.052)  
9B -0.0771 -1.998  -0.037 -0.322***   -0.552* 0.474*** 0.197 
 (-0.319) (-0.599)  (-0.164) (-4.058)   (-1.882) (3.978)  
10A 0.0203 -0.492    -0.110 -0.177** -0.363 0.194*** 0.234 
 (0.184) (-0.876)    (-1.384) (-2.192) (-1.638) (5.446)  
10B -0.011 -1.502    -0.302** -0.271 -0.339 0.465*** 0.208 





Model DEBT_G PEQUITY_G CEQUITY_G STOCKFNC_G RETAIN_G MINORITY_G Constant AVG_R2 
Equity  
decomposition 
A -0.108** 0.0844 0.0944   -0.259 0.188*** 0.171 
 (-2.104) (0.258) (0.942)   (-0.369) (4.705)  
 B -0.264*** 0.559 0.191   -2.737 0.473*** 0.15 
  (-3.495) (0.779) (0.85)   (-0.848) (3.735)  
Common equity  
decomposition 
A -0.107* -0.0395  0.0787 0.0492 -0.205 0.186*** 0.178 
 (-2.064) (-0.135)  (0.863) (0.304) (-0.327) (4.608)  
 B -0.277*** 0.457  0.0981 0.271 -2.999 0.468*** 0.158 
  (-3.837) (0.564)  (0.418) (0.563) (-0.89) (3.739)  
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14.5% growth in real estate assets (RE_G) and 1.7% growth in non-real estate assets 
(NONRE_G). As expected, REIT growth is driven primarily by expansions in their real estate 
holdings. On the asset financing side, changes in outstanding debt is the largest growth 
component, constituting 57.1% of the asset growth rate of REITs. Changes in equity capital and 
minority interests formed 39.6% and 3.3% of the asset growth rate recorded by REITs, 
respectively. 
  To examine how each of the growth constituents impact performance, this part estimates 
the Fama-MacBeth regressions of REIT stock returns on each of the lagged components of 
asset growth while controlling for the effects of firm size, B/M ratio, and momentum.16 The 
results are reported in Table 2-8. The dependent variable for regression models 7A, 8A, 9A and 
10A is 12-month stock returns, whereas for models 7B, 8B, 9B and 10B is 36-month stock 
returns, respectively.  
Consistent with our earlier findings, the effect of growth on return performance is stronger 
over the longer horizon of 36 months. On the asset investment side, Model 7B shows that stock 
market reacts differently towards year-on-year change in real estate assets (RE_G) and change 
in non-real estate assets (NONRE_G) held by REITs. While the coefficient for NONRE_G is 
negative and statistically significant (t-statistics=-2.26), the effect of RE_G on future stock 
returns is insignificant. A Wald test confirms that the regression coefficients for RE_G and 
NONRE_G are significantly different at 5%, which appears to be consistent with the hypothesis 
that the asset growth effect is weaker for more transparent assets. Changes in non-real estate 
                                                     
16 We also expanded the regression models to include more explanatory variables, namely ROA, ACCRUALS and 
ISSUANCE as we have done earlier in Table 5. As the results of the expanded models yield the same conclusions, 
Table 8 only presents results for the base regression models.  
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assets can be broken down into changes in cash, changes in current assets and changes in other 
assets. Further analysis shows that the significant negative relationship between NONRE_G and 
future stock returns is attributable mainly to growth in other assets or current assets, but not 
growth in cash. 
The insignificant relationship between RE_G and future stock performance in Table 2-8 is, 
nevertheless, inconsistent with CGS’s (2008) finding of a negative coefficient for Property, 
Plant and Equipment. To reconcile the conflicting results, note that our study covers REITs 
which specialize in real estate ownership while CGS’s sample comprises general firms which 
do not have any specialty skills on real estate investment and management. This suggests that 
firms which expand out their core areas are penalized. 
On the asset financing side, the regression results of Model 8A and Model 8B indicate that 
growth in equity capital (EQUITY_G) and growth in minority interests (MINORITY_G) cannot 
predict future return performance.17 To probe deeper, this study then examines whether growth 
in common equity has the same effect as growth in preferred equity. In addition, this study also 
decompose growth in common equity into growth in common stock and growth in retained 
earnings. Overall, the coefficient estimations of the various equity components are shown to be 
insignificant.18 These results indicate that the adverse effect of asset growth on future REIT 
performance is not driven by growth in equity capital. Neither does the market differentiate 
between the alternative channels of equity expansion, namely preferred equity issues, new 
                                                     
17 This is inconsistent with Loughran and Ritter (1995)’s finding of firms’ long-run negative returns following 
secondary equity offerings (SEOs). 
18 To verify the insignificant results, we employ another proxy for equity offerings, namely Daniel and Titman’s 
issuance variable. The results are consistent.  
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common equity issues, or retained earnings.  
The regression results reported in Table 2-8 do show that REITs which fund growth by 
employing more debt in their capital structure are associated with negative stock performance 
over the next 12 to 36 months. Specifically, the estimated coefficient on growth in total debt 
(DEBT_G) is negative and statistically significant in models 8A and 8B. Our results are 
consistent with prior studies on the long-run underperformance associated with debt offerings.19 
To investigate further, growth in total debt (DEBT_G) is partitioned by their debt maturity and 
seniority structure. In Model 9A and Model 9B, DEBT_G is replaced by year-on-year change 
in short-term debt (STDEBT_G) and year-on-year change in long-term debt (LTDEBT_G). 
Short-term debt refers to loans due within one-year. In Model 10A and Model 10B, DEBT_G 
is replaced by the year-on-year change in secured (SECDEBT_G) and year-on-year change in 
unsecured debt (UNSECDEBT_G). To complete the identity on total debt, growth in non-
interest bearing debt (NIBL_G) is included in the decomposed models.  
The descriptive statistics reported in Table 2-7 indicate that secured debt of REITs grew 
by 4.69% annually, as compared to 2.86% for unsecured debt. Over the same period, long-term 
debt grew 7.61% annually versus 0.62% annually for short-term debt. The regression results in 
Model 9 and Model 10 show that the observed negative relationship between lagged asset 
growth and subsequent REIT returns appears to be associated primarily with the issuance of 
long-term unsecured debt. Overall, the results suggest that the provision of collateral associated 
with secured debt and the refinancing frequency associated with short-term loans are effective 
                                                     
19 See Spiess and Affleck-Graves (1999) and Higgins, Howton and Howton (2004) for evidence of long run 
underperformance of debt offerings by general firms and REITs, respectively. 
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in restricting REIT managers from engaging in sub-optimal investment activities. Growth in 
equity capital and its constituent, namely preferred equity, common stock as well as retained 
earnings, however are unable to predict future stock price performance. 
2.5 Conclusions  
This paper examines the effects of asset growth on stock returns for 309 publicly listed 
equity REITs from 1993 to 2013. When asset growth is measured by each REIT’s year-on-year 
percentage change in total assets, both the univariate results and the multivariate cross-sectional 
regression models show that REIT “hares” tend to underperform REIT “tortoises” over a longer 
horizon. The negative relationship between asset growth rate and future return performance is 
robust to adjusting for firm size and risk. Analyzing the effect of asset growth rate during the 
“crisis” periods, this study finds no evidence that REITs which adopted a “contrarian” 
investment strategy (by acquiring assets aggressively) during crisis periods produced superior 
returns over the next one- to three-year investment horizons. Nevertheless, the asset growth 
effect is weaker in the REIT market than in general equity markets as reported in prior studies.  
This muted asset growth effect in the REIT market can be attributed to the stricter regulatory 
environment in which REITs operate.  
To isolate the channels driving the relationship between asset growth and return 
performance, this study further decomposes REIT asset growth into its major components from 
both the left-hand (investment) side and right-hand (liability) side of the balance sheet. Not 
surprisingly, REIT growth is driven primarily by the expansion of real estate holdings (89.5%). 
The growth in financial liabilities is primarily attributable to additional debt (57.1%) and equity 
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(39.6%) capital and, to a smaller extent, changes in minority interests (3.3%).  
On the asset side of the balance sheet, the rate of growth in real estate holdings does not 
appear to significantly affect future return performance. The negative asset growth effect 
instead appears to be driven by growth in the non-real estate assets of typical REITs. This is 
consistent with the notion that firms that grow outside of their competency areas are penalized 
by the market.  
On the liability side of the balance sheet, the negative asset growth effect is not driven by 
growth in firm equity. Moreover, the market does not appear to differentiate between alternative 
channels of equity expansion, namely preferred equity issues, new common equity issues, or 
retained earnings. The evidence instead shows that REITs which fund their asset expansion 
activities by employing more debt in their capital structure are associated with negative stock 
performance over the next 12 to 36 months. Further analysis suggests that the observed negative 
relationship between lagged growth rate and REIT stock returns appears to be associated 
primarily with the issuance of long-term unsecured debt to fund the asset growth. This is 
consistent with the agency cost of debt stories in which the provision of collateral associated 
with secured debt and the refinancing frequency associated with short-term loans restrict 
managers and shareholders from engaging in sub-optimal investment activities.
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Chapter 3    Good Growth, Bad Growth: How Effective are the Corporate 
Watchdogs?  
3.1 Introduction 
Chapter 2 shows that, given the unique regulatory environment of the REIT industry, the “asset 
growth anomaly” was much weaker in REITs. This chapter proceeds to evaluate the growth 
decisions of REITs and explore the determinants of good (bad) growth. 
Numerous theories have been deployed to explain why managers like to pursue corporate 
growth. “Economy of scale”, which is a commonly cited reason to justify corporate growth,  
prescribes that as a firm increases in size its average operating cost would decrease because the 
firm’s fixed costs are spread over a larger base. Another popular reason why growth is favored 
by managers is the belief that growth firms can secure cheaper funding due to lower borrowing 
costs (from better credit ratings) and better stock valuation (from higher price multiples). This 
can trigger a chain reaction of continuous growth whereby fast growing firms can raise more 
capital to pursue even more growth. Another reason is the misconception that growth is often 
associated with winning (and which manager does not like to be a winner). But this may not 
always be true as illustrated by the following pledge made by Jim Cantalupo, former CEO of 
McDonald’s, to turnaround the fast-food company’s earnings decline in 2003, “McDonald’s no 
longer wanted to be bigger than anybody else, just better”. 20   
The results of many empirical studies have shown that corporate growth does not always 
                                                     
20 Source:(Economist, 2003). On the back of registering its first-ever losses in 2003 and its share priced neared a 
10-year low, McDonald’s finally admitted that the company’s accelerated rate of restaurant openings and advertising 
spending have eroded profits and did not benefit their shareholders. 
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lead to improved firm efficiency or increased shareholders wealth. Contrary to the notion that 
“big is good”, the literature on asset pricing find that larger-sized firms tend to earn lower risk-
adjusted rates of return (Banz, 1981; Reinganum, 1981). In addition, the insignificant (or even 
negative) reaction of stock prices to announcements of corporate acquisitions is inconsistent 
with the view that growth is beneficial to shareholders (Moeller et al., 2005). Conversely, the 
positive stock price reaction to news of corporate sell-offs suggest some benefits associated 
with firm size shrinkage (Jain, 1985; John and Ofek, 1995; Rosenfeld, 1984). Furthermore, a 
stream of studies in the finance literature recently uncovers a significant negative relation 
between asset growth and average returns of stocks (Gray and Johnson, 2011; Yao et al., 2011). 
Capital investments, sale growth rates, and fund raising are also observed to be negatively 
correlated with future returns (Fama and French, 2008; Lipson et al., 2011). Observing that the 
negative asset growth effect is weaker in times of increased corporate oversight, Cooper et al. 
(2008) posit that “the asset growth effect arises in part from managerial overinvestment and 
related investor under-appreciation of managerial empire building.” 
While REITs are considered more transparent investment vehicles, the decision to grow is 
still under the discretion of its management. Arising from the separation of management from 
the ownership of a firm, the agency theory argues that managers do not always act in the best 
interest of the owners (Jensen and Meckling, 1976a). Self-serving managers are instead prone 
to overinvestment and “empire building”, that is, they are inclined to undertake new projects 
with the aim of expanding the resources under their control; thereby, increasing their 
remuneration, power base, and reputation (Jensen, 1986; Murphy, 1985). Managers may also 
be motivated to invest in pet projects that require their special knowledge; thereby, entrenching 
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their positions and making themselves difficult to be replaced (Shleifer and Vishny, 1989). The 
free rider problem faced by small and poorly-informed shareholders and the inability to design 
a perfect contract that covers all contingencies are two key reasons why managers could 
continue to exploit these sub-optimal opportunities.21 To address the moral hazard problem, 
various governance mechanisms have been designed and implemented with the hope of 
monitoring managers’ behavior and aligning the managers’ interest to the shareholders. While 
prior studies have employed cross-sectional or panel regressions to establish relationships 
between various corporate governance measures and corporate performance (using various 
performance metrics, such as accounting returns, stock returns, or firm valuation), little 
attention is paid on identifying causality. The literature on determinants of good and bad 
corporate growth is sparse.22  
This study focuses on the marginal asset expansion of firms to establish a clearer channel 
of causality between delegated monitoring and the firms’ propensity to engage in “bad” growth. 
The research connects two strands of literature, namely scale efficiency in the context of 
corporate growth, and the role of delegated monitoring in the context of corporate governance. 
Specifically, this study tests whether managers’ propensity to engage in sub-optimal growth 
decisions is suppressed, if any, under the watchful eyes of three groups of corporate watchdogs, 
                                                     
21 Shleifer and Vishny (1989) argue that most future contingencies are hard to describe and foresee, and hence, 
complete contracts are technologically infeasible. Consequently, the managers are allocated residual control rights, 
namely the rights to make decisions in circumstances not fully foreseen by the contract.   
22 There are some studies examining the determinants of wealth effect of acquisition announcements, but acquisition 
is only one aspect of firm growth. Early studies on firm growth tend to focus on substantiating or disproving the 
Gibrat’s law, which states that the growth rate of a firm is independent of its size. Evans (1987) finds that smaller 
firms grow faster than their larger counterparts. He concludes that firm growth is not independent of firm size, which 
is inconsistent with the Gibrat’s law. 
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namely independent directors, external creditors, and institutional investors. The main thesis is 
that self-serving managers may be deterred from pursuing value-destroying growth if their 
actions are monitored closely. 
Tracking the growth of a sample of 176 US equity REITs since their IPO, Figure 3-1 shows 
that the average size of a REIT has increased from $300 million in 1992 (inflation-adjusted) to 
around $5.0 billion in 2012.23 This represents a real compound annual growth rate 
(CAGR) of 14.0% over the 20-year period.24 The rapid expansion provides a rich sampling 
of both “good” and “bad” growth of firms operating in the same sector over varying market 
conditions. Prior studies on REITs’ economies of scale have largely focused on data in the 1990s. 
For example, the most recent study by Ambrose et al. (2005) employed data from 1990 to 2001. 
Noticeably, the market capitalization of equity REITs has nearly doubled from around $300 
billion in the late 1990s to around $600 billion in 2012 (see Figure 3-1). Given that Noulas, 
Ray and Miller (1990) and Ambrose et al. (2000) have argued that scale economies exist only 
for smaller banks and REITs, it is not clear whether REITs in the modern era still enjoy 
economies of scale. 
                                                     
23 This chapter uses a sample of REITs that went public after the modern REITs era. This design allows us to evaluate 
the growth of REITs since they were born and mitigates the influence of some old REITs in the evaluation of growth. 
This is not a selection bias, because this chapter targets at a life-span evaluation on the growth of modern REITs. 
Growth has been inflation adjusted to 2012 USD because panel analysis are used in this Chapter.   
24 The 14.0% inflation-adjusted growth rate is comparable to the 16.5% non-inflation-adjusted average growth rate 
in Chapter 2. 
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Figure 3-1  Tracking the growth of REITs 
This figure tracks the growth of a sample of 176 US equity REITs since their IPO during 1992 to 2012. The average 
and the mean of total asset size for the sample REITs are plotted in lines against y1-axis.  Total market capitalization 
of this sample are plotted in bars against y2-axis. The values are reported in billions and have been inflation adjusted 





From the corporate governance perspective, the institutional characteristics of REIT sector also 
create an interesting setting to study the role of delegated monitoring. On the one hand, REITs 
are more transparent because they are subjected to stricter codes of disclosure and financial 
reporting. This may reduce the manager’s proclivity for investing in assets that destroy 
shareholders value (Berger and Ofek, 1995; Hope and Thomas, 2008).25 On the other hand, 
hostile takeovers, even of poorly performing companies, are rare in the case of REITs 
                                                     
25  Berger and Ofek (1995) document a positive association between disclosure level and benefits from 
diversification, and attribute the result to the monitoring effect of disclosure, concluding that greater firm disclosure 
reduces management’s proclivity for investing in assets that destroy shareholders value. Meanwhile, Hope and 
Thomas (2008) study a sample of multi-national corporations and show that firms without geographic earnings 
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(Campbell et al., 2001; Ghosh and Sirmans, 2003; Hartzell, Sun and Titman, 2006). In the 
absence of a takeover threat, corporate “watchdogs” play a more crucial role in monitoring 
managers’ behavior. Parallel to this argument is the increased popularity of REIT as an 
investment vehicle amongst institutional investors.26 Figure 3-2 shows that the ownership of 
publicly traded REITs by institutional investors has increased from around 50% between 1994 
and 2001 to around 80% recently.27 By virtue of their large shareholdings, expertise, and better 
information, institutional investors play an especially important role in monitoring and 
disciplining the managers. Ling and Ryngaert (1997), for example, argue that the dramatic 
increased ownership of institutional investors (from below 10% before 1990 to 41.7% in the 
early 1990s), who are presumably better informed than retail investors, affected the pricing of 
IPO REIT shares in the post 1990 era. Besides institutional investors, the study also examine 
the effectiveness of independent directors, external creditors  
 
                                                     
26 The increased in popularity can be attributed to a relaxation in the legislation on ownership. Before 1993, 
companies were required to meet two basic ownership rules in order to qualify for REIT designation, namely the 
“100 Shareholder Rule” and the “5/50 Rule”. The “100 Shareholder Rule” stipulated that a REIT company must be 
owned by 100 or more shareholders, while the “5/50 Rule” maintained that 5 or fewer individuals cannot own more 
than 50 percent of the stocks of a REIT company. The 5/50 rule, in particular, made REIT securities unattractive to 
institutional investors, such as pension funds because a pension fund was treated as an individual investor relative 
to the 5/50 rule. With the passage of the 1993 Revenue Reconciliation Act, the 5/50 rule was altered. Instead of 
counting a pension fund as a single investor, beneficiaries of the pension fund are now counted as individual investors 
(Anoruo and Braha, 2010). 
27 Several authors have recorded the dramatic increase in institutional holdings of REITs. Chan and Leung (1998) 
note that institutional ownership of REIT securities rose from 12%-14% between 1986 and 1992 to 30% in 1995. 
Ghosh, Nag and Sirmans (1997) attribute the rapid growth of REITs in the early 1990s to the increasing involvement 
of institutional investors. Below, Stansell and Coffin (2000) also observe that institutional investors prefer to invest 
in larger REITs. They also like low beta REITs in the pre-boom period and high beta REITs in the boom and post-
boom periods. More recently, Devos et al. (2013) observe that during the financial crisis, institutional investors tend 
to gravitate towards REITs with higher turnover, whereas after the crisis, institutional investors seem to be attracted 
to larger REITs with lower beta, lower individual risk, and lower turnover. 
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Figure 3-2  Growth of institutional ownership in equity REITs  
This figure plots the change in institutional ownership in equity REITs from 1992 to 2012. Data on institutional 
ownership is from Thompson Financials. To mitigate the influence of outliers, the data has been winsorzized at 1% 
and 99%.  
 
 
in curbing REITs from undertaking “bad” growth. 
This study tracks and analyze the growth of 176 REITs from 1992 to 2012 since their IPO. 
Following the literature on scale efficiency, “bad” growth is defined as year-on-year expansions 
in total assets that lead to the individual firms operating at decreasing returns to scale. By this 
definition, 44.5% of the corporate growth registered by REITs over the sample period were 
detrimental. The high incidents of growth that lead to diseconomies of scale emphasize the 
importance of examining the effectiveness of monitoring by corporate watchdogs.28 It also 
underlines the view that it is hard to achieve economies of scale for property holdings, 
particularly through geographical diversification, because of the heterogeneity and spatial 
                                                     
28 Although the moral hazard issue presumes that managers take advantage of their position at the expense of the 
shareholders, this study does not differentiate poor growths due to managerial opportunism from poor growths due 
to managerial incompetence. Arguably, the role of monitoring is also valid in reducing poor decisions due to 





















































Chapter3                                                               Corporate Watchdogs 
53 
 
dependence of real estate assets (Campbell et al., 2001). The closest study to ours is by Hartzell 
et al. (2006), who investigate the relation between various governance mechanisms and 
investment expenditures of REITs. Examining the issue from a broader angle, the current study 
includes both growth through external acquisition and organic growth, which tend to be slower 
but more sustainable.29 The sample coverage is extended to include corporate contractions 
because management discretion with respect to firm size is not confined to buying new assets 
only, but also in the selling of existing assets. Third, the study period is longer and includes the 
most recent financial crisis. 
The regression results show a negative relation between the level as well as changes in the 
level of institutional ownership in the current period and the likelihood of REIT managers 
engaging in “bad” growth in the next period. This implies that REIT managers are less likely 
to undertake value-destroying growth when there is an increased level of ownership by 
institutional investors, which is consistent with the hypothesis that institutional investors play 
an effective role in monitoring and disciplining managers from misbehaving. However, there is 
limited evidence on the effectiveness of independent directors and external creditors in reducing 
the probability of firms engaging in “bad” growth. The results are not sensitive to the inclusion 
of an extensive set of control variables, to alternative strategies of identifying detrimental 
growth, and to other robustness checks. 
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 discusses the hypotheses and 
                                                     
29 Hartzell et al. (2006) focus on corporate expansions that are smaller than 100%, which are more likely to be 
organic growth, this study has examined both the slow organic growth and growth that are larger than 100%, which 
are possibly associated with external acquisitions. Aside from being large and visible, acquisition decisions have the 
potential for wide disparity between shareholder and manager interests (Chen, Harford and Li, 2007) 
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research design adopted to test the hypotheses. Section 3.3 describes the data. Section 3.4 
carries several tests on the effectiveness of the watchdogs in monitoring REIT managers and 
steering the company in the right direction. Section 3.5 conducts a few additional robustness 
checks. Section 3.6 concludes. 
3.2 Hypotheses and Research Design  
3.2.1 Research Hypotheses  
The agency cost theory predicts that managers, when not monitored, make self-maximizing 
decisions, such as aggressively growing the firm which reduces profitability and destroys firm 
value (Hope and Thomas, 2008). This chapter examines whether REIT managers’ propensity 
to engage in bad growth is restrained under the watchful eyes of three different corporate 
watchdogs,30 namely the independent directors, the external bankers, and the institutional 
investors.  
On the role of independent directors, Fama (1980) argues that outside board members can 
monitor management on behalf of shareholders more effectively because of their independence. 
Fama and Jensen (1983) added that outside directors have incentive to watch over the 
management to protect their reputation. It is thus not surprising that Corporate America has 
trended towards more board representation by independent directors. Indeed, Rosenstein (1990) 
observes a positive stock price reaction to the appointment of outside directors, which is 
consistent with the market’s preference for greater board independence. On the announcement 
                                                     
30 The term “watchdogs” is adopted from Bhagat and Black (1999) who, in questioning the effectiveness of 
independent directors, described them as “lapdogs”. 
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effects of corporate acquisitions, Byrd and Hickman (1992) observe that bidders with majority-
independent boards earn higher stock price returns as compared to bidders without such boards, 
which they posit may have ended up paying higher takeover premium. Friday and Sirmans 
(1998) suggest that the presence of independent directors can increase firm performance up to 
a point, and that too much outsider representation is discounted by the market.  
The use of debt financing by the REITs may also induce monitoring by lenders. Maloney, 
Mccormick and Mitchell (1993) argue that the necessity of making periodic, legally mandated, 
unalterable payments to creditors disciplines managers to take extra care in their decision 
making. Furthermore, by pre-committing the firm to pay out its free cash flows, debt constrains 
the amount of funds available for managerial opportunism (Jensen, 1986; Stulz, 1990). The 
close monitoring of lenders as well as the threat of bankruptcy associate with debt usage create 
an incentive for managers to work harder, consume fewer perquisites and make better decisions 
(Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996; Harris and Raviv, 1990; Jung, Kim and Stulz, 1996) 
Institutional investors, who are substantial shareholders of the firms, arguably will be more 
willing to engage in shareholder activism, either by voicing their dissatisfaction over bad firm 
performance, or by pressuring the ouster of poorly performing CEOs, or by selling their shares 
when they are dissatisfied (Gillan and Starks, 2003; Mccahery, Sautner and Starks, 2010). The 
empirical evidence largely supports the monitoring hypothesis of institutional investors 
(Hartzell et al., 2006; Mcconnell and Servaes, 1990). Discounting the possibility that 
institutional investors are merely good at picking good firms to invest, Aggarwal et al. (2011) 
observe that while changes in institutional ownership over time drive subsequent changes in 
firm-level governance, the opposite does not hold. Since the direction of the effect flows from 
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institutional ownership to subsequent changes in governance, and not from governance to 
institutional ownership, they conclude that institutional investors play an active role in firms’ 
governance. 
The effectiveness of the corporate watchdogs has also been questioned. In general, the 
literature identifies three characteristics that are essential for an effective corporate watchdog: 
(1) free of conflict, (2) hold large stake, and (3) have longer horizon (Coffee, 1991; Shleifer 
and Vishny, 1997). On the issue of conflict of interests, Harris and Raviv (1990) argue that 
banks, instead of disciplining managers, have incentive to cater to them to get more businesses 
(provided the firms are far away from defaulting). Pound (1988) similarly proposes that due to 
strategic alignment, institutional investors may also vote with the management to maintain 
other business relationship with the firm.31  The effectiveness of independent directors to 
restrain CEOs’ tendency to build corporate empire has also been challenged by several authors, 
such as Agrawal and Knoeber (1996), Subrahmanyam, Rangan and Rosenstein (1997), and 
Bhagat and Black (1999), who observed a negative relationship between percentage of outside 
board members and firm performance. 
3.2.2 Empirical Models  
To examine the effectiveness of monitoring by independent directors, external creditors, and 
institutional investors, the main empirical strategy involves estimating a multivariate probit 
                                                     
31 Examples of strategic alignment may include the institutional investors having insurance contracts with the firm, 
or running pension funds for the firm’s employees, or providing personal wealth management for some managers of 
the firm. 
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regression model conditioned on the probability of the firms pursuing bad growth.32 The 
specification of the probit model is as follows:  
	ܲݎ൫ܤܣܦ_ܩܴܱܹܶܪሺ௧,௧ାଵሻ ൌ 1หܺ൯ ൌ ߔሺܥ ൅ ࡮૚࢝ࢇ࢚ࢉࢎࢊ࢕ࢍ࢙࢚ ൅	࡮૛ࢉ࢕࢔࢚࢘࢕࢒࢙࢚ሻ    (1) 
The dependent variable is a binary variable equivalent to 1 for bad growth and 0 otherwise. The 
three key explanatory variables in the model are the number of independent directors (scaled 
by the total number of directors), the debt ratio of the individual firms, and the percentage of 
outstanding shares owned by institutional investors. They represent the level of monitoring by 
outside directors, external creditors and institutional investors, respectively. Information on 
independent directors is extracted from the firms’ periodic Proxy Statements, which is a 
requirement for listing on the NYSE or NASDAQ, while information on institutional ownership 
is obtained from Thompson Financial. Debt ratio is represented by the book value of total debt 
divided by the book value of total assets.33 To establish causality, the watchdogs has also been 
tested in its log differences (∆࢝ࢇ࢚ࢉࢎࢊ࢕ࢍ࢙ሺ࢚ି૚,࢚ሻሻ. In other words, this study measures the 
relationship between the change in the level of monitoring by the watchdogs from year t-1 to 
year t, and the likelihood of the company engaging in bad growth during the year t and t+1.  
A number of studies have also evaluated the relationship between corporate performance 
and various aspects of board composition, such as size of the board (Coles, Daniel and Naveen, 
2008; Dalton et al., 1999; Eisenberg, Sundgren and Wells, 1998; Yermack, 1996), and duality 
of CEO as the Chairman of the Board (Finkelstein and D'aveni, 1994; Rechner and Dalton, 
                                                     
32 We also ran the regressions in logit model and the estimation results hold.   
33 The book-value of total debt is used because the market-value measure gives too much importance to recent 
changes in equity, see Lang et al. (1996). The conclusion nevertheless holds when a market-value measure of 
leverage is employed. 
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1991). The following corporate governance variables are included in the regression models: 
insider ownership, 34  block ownership, 35  board size, 36  CEO compensation, 37  and CEO 
duality38 in the regression models. Insider ownership is proxied by the amount of shares owned 
by the REIT manager and directors, while block ownership is represented by the amount of 
shares owned by shareholders with more than 5% holdings. Board size refers to the total number 
of directors on board, while compensation structure refers to the proportion of CEO 
                                                     
34 While high insider ownership implies a better alignment of interests between the managers and shareholders, it 
could also lead to managerial entrenchment. For example, Hartzell et al. (2006) observe that high insider ownership 
allows REIT managers to pursue their own investment agenda.  In an un-reported regression, we have tested the 
potential non-linearity of insider ownership by adding a square term to the model. The test results for non-linearity 
were insignificant. 
35 The basic premise is that a substantial shareholder has more incentive to collect information and monitor the 
management, thereby avoiding the traditional free-rider problem. Friday and Sirmans (1999) however find no 
support for monitoring benefits by outside block-holders. Ghosh and Sirmans (2003) also find that block-ownership 
has a negative impact on the ROE of REITs. An explanation is offered by Shleifer and Vishny (1997) who posit that 
large investors may abuse their power. 
36 The evidence on the relationship between board size and corporate performance is mixed. Goodstein, Gautam 
and Boeker (1994) argue that boards, by becoming larger and more diverse, help to link their organization to their 
external environment; thus, obtaining prestige and legitimacy. Yermack (1996), on the other hand, argues that large 
boards may be less cohesive and more difficult to coordinate, and are more susceptible to be controlled by the CEO, 
see also He and Huang (2011). 
37 Incentive contracts, in the form of bonuses, share ownership, stock options, or a threat of dismissal if income is 
low, can induce the managers to act in the interest of the shareholders. According to Bizjak, Brickley and Coles 
(1993), firms with high or persistent informational asymmetries will tend to favor contracts that focus on long-run 
stock returns. When long-term compensation is high, REIT shareholders tend to demand less dividend payout, see 
Ghosh and Sirmans (2006). Shleifer and Vishny (1997), however, highlighted that incentive contracts also create 
enormous opportunities for self-dealing for the managers, especially if the contracts are negotiated with poorly 
motivated boards of directors. In support, Denis, Hanouna and Sarin (2006) report a significant positive association 
between the likelihood of securities fraud allegations and a measure of executive stock option incentives.  
38 Finkelstein and D'aveni (1994) argues that CEO duality may have both negative and positive impacts — while 
agency theory suggests that duality adds to CEO entrenchment, the organizational theory suggests that duality can 
build strong and unambiguous leadership. Empirically, Rechner and Dalton (1991) find that firms that opt for duality 
of CEO and chairman of board consistently underperform their peers. Ghosh and Sirmans (2006) also observe that 
shareholders demand higher dividend payout when the CEO of a REIT also chairs its board, which reflects their 
concern with managerial entrenchment due to the duality appointment. 
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compensation that is tied to long-term performance. CEO duality is a dummy variable, which 
equals 1 if CEO of a REIT also chairs the board of directors.  
In addition, a set of firm-specific attributes are included, namely firm size, growth rate, 
age.39 We also experimented with other firm-specific variables, such as the manager’s track 
record,40 firm’s free cash flows,41 and the property-type’s investment climate.42 Finally, a set 
of fixed effects for property sector and year is included to address concerns that the likelihood 
of engaging in bad growth might be related to property sector- and market-wide changes. 
Following the NAREIT’s classification of REITs, the set of binary variables include retail, 
health care, residential, industrial/office, diversified, lodging/resorts, and self-storage sectors. 
As noted by Ambrose et al. (2005), although all of the firms are publicly traded, most have a 
specific property focus with each sector effectively a separate industry with its own operating 
and competitive dynamics. Vogel (1997) argues that the rapid growth of REITs may not be 
attributed to the better operating efficiency of larger companies, but was a result of a host of 
external factors such as regulatory changes and growth in institutional investment during the 
                                                     
39 We have also considered the UPREIT structure and whether a REIT is registered in the Maryland state. But these 
two variables are shown to have no significant impact and are unreported. 
40 Reputation-building is a common explanation for why people deliver on their agreement even if they cannot be 
forced to, see Shleifer and Vishny (1997). In the financing context, Diamond (1989, 1991) shows how firms establish 
reputations as good borrowers by repaying their short term loans. Good performing managers may have a greater 
desire to safeguard their reputation by conducting good growth. Stock market performance (measured with excess 
return over the property sector return) is used as a proxy for management track record. 
41 Jensen (1986) free cash flow hypothesis prescribes that managers choose to reinvest the free cash rather than 
return it to investors. If this is true, managers are more likely to engage in “bad” growth with increased retained 
earnings. 
42 Tobin’s Q of the property-type reflects investment opportunities in the market sector. It is the calculated as the 
average of Tobin’s Q of firms of the same property sector. Growths are less likely to be “bad” when there is an 
increase in Tobin’s Q of the property-type. 
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period of study. In particular, a series of innovations in the real estate and capital markets drove 
the exponential growth of REITs.43  
3.2.3 Identification Strategy for Bad Growth 
In a study of such nature, the main challenge is in identifying good and bad growth. One 
identification strategy would be to examine the wealth effect of growth using stock market data. 
While the event study methodology is the standard way to examine the wealth effect of mergers 
and acquisitions, this methodology is not suitable for this study because this study is looking at 
a more general growth in total assets without knowing the exact event time.44 One might 
possibly measure stock returns over a longer period, but a wider window would introduce 
noises since a stock’s performance may be subjected to many other reasons. As the main 
identification strategy, the study appeals to the classical economic theory for a framework to 
identify “good” and “bad” growth: namely, returns to scale is increasing (decreasing) if one 
percentage increase in the inputs results in more (less) than one percentage increase in outputs. 
Scale efficiency is said to exist when an individual firm cannot reduce its average cost by either 
                                                     
43 Vogel (1997) suggested that REIT growth was not related to the better operating efficiency of larger companies, 
but was a result of a host of external factors like regulatory changes and growth in institutional investment during 
the period of study. For example, the credit crunch in the early 1990s forced heavily leveraged real estate firms to 
turn to the equity market for survival and to reconstruct their impaired balance sheet. Aided by the 1993 Revenue 
Reconciliation Act, which removed the 5/50 rule that had prevented institutional investors from actively participating 
in real estate, the IPO boom in 1993 and 1994 saw REITs gaining popularity among large investors. On the supply 
side, the UPREIT structure introduced in 1992 provided another impetus for REITs rapid expansion by offering the 
benefits of deferred capital gain tax for real estate owners who were previously reluctant to sell-off their assets. 
Innovations in the debt securitization market provided further fuel through the financing channel to feed the 
insatiable appetite of REITs to grow through mergers and acquisitions. Finally, the inclusion of Equity Residential 
REIT into the S&P 500 index in 2001 provided the formal recognition of REIT as an established investment vehicle.  
44 According to the market efficiency hypothesis, the impact of an event should be fully priced when this information 
became public. 
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increasing or decreasing its asset size. Assuming a U-shaped average cost curve, a firm is said 
to be scale efficient if it operates at the bottom of the curve. Firms located on the left side of 
the curve are said to be operating at an increasing return to scale (IRS), while those on the right 
side of the curve are operating at decreasing return to scale (DRS).  
 The story of economies of scale boils down to accounting profitability. If scale economies 
exist, REITs’ operating costs should increase at a decreasing rate and efficiency gains should 
be reflected in higher accounting returns. In other words, firm profitability should increase with 
size in the presence of scale economies (Ambrose et al., 2005). In this spirit, bad growth could 
be defined as expansions (contractions) in total assets that are accompanied with a decrease 
(increase) in the individual firms’ accounting profit, as represented by their funds from 
operations (FFO) scaled by equity capital. 45  However, a limitation in using financial 
performance is that impact of growth is often not realized immediately because some projects 
take time to be profitable. For this reason, this research does not implicitly evaluate scale 
efficiency by linking growth with accounting profitability but explicitly measuring whether a 
REIT is operating at increasing/constant/decreasing returns to scale. As a basic strategy, bad 
growth is defined as year-on-year expansions in total assets that resulted in the individual REITs 
operating at decreasing returns to scale.  
 The Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) is used to study scale efficiency.46 The DEA, 
                                                     
45 This ratio, which is similar to the widely used Return on Equity (ROE) for traditional firms, measures returns to 
shareholders’ capital after considering the effect of leverage. However, instead of using net operating income (NOI) 
as the numerator, the ratio uses FFO as it is a more suitable indicator of profitability for REITs because it excludes 
depreciation expenses of real estate assets. Unlike plants and equipment, property rarely loses value and often 
appreciates over time.  
46 Bers and Springer (1997) provide the earliest studies on the scale efficiency of REITs by estimating a translog 
cost function with a sample of REITs from year 1992 to year 1994. But this methodology fails to separate the impact 
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which is a non-parametric linear programming technique commonly used to compare the 
relative efficiency of peer groups, has been widely adopted in studies on operating efficiency 
(Andersen and Petersen, 1993; Banker, Chang and Natarajan, 2005; Cummins and Xie, 2013; 
Färe et al., 1994; Huang et al., 2011; Leibenstein and Maital, 1992; Sherman and Gold, 1985; 
Topuz et al., 2005). The DEA technique essentially involves benchmarking each of the sampled 
firms against a hypothetical best-practicing firm, which is formed by combining the attributes 
of the sample firms, i.e. an efficient frontier.47 The main premise behind the technique is that 
if one firm can produce q outputs with i inputs, then other firms must be able to do the same, 
or else they are identified as having some degree of inefficiency.48  
Pioneered by Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes (1978), the CCR model using DEA framework 
assumes that there are ݊ decision making units (DMUs), and each DMUk is producing ݏ 
categories of outputs of different amounts ݕ௥௞	ሺݎ ൌ 1,2, … , ݏሻ, using ݉ categories of inputs 
of different amounts ݔ௜௞ሺ	݅ ൌ 1,2, …݉ሻ. The hypothetical firm produces ∑ ݕ௥௝λ௝௡௝ୀଵ 	amount 
of output ݎ  (r ൌ 1,2, … , s), using ∑ ݔ௜௝λ௝௡௝ୀଵ  amount of input ݅  (݅ ൌ 1,2, … ,݉). λ௝  is a 
vector describing the weight of other sampled firms, DMUj ሺj ൌ 1,2, … , n), used to construct 
                                                     
of technical efficiency with scale efficiency. Another popular methodology to study operating efficiency is the 
stochastic frontier methodology, but it is sensitive to assumptions on its production function or cost function, or on 
the functional form or error term (Anderson et al., 2002; Miller et al., 2006). This study follows Anderson et al. 
(2002) and Topuz, Darrat and Shelor (2005) to calculate the scale efficiency of REITs using the DEA methodology 
due to its ease of applicability. DEA can separately study scale efficiency and technical efficiency. The advantage of 
DEA also lies in that it does not need to assume a production function. Besides, DEA is able to combine multiple 
inputs to fit any measure of efficiency. 
47 The DEA constructs a hypothetical firm that is a combination of the two aforementioned firms with composite 
inputs and outputs. If the hypothetical firm produces the same output with the same or fewer inputs, then the sample 
firm is inefficient to some degree. 
48 Since the degree of inefficiency is measured by the sample firm’s deviation from the hypothetical firm, the crux 
of the DEA analysis lies in finding the optimal hypothetical firm for each sample firm (Anderson et al., 2002).   
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the hypothetical firm.49 The overall efficiency of a DMUk can be evaluated as follows: 
min ߠ െ ߝሺ∑ ݏ௜ି ൅ ∑ ݏ௥ା௦௥ୀଵ ሻ௠௜ୀଵ                     (2)  
ݏݐ. ∑ ݔ௜௝λ௝௡௝ୀଵ ൅ ݏ௜ି ൌ ߠݔ௜௞														݅ ൌ 1,2, … ,݉  
∑ ݕ௥௝λ௝௡௝ୀଵ െ ݏ௥ା ൌ ݕ௥௞																						r ൌ 1,2, … , s  
λ௝, ݏ௜ି , ݏ௜ା ൒ 0  
where ߝ ൐ 0 is non-Archimedean element, which is smaller than any positive real number. 
This specification allows the model to prioritize the task to find the minimum value of ߠ. ݏ௜ି  
and ݏ௥ା are slack variables to make the restriction functions equal. The idea of the system is 
that the hypothetical firm produces at least the same amount of output as DMUk  for each 
output category, but requires no more than ߠ times the amount of input for each input category. 
By minimizing ߠ, we can solve	λ௝ ሺj ൌ 1,2, … , n) and construct the best-performing firm.50  
To analyze returns to scale of the DMUk, it is projected to the efficient frontier using the 
following formula: 
ቊ
෠ܺ௜௞ ൌ ߠ௞∗ݔ௜௞ െ ݏ௜ି ∗ ൌ ∑ ݔ௜௝λ௝∗௡௝ୀଵ 																				݅ ൌ 1,2, …݉
෠ܻ௥௞ ൌ ݕ௥௞ ൅ ݏ௥ା∗ ൌ ∑ ݕ௥௝௡௝ୀଵ λ௝∗																								r ൌ 1,2, … s	         (3) 
where ෠ܺ௜௞	is the projection of ݔ௜௞ to the efficient frontier; ෠ܻ௥௞	is the projection of ݕ௥௞ to the 
efficient frontier. Returns to scale (RTS) can be determined for ( ෠ܺ௞, ෠ܻ௞) with Banker and Thrall 
(1992) Theorem:  
                                                     
49 The CCR model was built on the concept of relative efficiency by Farrell (1957) who evaluated productivity with 
multiple inputs for single output. A DMU is defined to be fully efficient if and only if none of its inputs or output 
can be improved without worsening some of its other inputs or outputs. An excellent discussion on DEA can be 
found in the Handbook on Data Envelopment Analysis (Cooper, Seiford and Zhu, 2011) 
50 The solution of ߠ௞∗ will always be ൑ 1, since the constrains can be fulfilled at ߠ ൌ 1, λ௞ ൌ 1 with all other 
λ௝ ൌ 0, and	ݏ௜ି , ݏ௜ା ൌ 0. A CCR efficient DMU operates at constant return to scale (CRS) and has θ=1.  




݅݊ܿݎ݁ܽݏ݅݊݃	ݎ݁ݐݑݎ݊ݏ	ݐ݋	ݏ݈ܿܽ݁	ሺܫܴܵሻ											݂݅ ∑ λ௝∗ ൏ 1	௡௝ୀଵ 	
ܿ݋݊ݏݐܽ݊ݐ	ݎ݁ݐݑݎ݊ݏ	ݐ݋	ݏ݈ܿܽ݁	ሺܥܴܵሻ										݂݅ ∑ λ௝∗ ൌ 1	௡௝ୀଵ
݀݁ܿݎ݁ܽݏ݅݊݃	ݎ݁ݐݑݎ݊ݏ	ݐ݋	ݏ݈ܿܽ݁	ሺܦܴܵሻ							݂݅ ∑ λ௝∗ ൐ 1	௡௝ୀଵ
            (4) 
In the empirical study, the frontier analysis is conducted for each of the sample year, since the 
relative performance of firms can vary with time. If a REIT is operating at DRS after increasing 
its output, bad growth is identified. Otherwise, the expansion incidents will be identified as 
good growth.  
We follow the literature on economies of scale of REITs to measure the output of REITs 
with their total assets (Bers and Springer, 1997; Lewis et al., 2003; Miller et al., 2006; Topuz et 
al., 2005). The value of total assets is arguably a good proxy of the present value of future rental 
flows for REITs. Another alternative measure of output is market cap. Lewis et al. (2003) show 
that although total assets and market cap are highly correlated, the former definition is preferred 
because it has less variance. The firm’s total assets are further decomposed into net property 
investment, loans to customers and other assets. Net property investment is defined as total 
properties less accumulated depreciation. Loans to customers include loans and finance leases 
held for investment or held for sale, net of unearned discount and gross of loss reserves.51 Other 
assets refer to asset categories other than net property investment or loans to customers.  
The inputs for the DEA model are the individual REITs’ total expenses, which are further 
decomposed into interest expenses, operating expenses, and general and administration (G&A) 
expenses. Interest expenses include interest on debt and other borrowings, on an incurred basis, 
                                                     
51 Noted that 60% of the sampled equity REITs held loan assets in their balance sheet, albeit the sum involved is 
small. For example, Kimco Realty Corporation declared in its 2012 10-K a sum of $70.7 million for mortgage and 
other financial receivables (consists of loans acquired and loans originated by the company). This is equivalent to 
0.7% of its total assets.  
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including the amortization of discount or premiums and interest on capital leases. Operating 
expenses include total expenses resulting from operating and maintaining all real estate assets. 
G&A expenses include costs attributable to senior management and other overhead activities 
but not directly to the property portfolio. On the whole, operating expenses constitute 53.6% of 
the total expenses of REITs. Interest expenses are also substantial, forming 37.4% of the total 
expenses incurred by REITs. The balance of 9.0% constitutes the G&A expenses. 
3.3 Data  
To provide a life-span evaluation of the growth of modern REITs, the initial sample is based on 
NAREIT IPO records of US equity REITs from 1991 to 2012, which covers the modern REIT 
era as well as the recent subprime crisis.52  The NAREIT dataset records the name of every 
REITs, their IPO year, and the property sector they were operating in. Financial information on 
the individual REITs is extracted from their annual statements maintained in the SNL REIT 
database. We adjust the data reported in the 10-k for inflation and standardized the figures to 
US$ in 2012. Data on corporate governance, namely board structure, insider ownership, and 
block ownership are hand collected from the individual REITs’ proxy statements, which are 
published annually around March and April. Finally, information on institutional ownership of 
the REITs is obtained from the Thompson Financial database. 
The sample includes REITs that have been delisted over the period to mitigate survivorship 
bias. Fourteen REITs were dropped from the NAREIT sample because their financial data were 
                                                     
52 The study period is dictated by data availability. In particular, REITs’ proxy statement filings, from which we 
obtain information on their corporate governance measures, are provided by SNL database and are available from 
1992 only. Admittedly, if the study period could be extended back in time, the evolving role of institutional investors 
could be studied, but this is not possible with the available data. 
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either not available or incomplete in the SNL database.53 This leaves us with an unbalanced 
panel sample of 176 equity REITs with financial information available from year 1992 to 2012. 
As was discussed in the previous section, this study demands a lead and lag data structure: for 
example, this research evaluates the impact of change in corporate monitoring from 1992 to 
1993 on the growth of REITs during year 1993 to 1994 based on operation efficiency at end of 
year 1994. From year 1994, the DEA analysis is conducted annually to identify the returns to 
scale status of the individual REITs in order to determine whether they are operating at 
increasing, constant, or decreasing returns to scale.54 Based on the growth of REITs from 1993 
to 2012, we are able to evaluate a total of 1330 incidents of year-on-year change in total assets, 
where 456 events are associated with a decline in total assets over the preceding year (i.e. 
contractions) and 874 events are associated with an increase in total assets (i.e. expansions).55 
The 874 incidents of growth are then categorized into: bad growth if they result in the firms 
operating at declining returns to scale, or otherwise as good growth.  
Table 3-1 presents the summary statistics for various financial characteristics of the 874 
                                                     
53 Six REITs on the NAREIT list were dropped because their financial information was not available on SNL. 
Another three REITs were dropped because they were delisted within less than a year after they went public. Finally, 
five REITs that went public in year 2012 were also omitted due to incomplete financial results at the time of data 
collection. 
54 The IPO boom in year 1993 also gives us a decent number of sample REITs to do a peer analysis on scale 
efficiency. 
55 Note that the individual firms’ growth rates are adjusted for inflation rate over the corresponding period. The 
average annual inflation rate is 2.5% from 1992 to 2012. A firm must growth more than depreciation plus inflation 
to be identified as growing. This design excludes some small growths. One advantage in using total assets instead 
of property assets to measure growth is that cash holdings are included; thus capturing the possibility of REITs with 
large cash holdings may not be utilizing their capital efficiently. We nevertheless experimented with alternative ways 
to define growth, namely by considering only year-on-year change in the REITs’ net real estate investment, and by 
adding back depreciation to total assets (because total assets of a firm may be affected by its depreciation and 
dividend policies). The results are robust to the alternative definitions used. 
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observations. It is noted that an average of 44.5% incidents are bag growth. The average REIT 
has an asset size of $ 2.5 billion; out of which 56% are financed through debt capital. On 
average, insiders (i.e. executives and directors) own 11.6% of the REIT stocks. Block 
ownership was also considerably high (25.9%), and institutional investors collectively owned 
65.1% of the REITs stocks. With regards to board composition, the average REIT has 8 
directors, out of which 72.8% were independent directors. 48.8% of the REIT CEOs also served 
as chairman of the board. Long term compensation, on average, constituted 29.9% of total 
compensation of REIT managers.56  
                                                     
56 Long-term compensations, or incentive compensations, are reported in Proxy Statement. They include restricted 
share awards, Options/ SARs, and other forms of long-term compensation 
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Table 3-1  Descriptive statistics of characteristics of growing REITs 
This table presents descriptive statistics of the 176 unique equity REITs that collectively registered a total of 874 
events associated with an increase in total assets.  
 
Variable Definition  Mean Std.Dev. Min Max 
BAD_GRWTH Binary variable equals 1 if growth in total 
assets from year t to year t+1 lead to DRS 
at the end of year t+1 
0.445 0.497 0.00 1.00 
INSTI_OWN  % of shares owned by institutional 
investors  
0.641 0.260 0.00 1.00 
IND_DIRECTOR  No. of outside director/total no. of directors 0.729 0.103 0.43 0.92 
DEBT  Debt to asset ratio 0.560 0.155 0.0166 1.207 
INSIDER_OWN  % of shares owned by both executives and 
directors.  
0.116 0.115 0.00 0.80 
BLOCK_OWN % of shares owned by shareholders with 
more than 5% ownership as declared in 
Proxy statement 
0.259 0.170 0.00 0.74 
SALARY % of long-term compensation (restricted 
stocks, options/SARs and other incentive 
compensation) in total compensation 
0.299 0.240 0.00 1.00 
CEO_DUALITY  Binary variable equals 1 if the CEO and 
Chairman is the same person 
0.492 0.500 0.00 1.00 
NUM_DIRECTOR  Total no. of directors on board 7.976 1.938 4 14 
SIZE  Total assets (in $ million) 2531.2 3688.3 9.5 28800.0
AGE  Age of REIT from IPO (in years) 6.658 4.810 1 20 
GROWTH Log growth in total assets from year t to 
year t+1 
0.201 0.233 0.0002 2.745 
EXCESS_RETURN The difference between the annual stock 
market return of a REIT and its property 
sector index return 
0.0375 0.328 -0.608 7.559 
RETAINED_FFO Fund from operation minus dividends 
scaled by total assets 
0.0260 0.0298 -0.189 0.154 
PROPERTY_Q The average of firms’ Tobin Q for firms 
operating in the same property category 
1.361 0.286 0.762 3.089 
 
Table 3-2 further investigates the characteristics of bad growth across different years, and 
for sub-groups with different asset size and asset growth rates. Panel A of Table 3-2 presents a 
time-series analysis on the percentage of bad growth by year. It is noted that the percentage of 
bad growth is higher than average in the following years: 1995 (61.1%), 1997  
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Table 3-2  Percentage of bad growth by REITs (by year, firm size and growth rate) 
Panel A. This table presents the percentage of bad growth for years 1994 to 2012 using a sample of 176 public equity 
REITs. Over the period, 874 incidents of total asset expansion were recorded by the REITs. Bad growth is defined as 
expansions that led to the individual REITs operating at decreasing returns to scale. Year 1994 refers to growth from 
end of year 1993 to end of year 1994 and returns to scale is based on accounting data at end of year 1994. 
 
Year  All growth  Good growth Bad growth 
1994 28 19 9 (32.1%) 
1995 36 14 22 (61.1%) 
1996 59 45 14 (23.7%) 
1997 59 24 35 (59.3%) 
1998 62 52 10 (16.1%) 
1999 60 21 39 (65.0%) 
2000 47 14 33 (70.2) 
2001 44 27 17 (38.6%) 
2002 50 26 24 (48.0%) 
2003 46 36 10 (21.7%) 
2004 48 36 12 (25.0%) 
2005 46 31 15 (32.6%) 
2006 49 31 18 (36.7%) 
2007 51 25 26 (51.0%) 
2008 35 15 20 (57.1%) 
2009 27 11 16 (59.3%) 
2010 33 9 24 (72.7%) 
2011 43 18 25 (58.1%) 
2012 51 31 20 (39.2%) 
Total 874 485 389 (44.5%) 
 
Panel B. This table examines the relationship between the incidents of bad growth and firm size. The 874 
observations are divided into 6 sub-samples according to the ranking of firm size. The average size of the firms and 
the percentage of bad growth is calculated. Bad growth is defined as expansions that led to the individual REITs 
operating at decreasing returns to scale. 
 
Asset size interval Average asset size (b$) % bad growth Obs. 
0m-500 0.285 22.02% 168 
500m-1b 0.736 40.70% 199 
1b-2b 1.417 29.83% 181 
2b-3b 2.454 50.00% 126 
3-5b 3.855 74.26% 101 
>5B 10.736 79.80% 99 
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(Table 3-2 Continued) 
Panel c. This table examines the relationship between the incidents of bad growth and growth rates. The 874 
observations are divided into seven subsamples according to the ranking of growth rates. And for each basket, the 
average growth rates and the percentage of bad growth is calculated. Bad growth is defined as expansions that led to 
the individual REITs operating at decreasing returns to scale. 
 
Growth rate interval average growth rate %bad growth obs. 
0%-5% 2.25% 50.29% 175 
5%-10% 6.71% 51.11% 180 
10%-15% 11.65% 42.74% 117 
15%-20% 16.85% 38.95% 95 
20%-30% 24.11% 45.83% 120 
30%-50% 38.00% 39.64% 111 
>50% 67.62% 30.26% 76 
 
(59.3%), 1999-2000 (65.0%-70.2%), 2002 (48.0%), 2007-11 (51.0%-72.7%). This suggests 
that the market environment may have an impact on the outcome of corporate growth. In 
particular, during the period of the internet bubble (1998-2001) and the subprime crisis (2007-
2010), REIT growth is largely not scale efficient. 
Panel B of Table 3-2 examines the relationship between firm size and bad growth by 
grouping the 874 growth according to firm size. For each sub-group, the percentage of bad 
growth is calculated. Panel A of Figure 3-3 further plots the average asset size on x-axis against 
the percentage of “bad” growth on y-axis. We observe that as the firms get bigger, they are 
more likely to engage in “bad” growth. Consistent with a U-shaped cost curve (Ambrose et al., 
2000; Noulas et al., 1990), the propensity to engage in “bad” growth is higher for large firms. 
In particular, 70% of the growth registered by REITs with total assets exceeding $3 b were 
classified as “bad”. 
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Figure 3-3  Relationship between firm size and propensity to engage in bad growth  
Panel A. This figure plots the average asset size on x-axis against the percentage of bad growth on y-axis by dividing 
the 874 observations into 6 groups according to the ranking of firm size. For each group, the average asset size and 
the percentage of bad growth is calculated. Bad growth is defined as expansions that led to the individual REITs 




Panel B. This figure plots the average growth rates on x-axis against the percentage of bad growth on y-axis by 
dividing the 874 observations into seven groups according to the ranking of growth rates. For each group, the average 
growth rates and the percentage of bad growth is calculated. Bad growth is defined as expansions that led to the 
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Studies on fast growing firms (commonly known as gazelle firms), such Senderovitz et al. 
(2012), found a positive relationship between growth rate and subsequent profitability. In the 
case of REITs, firms with slow growth may be pursuing organic growth, while firms with fast 
growth rates may be those pursuing growth aggressively through external acquisitions and or 
property developments. Since their impact on the propensity to engage in “bad” growth may 
differ, Panel C of Table 3-2 divides the 874 observations into six sub-groups based on their 
growth rates. For each category, the percentage of bad growth is calculated. Panel B of Figure 
3-3 further plots the average growth rates on x-axis against the percentage of bad growth on y-
axis. It is noted that REITs with higher growth rates tend to have lower incidents of bad growth, 
which suggests that fast growth do not necessarily lead to bad growth.  
To provide a quick overview of the potential determinants of “bad” growth, Table 3-3 
further compares the characteristics of REITs that engaged in “good” and “bad” growth. The 
average size of the REITs in the pool of “bad” growth ($3.844 b) is more than doubled the size 
of the average REIT in the pool of “good” growth ($1.650 b), which observation is consistent 
with the notion of diminishing returns to scale as firms grow. In other words, growth is less 
likely to be beneficial for large firms. The ownership structures of the REITs in the two pools 
are also significantly different. “Good” growth REITs have marginally higher level of insider 
ownership, but lower block ownership, which are consistent with the alignment hypothesis of 
insider ownership and the entrenchment hypothesis of block ownership. Surprisingly, “bad” 
growth REITs appear to have higher level of institutional ownership, which appears to 
contradict the active monitoring hypothesis by institutional investors. Meanwhile, consistent 
with the disciplining role of debt hypothesis, REITs in the pool of “good” growth employed  
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Table 3-3  Firm attributes of REITs  
This table shows difference in mean comparison for a set of firm characteristics for the good growth sample and bad 
growth sample identified using DEA analysis. The variables are defined according to Table 3-1.  
 
Firm attributes  All Growth Good growth Bad growth Difference in mean
INSTI_OWN 0.641 0.6032 0.7084 -0.1052*** 
IND_DIRECTOR 0.729 0.7264 0.7296 -0.0032 
DEBT 0.560 0.5710 0.5520 0.0191* 
INSIDER_OWN 0.116 0.1201 0.1110 0.0091 
BLOCK_OWN 0.259 0.2422 0.2830 -0.0408*** 
SALARY 0.299 0.2869 0.3139 -0.0270 
CEO_DUALITY 0.492 0.5033 0.4692 0.0342 
NUM_DIRECTOR 7.976 7.6541 8.3753 -0 .7212*** 
SIZE 2531.2 1,650.3 3,843.9 - 2,193.6*** 
AGE 6.658 6.2262 7.3056 -1.0794*** 
GROWTH 0.201 0.2079 0.1758 0.0322** 
EXCESS_RETURN 0.0375 0.0494 0.0243 0.0251 
RETAINED_FFO 0.0260 0.0270 0.0247 0.0023 
PROPERTY_Q 1.361 1.3530 1.3598 -0.0068 
# of observations 874 451 373  
 
marginally more debt in their capital structure. These univariate relationships however should 
be interpreted with caution, particularly since ownership structure is highly correlated with firm 
size (Below et al., 2000; Ferreira and Matos, 2008). Specifically, the pairwise correlation 
matrix in Table 3-4 shows that bigger REITs have more concentrated institutional ownership 
and lower insider and block ownerships. Thus, the impact of monitoring by institutional 
investors on growth needs to be further analyzed within a multivariate context to control for the 
effect of firm size. 
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Table 3-4  Correlation matrix  

















BAD_GROWTH 1              
GROWTH -0.071** 1             
AGE 0.111*** -0.320*** 1            
SIZE 0.350*** -0.314*** 0.519*** 1           
INSIDER_OWN -0.0400 0.060* -0.126*** -0.217*** 1          
INSTI_OWN 0.200*** -0.114*** 0.356*** 0.604*** -0.408*** 1         
SALARY 0.0560 -0.0370 0.263*** 0.327*** -0.141*** 0.261*** 1        
NUM_DIR 0.185*** -0.147*** 0.308*** 0.426*** 0.102*** 0.157*** -0.0170 1       
IND_DIR 0.0150 -0.069** 0.202*** 0.096*** -0.0420 0.075** 0.071** 0.150*** 1      
CEO_DUAL -0.0340 -0.00600 -0.0240 -0.119*** 0.0550 -0.199*** -0.098*** -0.0350 -0.0130 1     
BLOCK_OWN  0.119*** -0.066* 0.152*** 0.220*** -0.142*** 0.521*** 0.061* 0.151*** 0.122*** -0.140*** 1    
PPTY_Q 0.090*** 0.00100 0.263*** 0.124*** -0.0460 0.143*** -0.0130 0.168*** 0.069** 0.0400 0.057* 1   
EXCESS_RETURN -0.0370 0.0540 0.00200 0.0320 0.00900 0.0190 0.0470 -0.0420 -0.0130 -0.0410 -0.0270 -0.062* 1  
DEBT -0.063* -0.214*** 0.303*** 0.101*** 0.199*** -0.0480 -0.099*** 0.206*** 0.078** 0.0420 0.0450 0.153*** 0.0100 1 
RETAINED_FFO -0.0370 -0.0190 0.0220 -0.104*** 0.152*** -0.169*** -0.058* 0.0550 0.0180 0.101*** -0.117*** -0.0150 0.0500 0.146*** 
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3.4 Regression Results  
The estimation results of the probit model are presented under models (1) and (2) in Table 3-5.57 
In model (1), the “watchdogs”, namely INSTI_OWN, DEBT and IND_DIRECTOR are 
expressed in levels, while they are expressed in first log differences in model (2). The dependent 
variable in both models, namely “bad” growth, is defined as one if the growth in total assets 
that lead to the firms operating at declining returns to scale, and zero otherwise.  
Consistent with previous analysis, total asset size is not surprisingly positively related to 
bad growth REITs, which is consistent with the notion of diminishing returns to scale. On 
average, bad growth REITs have an average asset size of $ 3.84 billion, as compared to $1.65 
billion for good growth REITs, which indicates that growth is less likely to be good for larger 
firms. Looking at the other control variables, REITs are also more likely to engage in bad 
growth when more cash flow are retained, which is consistent with the agency cost of free cash 
flow. The other proxies for corporate governance, namely insider ownership, block ownership, 
compensation structure, and CEO duality, are not statistically significant.   
Focusing on the key variables of interest, we find that the probability for REITs 
undertaking bad growth is negatively associated with the level of institutional investors. The  
                                                     
57 This study starts with 1330 observations with information available on ܩݎ݋ݓݐ݄ሺ௧,௧ାଵሻ and returns to scale at end 
of year t+1, where 874 observations record a positive growth. Deleting observations with missing information on 
࢝ࢇ࢚ࢉࢎࢊ࢕ࢍ࢙࢚  and ࢉ࢕࢔࢚࢘࢕࢒࢙࢚ , 1044 observations are left, where 706 observations record a positive growth. 
Excluding 8 observations with growth >100%, 698 observations remain in model (1). In baseline model (2), 685 
observations remain after deleting observations without information on ∆࢝ࢇ࢚ࢉࢎࢊ࢕ࢍ࢙ሺ࢚ି૚,࢚ሻ. Compared with model 
(2), there were 23 observations with missing information on growth in real estate assets from year t to t+1 in model 
(3); adding back the 8 observations with growth >100% to model (2), 693 observations remain in model (4); there 
are 551 observations in model (5) with information on ܤܣܦ_ܩܴܱܹܶܪሺ௧ିଵ,௧ሻ; and there are 615 observations with 
information on SHORT_DEBT and SECURE_DEBT in model (6). 
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Table 3-5  The determinants of bad growth  
This table shows regression results of model 	ܲݎ൫ܤܣܦ_ܩܴܱܹܶܪሺ௧,௧ାଵሻ ൌ 1หܺ൯ ൌ ߔሺܥ ൅ ࡮૚࢝ࢇ࢚ࢉࢎࢊ࢕ࢍ࢙࢚ ൅
	࡮૛ࢉ࢕࢔࢚࢘࢕࢒࢙࢚ሻ. BAD_GROWTH is a binary variable equals to 1 for bad growth; 0 otherwise. The explanatory 
variables are defined in Table 3-1. The “watchdog” variables, INSTI_OWN, IND_DIRECTOR, and DEBT, are 
expressed in levels in model (1) and in first log differences (∆࢝ࢇ࢚ࢉࢎࢊ࢕ࢍ࢙ሺ࢚ି૚,࢚ሻሻ through models (2) to (6). In 
models (1) and (2), bad growth is identified as growth in total assets that lead to declining returns to scale. In model 
(3), bad growth is identified as expansion in the firm’s net real estate investment that lead to declining returns to scale. 
In model (4), the sample is expanded to include observations with growth in total assets that are larger than 100%. 
Model (5) controls for the persistency of bad and good growth. In model (6), SECURE_DEBT is measured with the 
percentage of collateralized debts in total debts. SHORT_DEBT is measured with the percentage of debts due by the 
next fiscal year in total debts. T-stats are in parenthesis, ***p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The coefficients have been 
adjusted for linear interpretations. 
 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
INSTI_OWN -0.805* -0.688** -0.683** -0.689** -0.524* -0.629**
 (-1.820) (-2.287) (-2.292) (-2.372) (-1.738) (-1.990) 
IND_DIRECTOR 0.344 -0.798 -0.803 -0.864 0.233 -0.796 
 (0.480) (-0.939) (-0.936) (-1.036) (0.231) (-0.840) 
DEBT -1.143 -0.212 -0.0827 -0.255 -0.266 -0.342 
 (-1.553) (-0.932) (-0.346) (-1.187) (-1.163) (-1.371) 
INSIDER_OWN 0.956 0.817 0.749 0.845 0.812 0.972 
 (1.322) (1.075) (1.005) (1.148) (1.057) (1.174) 
BLOCK_OWN 0.514 0.185 0.449 0.250 -0.0416 0.518 
 (1.094) (0.430) (1.063) (0.593) (-0.0923) (1.081) 
SALARY -0.309 -0.192 -0.295 -0.105 -0.244 -0.208 
 (-1.039) (-0.649) (-0.994) (-0.369) (-0.769) (-0.649) 
CEO_DUALITY -0.00759 0.00383 0.0359 -0.00787 0.0849 -0.0911 
 (-0.0548) (0.0271) (0.257) (-0.0571) (0.587) (-0.599) 
NUM_DIRECTOR 0.0254 0.0415 0.0334 0.0256 0.0226 0.0558 
 (0.573) (0.930) (0.761) (0.594) (0.496) (1.162) 
Ln(SIZE) 0.805*** 0.725*** 0.726*** 0.662*** 0.745*** 0.693***
 (7.309) (7.009) (7.031) (6.785) (6.552) (5.899) 
Ln(AGE) 0.104 0.0428 -0.00524 0.111 -0.00658 0.0322 
 (0.795) (0.317) (-0.0393) (0.848) (-0.0458) (0.217) 
GROWTH -0.413 -0.342 -0.186 0.471* -0.277 -0.189 
 (-1.011) (-0.822) (-0.458) (1.663) (-0.625) (-0.407) 
EXCESS_RETURN -0.339 -0.339 -0.293 -0.376 -0.434 -0.348 
 (-1.427) (-1.482) (-1.392) (-1.534) (-1.226) (-1.425) 
RETAINED_FFO 6.955** 7.817** 8.332** 7.630** 4.856 8.731** 
 (2.141) (2.329) (2.451) (2.365) (1.179) (2.338) 
PROPERTYQ 0.380 0.398 0.422 0.316 0.321 0.254 
  (1.202) (1.238) (1.328) (1.015) (0.840) (0.746) 
BAD_GRWTH(t-1)     0.219  
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(Table 3-5 Continued) 
     (1.236)  
SHORT_DEBT      0.656 
      (1.406) 
SECURE_DEBT      -0.441 
            (-1.466) 
Year fixed Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Property-sector fixed Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 698 685 666 693 551 615 
Number of firm 138 135 134 139 126 130 
chi2 160.9 152 147 150.2 133.1 135.3 
Prob>chi2 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  
 
regression coefficients for IND_DIRECTOR and DEBT are however not significant, suggesting 
that independent directors and external creditors are not as effective as institutional investors in 
preventing REIT managers from undertaking bad growth. The insignificant result for 
independent directors is consistent with the findings of Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) and 
Bhagat and Black (1999, 2000) who questioned the effectiveness of independent directors in 
disciplining managers.  
  The impact of institutional ownership is robust when the corporate governance variables 
are expressed in lagged first difference (model 2). The estimated coefficient on institutional 
stays robust when corporate expansion is redefined to include only growth in net real estate 
investment (model 3), or the sample is expanded to include growth that are larger than 100% 
(model 4).58 The result is consistent with Mcconnell and Servaes (1990), Below, Stansell and 
Coffin (2000) and Hartzell et al. (2006) that institutional investors play an active monitoring 
role.  
                                                     
58 After adding growths that are larger than 100% in model (4), GOWTH is shown to have a weakly positive relation 
with bad growth; in comparison, GROWTH is shown to be insignificant in the rest of the models. These evidence 
suggest that while the propensity to bad growth does not increase with the growth rate of REITs, some extreme cases 
of fast growth are nevertheless likely to be detrimental. 
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Table 3-6  An additional test on the role of institutional investors 
This table shows the difference in mean comparison for the subsequent change in institutional ownership after a firm 
has recorded a growth event, pooled by “bad” growth and “good” growth. 
 
 Mean 
Difference in mean 
 Good growth Bad growth 
INSTI_OWN (chg) 0.0421 0.0065 0.0355** 
Number of observations  451 373  
 
To better understand the investment behavior of institutional investors, Table 3-6 also 
tracks subsequent changes in institutional ownership after a firm has conducted good (bad) 
growth. On average, REITs that recorded good growth in the current period experienced an 
increase of ownership by institutional investors by 4.21%. This implies that REITs that 
undertook good growth is more attractive to institutional investors. In contrast, there is only a 
marginal change in the level of institutional ownership by REITs that recorded bad growth. The 
difference in mean analysis as reported in Table 3-6 suggests that the marginal changes in 
institutional ownership are significantly different between REITs that registered good growth 
and REITs that registered bad growth. To ensure that the result is not driven by institutional 
investors picking REITs which have done well in the preceding period, model (5) incorporates 
an additional variable to control for the persistency of good (bad) growth. The regression 
coefficient for INSTI_OWN remains negative and statistically significant.  
Till now, this study does not find any evidence supporting the disciplining role of debt 
(Jensen, 1986; Stulz, 1990). Given the conservative capital structure employed by REITs, the 
finding is consistent with Harris and Raviv (1990) argument that banks have no incentive to 
discipline managers as long as the firm is far from default. According to Lang et al. (1996), 
increased leverage reduces both current funds available for investment as well as the firm’s 
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ability to raise additional funds to invest, so that firms with high leverage might not be able to 
take advantage of growth opportunities.59 To further examine the monitoring role of bankers, 
model (6) introduces secured debt and short-term debt as additional explanatory variables. 
SECURE_DEBT is proxied by the amount of collateralized debts as a percentage over total 
debts, while SHORT_DEBT is represented by the percentage of total debts of the REITs that 
are due for maturity within the next twelve months. The conjecture is that REIT managers faced 
greater pressure to behave when a significant portion of their loans are due for renewal. 
Likewise, the provision of collateral in secured debt restricts managers from engaging in asset 
substitution activities. However, the estimation results for the two variables are insignificant, 
suggesting that the use of secure debt and short-term debt do not help to decrease the propensity 
of bad growth.  
3.5 Robustness Checks  
Table 3-2 suggests that the market environment have an impact on the outcome of corporate 
growth. In addition to the year fixed effects in the earlier regressions, model (7) under Table 
3-7 controls for the impact of financial crisis on bad growth with two additional binary dummies: 
INTERNET_BUBBLE and SUBPRIME to account for growth during 1998-2001 and 2007-2010, 
respectively. The regression results show that the earlier results on the effectiveness of  
                                                     
59 In a separate set of unreported regressions which we carried out on total growths as the dependent variable, we 
observed that REITs employing high level of debts in their capital structure are associated with slow growth rates, 
which is consistent with the negative impact of debt on corporate growth. 
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Table 3-7  Robustness tests on the determinants of bad growth  
This table shows regression results of model 	ܲݎ൫ܤܣܦ_ܩܴܱܹܶܪሺ௧,௧ାଵሻ ൌ 1หܺ൯ ൌ ߔሺܥ ൅ ࡮૚࢝ࢇ࢚ࢉࢎࢊ࢕ࢍ࢙࢚ ൅
	࡮૛ࢉ࢕࢔࢚࢘࢕࢒࢙࢚ሻ. The watchdogs are expressed in first log differences (∆࢝ࢇ࢚ࢉࢎࢊ࢕ࢍ࢙ሺ࢚ି૚,࢚ሻሻ through models (7) to 
(10). BAD_GROWTH is a binary variable equals to 1 for bad growth; 0 otherwise. The explanatory variables are 
defined in Table 3-1. In model (7), INTERNET_BUBBLE is a binary variable that equals 1 for growth happened 
during year 1998-2001, and zero otherwise. SUBPRIME is a binary variable that equals 1 for growth happened during 
year 2007-2010, and zero otherwise. In model (8), the sample is expanded to include incidents of corporate 
contractions. Bad contraction is identified if they lead to the firm operating at increasing returns to scale. In model 
(9), bad growth is identified if an expansion in total assets leads to a decrease in the firm’s accounting profit 
(FFO/equity). In model (10), bad growth is crudely identified as growth that are carried out against the herding 
behavior of similar firms in the market. Specifically, bad growth is identified if there are more firm contractions than 
growth for a specific year. T-stats are in parenthesis, ***p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Same as the baseline model (2), 
685 observations remain in model (7) (9) (10). Adding back corporate contractions, 1020 observations remain in 
model (8). The coefficients have been adjusted for linear interpretation 
 
VARIABLES (7) (8) (9) (10) 
     
INSTI_OWN -0.625*** -0.414** -0.814** -0.728*** 
 (-2.588) (-2.178) (-2.266) (-2.638) 
IND_DIRECTOR -0.800 -1.094* -0.462 -0.744 
 (-1.018) (-1.886) (-0.516) (-0.924) 
DEBT -0.244 -0.181 0.239 -0.389 
 (-1.208) (-0.971) (0.933) (-1.194) 
INSIDER_OWN 0.315 0.932** 1.085 2.182*** 
 (0.446) (2.017) (1.408) (3.300) 
BLOCK_OWN 0.336 0.0552 -0.167 -0.0822 
 (0.872) (0.195) (-0.349) (-0.208) 
SALARY -0.422 -0.0867 0.0811 0.240 
 (-1.528) (-0.439) (0.253) (0.855) 
CEO_DUALITY -0.0212 0.241*** 0.148 0.111 
 (-0.161) (2.577) (0.965) (0.857) 
NUM_DIRECTOR 0.0373 -0.0220 0.00865 -0.0432 
 (0.892) (-0.807) (0.198) (-1.164) 
Ln(SIZE) 0.606*** 0.108* -0.153 0.0817 
 (6.393) (1.792) (-1.641) (1.048) 
Ln(AGE) -0.330*** 0.0621 0.0872 0.397*** 
 (-3.312) (0.714) (0.626) (3.804) 
GROWTH -0.117 -0.866*** -3.087*** -2.363*** 
 (-0.324) (-2.785) (-4.246) (-4.328) 
EXCESS_RETURN -0.306 -0.178 -0.785** -0.575** 
 (-1.539) (-1.107) (-2.463) (-2.087) 
RETAINED_FFO 6.872** 0.253 2.204 2.137 
 (2.176) (0.129) (0.702) (0.770) 
PROPERTYQ 0.251 0.120 -0.223 -1.393*** 
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(Table 3-7 Continued) 
 (0.946) (0.589) (-0.693) (-4.539) 
INTERNET_BUBBLE 0.614***    
 (3.628)    
SUBPRIME 0.885***    
 (4.663)    
CONTRACTION  -0.357***  
  (-3.176)   
Year fixed N Y Y N 
Property-sector fixed Y Y Y Y 
Observations 685 1,020 685 685 
Number of firm 135 148 135 135 
chi2 111.5 92.81 79.23 82.39 
Prob>chi2 0.00 1.75e-06 6.63e-05 1.54e-09 
 
the three watchdogs are robust to the inclusion of the new variables. In addition, the coefficients 
for both the new variables are negative and statistically significant, which indicates that during 
the period of the internet bubble (1998-2001) and the subprime crisis (2007-2010), the growth 
of REIT are largely not scale efficient.60  
The analysis so far has only covered positive growth rates; that is, firm expansions. As a 
further test, the sample is expanded to include observations that have recorded a decrease in 
total asset size, which is firm contractions. As before, bad growth is defined as incidents of 
growth in total assets that resulted in the firm operating at declining returns to scale. Conversely, 
bad contractions are defined as incidents of reduction in total assets that resulted in increasing 
returns to scale. In addition, a binary variable CONTRACTION is added for the contraction sub-
sample to differentiate them from the growth sub-sample. The estimation results are reported 
under model (8). First, the regression coefficient for the new variable is negative and significant. 
                                                     
60 During the crisis period, there is reduced demand in the market. A property acquired during crisis period would 
worth less than during non-crisis period because less future cash flow is expected to be generated. On the other hand, 
the costs of acquiring and running the property do not decrease during crisis period. So acquisitions during crisis can 
negatively influence returns to scale by reducing the output to input ratio. 
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This indicates that REITs are less likely to make bad contraction decisions, which is consistent 
with general findings of positive wealth effect associated with announcements of asset sales 
and corporate divestitures. It is also encouraging to note that the regression coefficients for the 
other variables are robust. In particular, institutional investors continue to play an active role in 
monitoring REITs’ divestment activities. This finding is consistent with studies on corporate 
monitoring and investor gain to divestment announcement (Hanson and Song, 2000). 
Noticeably, the estimated coefficient on IND_DIRECTOR is also negative and significant, 
providing some support for the monitoring role of independent directors. Overall, this research 
finds no evidence on the monitoring of creditors. As suggested by Harris and Raviv (1990), 
bankers have incentives to do more business as long as firms are far away from defaulting. 
Model (8) shows that REITs are more likely to made bad decisions when insider ownership is 
high and when the CEO also chairs the board. This result is consistent with an entrenchment 
story that high insider ownership allows REIT managers to have their own investment agendas 
(Hartzell et al., 2006). 
Till now, the main identification strategy of bad (good) growth is based on the DEA. Two 
alternative identification strategies for bad growth are also considered. In model (9), bad growth 
is identified as an expansion in total assets that leads to a decrease in the firm’s accounting 
profit, measured by FFO/equity. In model (10), bad growth is identified as growth that are 
carried out against the herding behavior of similar firms in the market. Again, the result shows 
consistent evidence of institutional investors playing a significant role in reducing the 
probability of REITs engaging in bad growth. There is also some evidence that gazelle (fast 
growing) REITs are less likely to engage in bad growth, which is consistent with Senderovitz 
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et al. (2012). In addition, the significant negative estimated coefficient on EXCESS_RETURN 
suggests that good-performing managers have a desire to safeguard their reputation by 
conducting good growth. In model (10), the estimated coefficient on PROPERTYQ is negative 
and significant, indicating that an increase in investment opportunities in the market decreases 
the probability of bad growth. 
Finally, in addition to estimating the binomial models of “bad” versus “good”, we examine 
the elasticity of financial performance of the individual REITs to growth in asset size. If 
monitoring by the watchdogs leads to a REIT undertaking good growth, it can be hypothesized 
that the elasticity of financial performance to asset size would be a function of their monitoring 
level. 
ீ௥௢௪௧௛	௜௡	௣௘௥௙௢௥௠௔௡௖௘ሺ௧ିଵ,௧ሻ
ீ௥௢௪௧௛	௜௡	௦௜௭௘ሺ௧ିଵ,௧ሻ ൌ ݂ሺݏ݅ݖ݁௧ିଵ, ݓܽݐ݄ܿ݀݋݃ݏ௧ሻ                 (5) 
Financial performance is measured by funds from operations (FFO) scaled by equity.61 This 
indicator measures the returns to shareholder investment after considering leverage. The above 
equation can be indirectly tested with the following regression model: 
∆ ln ቀ ிிை௘௤௨௜௧௬ቁሺ௧ିଵ,௧ሻ 	ൌ ܥ ൅ ߚଵGROWTHሺ௧ିଵ,௧ሻ ൅ ߚଶܩܴܱܹܶܪሺ௧ିଵ,௧ሻ ൈ SIZE௧ିଵ         (6) 
																					൅࡮૜ܩܴܱܹܶܪሺ௧ିଵ,௧ሻ ൈ ࢝ࢇ࢚ࢉࢎࢊ࢕ࢍ࢙࢚ ൅	࡮૝ࢉ࢕࢔࢚࢘࢕࢒࢙࢚  
∆݈݊	ሺܨܨܱ/݁ݍݑ݅ݐݕሻ measures the change in financial performance, while ݃ݎ݋ݓݐ݄ represents 
the growth in total assets over the same period. The interaction term ܩܴܱܹܶܪ ൈ ܵܫܼܧ  
                                                     
61 Unlike net income which is used to measure the accounting performance of most firms, FFO is more commonly 
used to measure the performance of REITs. This is because net income is derived after deducting depreciation 
expenses, which is a substantial non-cash charge to allocate the investment cost of fixed assets over their investment 
horizon. While this is acceptable for general firms, deducting depreciation is not appropriate for REITs because real 
estate assets rarely lose their value over time. Hence, the common practice is to evaluate REITs’ performance by 
their FFO, which generally involves adding back depreciation to net income and subtracting non-recurrent gains on 
sales of property assets. 
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Table 3-8  Regression on elasticity of financial performance to firm growth  
This table presents estimation results of model 	∆݈݊ሺܨܨܱ/݁ݍݑ݅ݐݕሻሺ௧ିଵ,௧ሻ ൌ ܥ ൅ ߚଵGROWTHሺ௧ିଵ,௧ሻ ൅
ߚଶܩܴܱܹܶܪሺ௧ିଵ,௧ሻ ൈ ln	ሺܵܫܼܧሻ௧ିଵ ൅ ࡮૜ܩܴܱܹܶܪሺ௧ିଵ,௧ሻ ൈ ࢝ࢇ࢚ࢉࢎࢊ࢕ࢍ࢙࢚ ൅	࡮૝ࢉ࢕࢔࢚࢘࢕࢒࢙࢚ . The dependent 
variable is growth in FFO/equity, which equals ln(FFO/equity)t - ln(FFO/equity)t-1. The key 
explanatory variable is GROWTH, which is measured by ln	ሺܵܫܼܧሻ௧ െ ln	ሺܵܫܼܧሻ௧ିଵ. The interaction term 
ܩܴܱܹܶܪ ൈ ln	ሺܵܫܼܧሻ captures potential impact of economies of scale. The other explanatory variables 
are defined in Table 3-1. Model (11) is estimated with OLS, while Model (12) addresses potential 
endogeneity of governance variables with 2SLS using one year lagged governance variables as 
instruments. T-stats are reported in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The original sample 
is from 176 equity with a total of 1568 firm year observations on GROWTHሺ௧ିଵ,௧ሻ, 912 out of 1568 
observations experience increases in total asset size. Another 185 observations are dropped due to 
missing information on growth in FFO/equity, institutional ownership, insider ownership, block 
ownership, CEO duality, board size, percentage of outside board and leverage. This leaves a sample 
of 727 observations in model (11). The use of lagged governance data incurred a loss of 45 observations 
in model (12). 
 
 (11) (12) 
VARIABLES OLS 2SLS 
GROWTH 0.646 2.180 
 (0.843) (1.333) 
GROWTH ൈLn(SIZE) -0.0778* -0.142** 
 (-1.706) (-2.308) 
GROWTHൈINSTI_OWN 1.254*** 1.819** 
 (3.444) (2.268) 
GROWTHൈDEBT -0.0265 -0.000711 
 (-0.734) (-0.0168) 
GROWTHൈIND_DIRECTOR -0.887 -1.532 
 (-1.276) (-0.881) 
GROWTHൈINSIDER_OWN -0.291 -1.361 
 (-0.517) (-1.300) 
GROWTHൈBLOCK_OWN 0.0126 -1.844 
 (0.0266) (-1.549) 
GROWTHൈSALARY 0.155 -0.736 
 (0.527) (-0.728) 
GROWTHൈCEO_DUALITY 0.116 0.115 
 (0.855) (0.503) 
GROWTHൈNUM_DIRECTOR -0.0219 0.00386 
 (-0.598) (0.0460) 
AGE -0.00863 -0.000339 
 (-0.511) (-0.0198) 
(AGE)2 0.000582 0.000115 
 (0.671) (0.130) 
DEBT 0.0118 0.0113 
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(Table 3-8 Continued) 
 (1.384) (1.196) 
INSTI_OWN 0.0110 -0.187 
 (0.0967) (-0.997) 
INSIDER_OWN 0.0936 0.229 
 (0.467) (0.772) 
BLOCK_OWN -0.0756 0.263 
 (-0.549) (1.005) 
SALARY 0.00938 0.247 
 (0.107) (0.964) 
CEO_DUALITY 0.0248 0.0359 
 (0.622) (0.648) 
IND_DIRECTOR 0.0833 -0.0131 
 (0.427) (-0.0384) 
NUM_DIRECTOR 0.00269 0.0166 
 (0.237) (0.862) 
Constant 0.109 0.0809 
 (0.447) (0.234) 
Year fixed Y Y 
Asset-sector fixed Y Y 
Observations 727 682 
Number of firm 138 130 
measures how the impact of assets growth on performance may vary with firm size. Likewise, 
the corporate governance variables are interacted with growth in total assets. An arguable 
endogeneity issue with equation (6) is the potential reverse causality problem between 
performance and corporate governance, in the sense that firms with good performance may ease 
their corporate governance. The strategy to address this potential endogeneity is to employ a 
2SLS regression using one year lagged governance data as instrument variables. This 
specification controls for the flow of causal relationship from the governance mechanisms in 
the preceding year to the firm’s performance in the current year, but not the reverse.  
The results, which are presented in Table 3-8, indicate that the elasticity of financial 
performance to growth depends not only on the asset level, but also on corporate governance. 
Consistent with the previous analysis, larger REITs are found to benefit less from growth in 
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total assets. Among the corporate “watchdogs”, the estimated coefficient on ݃ݎ݋ݓݐ݄ ൈ
	݅݊ݏݐ݅ݐݑݐ݅݋݈݊ܽ	݋ݓ݊݁ݎݏ݄݅݌  is positive and significant, providing support that institutional 
investors serve as effective external monitors on growth decisions of REITs. The coefficients 
for independent director and external creditors are however insignificant in the regression. 
3.6 Conclusions  
Corporate growth have always been enticing to the management. While economies of scale are 
expected to justify growth, there is evidence that corporate growth may be harmful to 
shareholder wealth. The rapid growth of REITs since the early 1990s attracts extensive 
discussions on whether REITs can benefit from expansion. Using different identification 
strategies, REIT growth is categorized into good and bad growth. Between 1992 and 2012, 44.5% 
of growth reported by REITs resulted in the firms operating at decreasing returns to scale. We 
then examined the role of monitoring by three corporate watchdogs, namely institutional 
investors, independent directors and creditors, in reducing the firms’ propensity to engage in 
bad growth. While we find limited evidence on the effectiveness of independent directors and 
creditors, we do observe consistent evidence that institutional investors play an effective role 
in preventing REITs from undertaking bad growth. The channel appears to be through the threat 
of “walking away” from poor firms by selling or withholding from buying additional shares of 
the affected firms. The results are robust to withstand a series of robustness tests which include 
adding more control variables, defining bad growth in various ways, and censoring or 
expanding the sample size.  
Examining firm growth using the scale efficiency framework, the research contributes to 
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the literature by connecting two strands of literature, namely scale efficiency in the context of 
corporate growth, and the role of monitoring in the context of corporate governance. 
Concerning the monitoring role of corporate watchdogs, this chapter provides implications for 
policy makers and REIT managers that institutional investors, through their active monitoring, 
play an important role in mitigating the agency cost of managerial opportunism. For investors 
and portfolio managers, this study also provides interesting investment insights. While some 
investors may prefer the blue chips, this study shows that it is actually more difficult for bigger 
REITs to engage in good growth. While some investors are concerned that rapid growth of 
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Chapter 4     A Relook into the Impact of Divestitures in the Presence of Agency 
Conflicts: Evidence from Property Subsidiary Sell-Offs in China62 
4.1 Introduction 
Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 have been focusing on the expansion of REITs. This chapter presents 
a special essay on the reverse side, i.e. corporate divestment. Divestment, the opposite of 
investment or acquisition, is defined as the sale of part of a company to a third party. As noted 
by Pike and Neale (2009), divestment is heavily used as a means of restructuring to reflect the 
continuing efforts of corporate management to adjust to changing economic and political 
environments. Two particular forms of divestments are sell-offs and spin-offs: Sell-offs involve 
selling part of a business, either a subsidiary, division, or product line to a third party, usually 
for cash. Spin-offs, on the other hand, involve transferring assets to a newly created company 
that is still controlled by the divesting firm.63 This chapter uses property subsidiary sell-offs in 
China to analyze the effect of a firm’s divestiture decision on shareholders’ wealth. If the 
financial markets view the divestiture as having a real economic value, there will be significant 
movements in the firm’s stock price around the announcement date (Hearth and Zaima, 1984)  
In essence, a sell-off decision involves the firm foregoing future cash flows from the to-be 
divested assets in exchange for a discounted present value payment today. A positive net present 
value increases shareholders’ wealth. Conversely, a negative net present value decreases 
                                                     
62 This chapter is forthcoming on the Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics. 
63 Sell-offs are subject to capital gains tax while spin-offs are not (Alexander, Benson and Kampmeyer, 1984; 
Rosenfeld, 1984). Gaughan (2010) notes that sell-offs are the most common form of divestitures. 
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shareholders’ wealth (Boudreaux, 1975). Divestiture announcements could therefore be met 
with positive, negative or even neutral stock price reactions. In reality, the extant literature 
predominantly documents a positive stock price reaction to divestitures. In a market economy, 
the sources of gains in shareholders’ wealth from divestures can be attributed to reasons such 
as tax advantages, asset allocation efficiency (Hite, Owers and Rogers, 1987), lower cost of 
capital through asset sales (Lang, Poulsen and Stulz, 1995), and increased business focus 
through selling incompatible or loss-making business units (John and Ofek, 1995). Prior studies 
find that abnormal returns are positively associated with the financial condition of the divesting 
firm (Hearth and Zaima, 1984; Rosenfeld, 1984), the relative size of the divestitures (Hearth 
and Zaima, 1984; Klein, 1986) and the increased focus on the firm’s core business through 
selling assets that generate negative synergies for the firm (John and Ofek, 1995).  
These positive stock price reactions to firms’ divesture decisions also apply to property 
sell-offs. Three customized reasons often cited in the real estate literature to explain the 
favourable market response to property sell-offs are asset valuation, tax shield and synergy.64 
Based on a sample of 139 property sell-offs between 1992 and 2002, Campbell et al. (2006) 
find positive and significant abnormal returns when real estate investment trusts (REITs) sell 
their properties. They attribute the positive wealth effects from real estate sell-offs to a more 
efficient asset allocation by the firm rather than to tax benefits or to undervaluation of assets 
                                                     
64 The asset valuation hypothesis maintains that because the book value of real estate assets are usually lower than 
its market value, analysts and investors will react favorably when the property is sold at a price higher than its book 
value. The tax shield hypothesis posits that the sale of a mature (fully depreciated) property and subsequent purchase 
of a replacement property allows firms to increase the size of their tax shelter. The synergies hypothesis argues that 
the sold property is not asset allocation efficient for the firm, or that the real estate arm of the business generates a 
negative synergy with the parent firm. Rodriguez and Sirmans (1996) and Campbell (2002) provide excellent and 
detailed reviews of the literature related to real estate sell-offs.  
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prior to the announcement.65 In an earlier study, Glascock et al. (1991) analyse a mixed sample 
of 51 voluntary sell-offs of real estate assets (31 property sell-offs and 20 property 
subsidiary/division sell-offs) in the U.S. market from 1971 to 1986. They find significant and 
positive abnormal returns for property sell-offs and positive but statistically insignificant 
abnormal gains for property subsidiary/division sell-offs. Their findings suggest that sellers are 
more likely to respond positively to a property sell-off rather than a division or subsidiary sell-
off. The authors did not further investigate the reasons for their results.  
This chapter aims to relook at the effects of divestiture decisions on shareholders’ wealth 
in the presence of agency conflicts. This study uses divestment data from China - a socialist 
market economy with political, economic and business environments which are significantly 
different from a typical market economy. Although China is implementing reforms to better 
integrate their market economy with the international market economy, some institutional 
features of the Chinese market particularly pertaining to firms that are strategic state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs), may induce managers to prioritize state goals over maximizing 
shareholders’ wealth. Szamosszegi et al. (2011) estimate that SOEs and SOE-controlled entities 
account for approximately 40% of China’s non-agricultural gross domestic product. Describing 
the business environment and managerial appointments of SOEs, they note that SOEs enjoy 
favourable and preferential access to financing from state-owned banks, favourable tax 
                                                     
65 Campbell et al. (2006) argue that neither the undervaluation nor the depreciation tax shield arguments applies 
well to the case of REITs. First, analysts are unlikely to underestimate property assets in the same way as 
conventional firms. Second, REITs also do not pay corporate taxes. The authors find a negative relationship between 
shareholder returns and sell-offs that is primarily motivated by debt reduction. They also argue that in an asymmetric 
information environment, managers who choose to increase a firm’s leverage are sending signals indicating 
confidence of future cash flows. 
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treatments, and a relatively favourable competitive environment compared to other firms. On 
the managerial appointments, appointees to SOE executive positions and said appointees’ 
subsequent career paths are determined by the state. These types of firm ownership structures 
with their strong Chinese characteristics warrant a new look at the issue of “separation and 
control” related to agency conflicts. Furthermore, the problem of poor managerial effort may 
be further aggravated by the type of managerial job incentives and weak monitoring of 
managers’ performance. As a result, these observations lead to the central research questions: 
What is the market’s reaction to divestitures by SOEs? Furthermore, conditional on the 
differences in business/financing environments facing SOEs and non-SOEs, will there be 
different market reactions to their respective divestiture decisions? Intuitively, given the higher 
probability of agency conflicts related to managerial discretion, the market is hypothesized to 
respond negatively to SOEs’ divestitures. 
In the empirical design, the standard event-study methodology is adopted to measure the 
stock market reaction to divestiture announcements by calculating the firm’s abnormal returns 
prior to and following from a divestiture announcement. In this first-stage analysis, this research 
looks at whether the stock market reacts positively, negatively, or remain neutral to the 
divestiture announcements. The sample is further split into two – SOEs and non-SOEs – to 
check whether the market reacts to the respective samples in the same way. In the second-stage 
analysis, the multivariate regression on the firms’ cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) is 
conducted to specifically examine the effect of agency conflicts on shareholders’ wealth.  
Finally, several robustness tests are conducted.  
Our results show some interesting findings. Overall, the stock market is neutral to the 
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announcements of property subsidiary sell-offs, but when separating the market reactions to 
SOEs and non-SOEs announcements, this study finds divergent results. Specifically, the market 
persistently reacts in a negative manner to sell-offs by SOEs, but predominantly reacts in a 
positive manner to sell-offs by non-SOEs. The multivariate analysis reinforces the findings that 
the market reacts negatively to SOE sell-offs. This divergent market reaction is influenced by 
the institutional feature of the Chinese market and is consistent with the high agency costs 
associated with state ownership. 
We make an empirical contribution to the literature in the following ways. First, this 
research provides a recent contribution to the limited literature that examines real estate sell-
offs at a subsidiary-level. Second, while studies on divestitures mainly concentrate on the US 
market, this chapter focuses on the institutional background of China and provides a new look 
at the issue of “separation of ownership and control” during divestitures. Third, as to the on-
going SOE reforms in the market of China, this study provides insights for policy makers that 
issues with SOEs are closely related to agency conflicts; potential remedies include delinking 
the appointment and promotion of key executives from politics, reducing free cash flow, and 
aligning the interest of the managers with shareholders. Finally, findings from this study will 
be useful for investors and asset managers who are looking to purchase Chinese equities. 
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows: section 4.2 reviews relevant literature on 
agency conflicts and describes the institutional features of state ownership of Chinese firms. 
Section 4.3 presents the empirical model used in this chapter. Section 4.4 provides an overview 
of the data along with some stylized facts related to these property subsidiary sell-offs. Section 
4.5 presents the findings. Section 4.6 extends the story with a few additional insights. Section 
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4.7 offers the summary and concluding remarks. 
4.2 Literature Review  
4.2.1 Agency Conflicts  
 Jensen and Meckling (1976b) relate the ‘ownership structure’ of a firm to the relative 
claims by insiders (firm’s management) and outsiders (investors with no direct control over the 
firm), thereby leading to issues of “separation of ownership and control” that arise in agency 
conflicts and subsequently, the incurrence of agency costs.66 Agency conflicts between insiders 
and outsiders are characterized by managers’ tendencies to expropriate the firm’s resources for 
their own benefits. Fama and Jensen (1983) further argue that issues of “separation of 
ownership and control” are not limited to only big corporations, but they exist in organizations 
such as large professional partnerships, financial mutual, and non-profits. They argue that 
agency problems are higher when there is a separation of decision and risk-bearing functions 
in organizations. Perotti (1995) argues that under public ownership, there is no incentive for 
managerial effort; whereas, under private ownership, managers will be rewarded for the 
efficient management of the firm’s production because the firm’s profit is highly correlated with 
managerial effort.   
Under the managerial agency hypothesis, managers prefer to retain the sale proceeds from 
divestiture and redirect these free resources to projects of their benefit. Bates (2005) 
                                                     
66  Agency costs comprise monitoring expenses (formal audits, budget restrictions, incentive-compatible 
compensation policies, operating rules, etc.) incurred by the principal, bonding expenses (contractual guarantees and 
limitations) incurred by the agent, and residual costs arising from a divergence in the decisions made by the agents 
that do not maximize the principal’s welfare. 
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summarizes the manager-specific benefits associated with agency conflicts related to 
managerial discretion. Managers use the sale proceeds from divestiture: (i) to maintain firm 
size and thereby preserve the manager’s power and prestige; (ii) to invest in manager-specific 
projects without using debt or equity which may increase external monitoring;67 and (iii) to 
diversify the firm and reduce the risk related to human resource movements. Extant empirical 
studies, which examine agency conflict-related factors and their influence on stock price 
reactions to divestitures, generally find that shareholder wealth increases when there are less 
agency issues present. Hirschey and Zaima (1989) find favourable market reactions when there 
is increased insider purchase of the firms’ shares before the sell-off announcement, and when 
managers hold a substantial ownership interest in the firm (closely held firm). They find neutral 
to negative market reactions when there is increased insider sale of the firm’s shares before the 
sell-off announcement and when there are diffused ownership by many shareholders (widely 
held firms). With increased net-insider purchase and/or a closely held ownership structure, 
managers’ decisions would be more aligned with shareholders’ interests. Hanson and Song 
(2000) provide further evidence to show that higher levels of managerial ownership and 
unaffiliated outside appointees to the board incentivize managers to make divestiture decisions 
that creates positive value to the shareholders. The results in Lang et al. (1995) can also be 
interpreted in relation to managerial discretion – the market reacts more favorably when the 
sale proceeds are paid out (either through dividends or payment of debt) than when the sale 
proceeds are retained within the firm, and are thus subjected to higher agency costs related to 
                                                     
67 According to Shleifer and Vishny (1989), managers tend to acquire assets which require their expertise to manage; 
thus, putting them in a valuable and difficult-to-replace position in the firm. As a result, investment opportunities 
that generate higher NPV returns may be rejected to make way for manager-specific projects. 
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managerial discretion. In their model, asset sales are used by managers as a means to raise 
capital without going to the capital markets.  
 
4.2.2 Chinese Institutional Ownership 
The institutional features peculiar to China brings a more interesting analysis to the 
problem. SOEs dominated China’s industrial sectors and contributed 77.6% of China’s total 
industrial output in 1978. Parallel to China’s transition to a market economy, reforms on the 
SOEs have reduced their share in the country’s total output to 28.8% by 1996.68 Yet, SOEs still 
employed 57.4% of urban workers and possessed 52.2% of total investment in industrial fixed 
assets. However, in spite of receiving large amounts of implicit subsidies from low-interest 
loans and other policy protections, over 40% of SOEs were losing money (Lin, Cai and Li, 
1998). In contrast, non-SOEs had to obtain credit and inputs from competitive markets, and in 
turn, their products were sold to markets. They faced hard budget constraints, and would not 
survive if their performances were poor.  
Since the mid-1980s, China rolled out several phases of reforms to the SOEs. The 
objectives of the more recent phases of SOE reforms were to improve the operational efficiency 
of the firms by introducing market management practices, such as limiting state intervention in 
the day-to-day operations of the firm and linking top executives’ performance with firm 
performance.69 Although the firms under study are publicly listed companies traded on stock 
                                                     
68 In October 1993, the 14th Congress of Communist Party of China introduced reforms towards the establishment 
of a socialist market economy with Chinese characteristics. The 15th Congress further identified public ownership 
as the mainstay of the economy, with diverse forms of ownership to develop side by side. 
69Szamosszegi et al. (2011) and Deng et al. (2011) provide details describing SOE reforms. 
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exchanges, the government still retain some form of control by holding onto a majority of the 
shares of SOEs (or partial privatization) (Jiang, Lee and Yue, 2010; Qu, 2003; Sun and Tong, 
2003). In particular, before listing on the national stock exchanges, SOEs have to issue almost 
over 30% of the total shares to the government.70 Another reform measure was the creation of 
the State-owned Asset Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC) in May 2003 to 
supervise, evaluate, and oversee the SOEs. The SASAC would act on behalf of the state as the 
majority shareholder, but would refrain from interfering with the firms’ production and 
operation decisions. However, it held the right to decide on matters related to the firms’ 
issuance/reduction of capital, issuance of bonds or changes in the firms’ capital structure such 
as mergers, divisions or liquidations. Together with the Communist Party’s Central 
Organization Department (COD), the SASAC also retained the right to appoint and remove top 
executives of the SOEs.  
As noted by Qu (2003), managerial appointments of SOEs are ultimately politically 
determined. As a result, managerial compensations and promotions are reliant on assessments 
made by their superiors in the political and administrative hierarchy, rather than the market 
performance of the firm. In support, Szamosszegi et al. (2011) observe that due to the incentive 
structure, the top executives in SOEs are likely to prioritize state goals over maximizing 
shareholders’ wealth. When the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of a firm is politically 
                                                     
70 Another form of government ownership of the shares can be in the form of legal-person shares.  These are shares 
owned by business agencies or local enterprises that are partially owned by the central or local government.  Prior 
to 2004, shares owned by the state and legal-person shares are not tradable on the stock exchanges. However, in 
early 2004, the State Council promulgated the ‘Guidelines on Promoting Reform, Opening Up and Steady 
Development of the Capital Market’. Consequently, in 2005-2006, the China Securities Regulatory Commission 
(CSRC) implemented reforms to lift the trading ban on non-tradable shares for ‘well-functioning market 
infrastructures and orderly operations’ (CSRC, 2007). 
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connected, Fan, Wong and Zhang (2007) find that the accounting performance of the firm and 
its long-term post-IPO stock returns are consistently and significantly worse than a similar firm. 
They further observe that the board of directors in firms that are politically connected would 
have more directors with political ties and fewer directors with business/professional expertise; 
thus, aggravating the problem of managers prioritizing state goals over maximizing 
shareholders’ wealth. Also looking into the relationship between managerial compensation and 
performance in state and non-state controlled firms, Conyon and He (2011) find that state 
controlled firms offer lower executive compensation and CEO ownership incentives than non-
state controlled firms.  Privately controlled firms are more likely to have an independent board 
structure and are more likely to replace CEOs who deliver poor performance. SOEs, on the 
other hand, were sheltered by ‘soft budget constraints’, that is, the state would absorb losses 
caused by state policies imposed on SOEs.71 This issue was raised in relation to agency 
problems in Lin et al. (1998). In particular, managers of SOEs may ascribe firm losses to state 
policies; thus, giving rise to worsening agency problems like managerial slacks, shirking, on-
the-job consumption, etc.72  
                                                     
71  Three examples of state policy related issues faced by SOEs are: (i) SOEs are instructed to operate in capital-
intensive industries; (ii) SOEs have to pay wages, pensions and other social-welfare benefits of their current, 
redundant as well as retired workers; and (iii) some SOEs’ output prices are still distorted (artificially suppressed) 
below production costs. In their paper, Lin et al. (1998) argue that the key for a successful reform is to create a level 
playing field by removing these policy burdens on the SOEs. 
72 Chinese media reported that in 2012, the amount of government subsidies granted to the top ten listed SOEs was 
comparable to the sum of net profits of all listed firms in the SZSE ChiNext. (Source: 
http://ccnews.people.com.cn/n/2013/0502/c141677-21336993.html).  China National Petroleum Corporation 
(CNPC) reported a government subsidy of 9.4 billion RMB in their 2012 financial statement. (Source: 
http://www.cninfo.com.cn/finalpage/2013-03-22/62239965.PDF?www.cninfo.com.cn.).  Based on annual reports 
for 2012, “business entertainment” expenses by listed firms in China totalled 13.3 billion RMB, while the “business 
entertainment” expenses by the top ten SOEs was 2.9 billion RMB. (Source: 
Chapter 4                                                                         Divestitures 
98 
 
Although the SOE reforms have made contingent linkages between managers’ 
performance and firm performance, the high level of state intervention in certain areas of the 
firms’ operations (here the paper is specifically interested in divestiture related decisions) may 
still lead to high incidences of agency problems related to firms’ divestitures. Hanson and Song 
(2000) note that gains from divestitures were conditioned upon the effectiveness of the firm’s 
internal monitoring mechanisms to minimize agency costs. Jiang et al. (2010) provide a 
succinct summary of factors that made China into an environment that is highly conducive to 
tunneling behavior.73 The authors also point out that controlling shareholders may engage in 
favourable asset-related transfers to “prop up” the earnings of a firm to meet key performance 
targets set by market regulators. In property subsidiary sell-offs, where there are transaction 
parties (buyer and seller) and cash settlements, this business environment is conducive to self-
dealing or tunneling by managers. Two such cases are reported in the Appendix to this chapter.   
In summary, the direct or indirect retention of ownership by the state in SOEs, alongside 
with the extension of soft budget constraints may lead to high incidences of agency issues such 
as the expropriation of minority shareholders by controlling shareholders (tunneling, self-
dealing, or propping), moral hazard and poor managerial effort. Monitoring of SOEs by SASAC 
is arguably weak, since SASAC officials are also prone to “separation and control” issues and 
may not have the incentives to fully monitor SOEs. Subsequently, the motivation of the sell-off 
                                                     
http://www.bbc.co.uk/zhongwen/simp/china/2013/05/130514_china_statecompanies.shtml.) 
73 The factors include: (i) presence of a dominant shareholder; (ii) the trading of state and legal persons shares are 
highly restricted, therefore encouraging the controlling stakeholder to obtain benefits from other channels rather than 
price appreciation in the shares; (iii) minority shareholders have limited legal enforcement rights against the 
controlling shareholders; and (iv) security market regulators have limited authority to enforce fines and prison terms 
for tunneling. 
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is unlikely to be due to either the asset efficiency theory or the financing theory. Given the large 
cash flows available to the firm after the sell-off and the high level of managerial discretion, 
shareholders may view that agency costs are higher for SOEs. Non-SOEs, on the other hand, 
do not have a competitive advantage nor do they have favourable financing. Hence, their 
motivation for divestures should be predominantly be driven by market economy related 
reasons and may be more aligned with shareholders’ interests. The market is hypothesized to 
react negatively to SOE divestitures due to higher incidences of agency problems.   
 
4.3 Methodology 
We adopt the market model to estimate the normal return of a given security.  For security i, 
the abnormal return (ARit) for event day t was calculated as: 
AR୧୲ ൌ r୧୲ െ ሺαෝ୧ ൅ β෠୧r୫୲ሻ                       (1) 
Where rit is the rate of return on security i for day t, and rmt is the return of the SHSE or the 
SZSE (depending on where security i was listed) on day t. αෝ୧ and β෠୧ are ordinary least squares 
estimates of the intercept and slope from a market model regression spanning a period of 250 
trading days. The pre-event period was taken to be days (-270, -21) and the event period was 
taken to be days (-20, +20). The cumulative abnormal return ሺܥܣܴ௜்ሻ for security i, over a 
specific period T was calculated as: 
ܥܣܴ௜் ൌ ∑ ܣܴ௜௧்ା௝௧ୀ௝                             (2) 
The average cumulative abnormal return (ܥܣܴതതതതതത்ሻ for a sample of n securities, over a specific 
period T was calculated as: 
ܥܣܴതതതതതത் ൌ ሺଵ௡ሻ∑ ܥܣܴ௜்௡௜ୀଵ                         (3) 
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To account for serial correlation and event-induced increases in volatility, the Standardized 
Cross Sectional Method74 is used to calculate the test-statistic. Patell (1976) proposes using the 
standardized approach to avoid problems in calculating the test-statistic caused by high stock 
volatilities. CARiT can be standardized (SCARiT) using the unit-normal distribution:  
ܵܥܣܴ௜் ൌ ஼஺ோ೔೅ඥ௏௔௥ሺ஼஺ோ೔೅ሻ	                        (4) 
The variance term was defined to be: 
ܸܽݎሺܥܣܴ௜்ሻ ൌ σ௜ଶTሾ1 ൅ ୘୙ ൅ T
ሺ∑ ୰ౣ౪/୘ି୰തౣሻ౐శౠ౪సౠ
మ
୙	୚ୟ୰ሺ୰ౣሻ ሿ          (5) 
where σ௜ଶ is the variance of the daily abnormal return estimated from the market model.  U 
is the length of the estimation window.  ̅ݎ௠  is the mean of the market return during the 
estimation period.  ܸܽݎሺݎ௠ሻ is the variance of the market return during estimation period.  
The average cross-sectional standardized cumulative abnormal return ሺܵܥܣܴതതതതതതത்) was calculated 
as: 
ܵܥܣܴതതതതതതത் ൌ ቀଵ௡ቁ∑ ܵܥܣܴ௜்௡௜ୀଵ ,										ܵܥܣܴതതതതതതത்	~	ܰ ቀ0,
ଵ
௡ቁ          (6) 
The Z-statistic was calculated as: 
Z= √݊		ܵܥܣܴതതതതതതത்                           (7) 
In the second stage cross-sectional analysis, the primary research interest is the financial 
market’s reactions to property subsidiary sell-offs, given that agency conflicts are present in the 
ownership structure of the firm. However, from the literature review, the regression analysis 
also needs to control for effects arising from the asset allocation efficiency, financing hypothesis, 
and specifically for property sell-offs, effects relating to asset valuations, tax shields, 
                                                     
74 This approach assumes cross-sectional independence of stock returns during each firm's estimation period and 
event period. 
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misalignment of the real estate business with the core business and the firm’s characteristics.  
The multivariate analysis of the cumulative abnormal returns adopts the following regression 
form: 
ܥܣܴ௜் ൌ ܿ ൅ ࡭࢏ᇱ࡮૚ ൅ ࡼ࢏ᇱ࡮૛ ൅ ݐ௜ߚଷ ൅ ࡿ࢏ᇱ࡮૝ ൅ ࢄ࢏ᇱ࡮૞ ൅ ߝ௜           (8) 
where ܥܣܴ௜் is the cumulative average abnormal return for security i over a specific period 
T. ࡭࢏  is a vector of variables for indicators of agency conflict. ࡼ࢏  is a vector of control 
variables which may influence the selling price of the target asset. ݐ௜ is the valuation error or 
taxation element.  ࡿ࢏ is a vector of control variables that may influence the synergy or asset 
allocation efficiency from divestitures. ࢄ࢏ is a vector of other control variables for firm i, and 
εi is the error term. Table 4-1 describes in detail the variables used in the multivariate analysis. 
These variables are based on extant empirical literature. 
Our main variable of interest, SOE, is a dummy variable with a value of one if the 
controlling shareholder of the seller of the property subsidiary is the SASAC.   
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Table 4-1  Definition of variables in the empirical models 
This table specifies the definition of the variables. The variables are classified by their potential way of influencing 
the outcome of divestitures, including components on agency conflict, selling price, valuation error/ tax, synergy and 
some other controls. Following Hirschey et.al (1989), the 6 months cutting point is used to measure net insider 
purchase (%). 
 
  Variable Description 
Agency 
Conflicts 
SOE seller  =1, if the seller is a SOE. SOEs are identified if the controlling shareholder 
is the State-Owned Assets Supervision and administration Commission of the 
State Council (SASAC) 
RPT  =1, if the buyer is a related party, as is announced by the seller according to 
the specification in the new accounting standard of China 
Duality   =1, if the GM and Chairman of board of the company is the same person 
Appraisal   =1, if an appraisal report of the target asset is provided for the divestitures 
Net insider 
purchase (%) 
the percentage of shares purchased minus the percentage of shares sold by 
insiders during the six months period prior to the divestitures. 
D/A ratio debt to asset ratio 
Repayment  
of debt 
 =1, if the seller states to use the proceeds to retire debt 
Insider 
ownership (%) 
 the percentage of shares owned by the insiders (board of directors, board of 
supervisors, and senior managers) of listed firms 
Price 
components 
OCF/asset  the ratio of net operation cash flow to total asset, which measures the 
profitability of a firm in its operations.  
Industry seller  =1, if the seller is real estate company according to its CSRC code 
Multiple sell  =1, if the event is not the first divestitures of the seller during the sample 
period 
Cooling measure  =1, if the divestiture was conducted after January 2010, the initiation of the 
cooling measures 
Industry of buyer  =1, if the buyer is a real estate company according to its CSRC code 
Valuation 




 the selling price minus the book value of the target weighted by the market 






Focus  =1, if the seller states specific business strategy reasons for the divestitures
Herfindahl Index 
(chg) 
changes in the Herfindahl index of revenue makeup one accounting period 
prior to and after the divestitures 
Regulation  =1, if the divestitures are required by the government 
Unwanted  =1, if the target is an unwanted subsidiary as stated by the seller  
Shares  the percentage of shares of the target firm sold 
 
Size announced transaction price weighted by the market value of equity of the 
seller 
other controls Sh  =1, if the seller is listed in Shanghai Stock Exchange 
 
Main  =1, if the seller is listed on the main board 
Developer  =1, if the target is a real estate developer 




Our data starts from January 2007 and ends on June 2012. The new accounting standard of 
China (Accounting Standard for Business Enterprises) was implemented among listed 
companies in January 2007, bringing changes to accounting measurements of firm assets, debts, 
and profits. 75 The sample starts from 2007 to ensure the continuity of the financial reported 
data. The sample includes divestiture announcements (either total or partial sell-offs of real 
estate subsidiaries) made by firms publicly listed on either the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SHSE) 
or the Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE).76  
During the sample period, 156 firm divestiture announcements were identified, but the 
final sample focuses on 142 announcements (hereafter referred to as sell-offs) made by 113 
firms.77 The sample excludes overlapping announcements of property sell-offs and property 
                                                     
75 Prior to 1 January 2007, the Chinese Accounting Standards (CAS), which was designed for financial 
reporting in a centrally planned economy with the state as the sole owner of the industry, was not suitable 
for reporting company’s performance in a market economy. From January 2007, China’s Ministry of 
Finance announced the adoption of 39 standards that are substantially aligned with the International 
Financial Reporting Standards (IFRSs) set by the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB).  
Source: Release Ceremony for Chinese Accounting Standards System and Audition Standards System 
held in Beijing.  Retrieved from http://www.acga-
asia.org/public/files/China_New_Accounting_Sytem_Feb06.pdf. 
76 Shanghai Stock Exchange (SHSE) and Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) are China’s two national 
stock exchanges: SHSE was re-established in December 1990, while SZSE was established in April 1991.  
As at Jun 2012, the SHSE had a total market capitalization of 15.3 trillion renminbi (RMB) with 945 
company listings.  The SZSE had a total market capitalization of 7.2 trillion RMB with 1,482 company 
listings on its main board. (Source: SHSE http://www.sse.com.cn; SZSE http://www.szse.cn). The SZSE 
also has a SME board and ChiNext (growth enterprise board).  The firms listed with these two boards 
are smaller firms with high growth potential, mainly in the high-tech industries like bio-technology, new 
energy, information technology and modern services, etc. 
77 These firm announcements and the exact date of the announcements can be accessed through the 
official websites of the two stock exchanges. 
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subsidiary sell-offs. This research also excludes events with clustered event windows and 
announcements made by firms with long periods of trading suspension and firms that were 
given “Special Treatment”.78 Financial information (stock prices of “A” shares and financial 
reports) on these firms were obtained from Shanghai Great Wisdom, a leading supplier of 
internet-based financial market data in China. Note that ‘A’ shares traded on the mainboards of 
the two national stock exchanges are owned by Chinese citizens and domestic institutions.79  
As at 2012, the percentage of tradable ‘A’ shares is 82% of the total shares issued in the 
market.80 
A majority of the 142 subsidiary sell-offs are carried out by firms listed on the mainboards 
(A) of China’s two national stock exchanges. 82 sell-offs (58%) were announced on the SHSE, 
54 sell-offs (38%) were announced on the SZSE, and the remaining 6 sell-offs (4%) were 
announced by firms listed on Shenzhen small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) board. 
                                                     
78 On April 22, 1998, the two stock exchanges announced that special treatment is to be given to listed 
companies with abnormal financial conditions.  These are: (i) negative net profit over two consecutive 
fiscal years; (ii) the per share net assets in a recent fiscal year is lower than the face value of the share; 
(iii) no audit report from an authorized accounting firm; and (iv) abnormal financial behavior identified 
and claimed by China Securities Regulatory Commission or a Stock Exchange. Source: China Stock 
Market Handbook (2008, February 15).  Retrieved from 
http://my.safaribooksonline.com/book/international-business-globalization/9781602670068/key-
concept-of-china-stock-markets/par01ch04sec04. 
79 There are two types of share listings – A and B – on the mainboards of the stock exchange in China.  ‘A’ type 
shares are denominated in Chinese RMB and are traded by Chinese residents (exclude residents in Hong Kong and 
Macau, and also the residents in Taiwan), Chinese domestic organizations/institutions and qualified foreign 
institutional investors.  ‘B’ type shares are denominated in foreign currency (USD in the SHSE and HKD in the 
SZSE) and are open to trading by both domestic and foreign investors.   
80 Prior to 2005, the percentage of tradable shares/total outstanding shares in China’s securities market is 38%.  
Thereafter, with the lifting of the non-tradable shares, the percentages increase steadily, and for the period of study: 
2007 – 46%; 2008 – 51%, 2009 -75%, 2010 – 77%; 2011 – 80% and 2012 – 82%. (Source: CSRC Annual Report 
2012, http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/csrc_en/Informations/publication/201307/ P020130716578944216513.pdf). 
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Firms which trade on the mainboards of the two stock exchanges are large firms and are 
predominantly state-owned companies (SOEs). The shares are denominated in the Chinese 
renminbi (RMB) and are traded by Chinese residents, domestic organizations/institutions and 
qualified foreign investors. In the sample, the majority of the sell-offs was a one-off sale. Out 
of the 113 firms, 94 firms (83%) conducted one property subsidiary sell-off and 19 firms (17%) 
conducted more than one property subsidiary sell-off. 97% of these property subsidiary sell-
offs was the real estate development arm of the firms. 
Table 4-2 presents some stylized facts about these property subsidiary sell-offs. Out of the 
142 sell-offs, 60% of these sales were by SOEs. The majority of these sell-offs were by non-
real estate firms (70%). The buyers of these sell-offs were more balanced – 45% of these sell-
offs were purchased by real estate firms and 55% by non-real estate firms. The average debt-
to-asset ratio of these firms was 56% and only about 6% of these firms used the sale proceeds 
to pay off debts. In terms of insider ownership, defined here as shares owned by directors, board 
of supervisors, and senior managers, it averaged about 0.14%. During the six months prior to 
the sell-off announcement, net-insider-purchase/sale of shares was almost economically 
insignificant, averaging only -0.04%  
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Table 4-2  Descriptive statistics 
Note: This table reports the descriptive statistics of variables. The variables are classified by their potential way of 
influencing the outcome of divestitures, including components on agency conflict, selling price, valuation error/ tax, 
synergy and some other controls. For the variable RPT, only 128 observations are available, since the buyer cannot 
be identified for the other 14 events. For the variable accounting profit, the book value of the target asset was 
unavailable in 8 events. For the variable net insider purchase and insider ownership, the unit of measurement is 
percentage. 
 
  Variables Obs. Mean Min Median Max  Std. Dev.
Agency 
conflicts 
SOE seller 142 0.6056  0  1  1  0.4904  
RPT 128 0.3516  0  0  1  0.4793  
Duality 142 0.1338  0  0  1  0.3416  
Appraisal 142 0.7394  0  1  1  0.4405  
Net insider purchase (%) 142 -0.0417  -4.2636 0.0000  0.0217  0.3678  
D/A ratio 142 0.5650  0.0556  0.5900  0.8923  0.1753  
Repayment of debt 142 0.0634  0  0  1  0.2445  
Insider ownership (%) 142 0.1442  0.0000  0.0003  5.2957  0.6562  
Price 
components 
OCF/asset 142 -0.0051  -0.2800 0.0000  0.2000  0.0777  
Industry seller 142 0.2958  0  0  1  0.4580  
Multiple sell 142 0.2042  0  0  1  0.4045  
Cooling measure 142 0.6549  0  1  1  0.4771  
Industry buyer 128 0.4531  0  0  1  0.4998  
Valuation 
error or tax 
component 
Accounting profit 134 0.0223  -0.0006 0.0076  0.3057  0.0461  
Synergy 
component 
Herfindahl index (chg) 142 0.0263  -0.4503 0.0071  0.5003  0.1291  
Focus 142 0.7465  0  1  1  0.4366  
Regulation 142 0.0563  0  0  1  0.2314  
Unwanted 142 0.1549  0  0  1  0.3631  
Shares 142 0.6507  0.0300  0.6000  1.0000  0.3224  
Size 142 0.0451  0.0006  0.0193  0.7036  0.0867  
Other 
controls 
Sh 142 0.5775  0  1  1  0.4957  
Main 142 0.9577  0  1  1  0.2019  
Developer 142 0.9718  0  1    
Looking into the motivation behind the sell-offs, 75% of the firms cited increased focus 
on their core business as the key reason for divesting their real estate subsidiary.81 We further 
                                                     
81 Two examples are: (i) Zhuhai Port Co., Ltd. which sold off their real estate subsidiary for 36 million RMB on 23 
November 2010 and announced that it is retreating from real estate to focus on its port logistic business 
(http://www.cninfo.com.cn/finalpage/2010-11-23/58693768.PDF?www.cninfo.com.cn), and (ii) Yeland Group Co., 
Ltd. which sold 50% of their real estate subsidiary for 270 million RMB on 12 February 2010.  The firm announced 
that the divestiture was strategically taken to reinforce the high-end positioning of its brand.  
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analyze this by constructing a Herfindahl index of revenue makeup one accounting period prior 
to and after the sell-offs. We find a positive change, indicating that there is improvement in the 
firms’ business focus after their sell-offs. 65% of these sell-offs were conducted after Jan 2010 
when the Chinese government introduced a series of property market cooling measures.82 
Another 6% of these sell-offs was due to other regulatory policies imposed by the Chinese 
government.83 Finally, 15% of the sell-offs involved voluntary sell-offs of poor performing 
assets by the firms.84 
To determine whether these property subsidiary sell-offs are conducted at “arm’s-length”, 
we looked into a few factors such as financial reporting of the asset sale, whether the Chairman 
and the General Manager of the firm is the same person, and whether the sale was conducted 
                                                     
(http://www.cninfo.com.cn/finalpage/2010-02-12/57607069.PDF?www.cninfo.com.cn) 
82 On 7th January 2010, the State Council of China announced a series of measures designed to cool down China’s 
property market.  These measures include: requiring banks to set loan quota and enhance credit management for 
developers, imposing a 40% down payment for buyers of second properties, allowing local governments to restrict 
property purchases from migrants.  On 17th April 2010, more measures were announced: the down payment is now 
increased to 50% of the property value, buyers of second properties have to pay 1.1 times the bench mark loan rate, 
banks can no longer lend to buyers of third properties, and property purchase restrictions were imposed in 12 cities.  
On 1 January 2011, more measures were announced: the down-payment is raised further to 60% of property price, 
and property purchase restrictions are now imposed in all municipalities, provincial capitals, and cities with high 
housing prices.  (Source: State Council Files 2010(4), 2010(10), and 2011(1)). One example is Anhui Shan Ying 
Paper Industry Co., Ltd., which sold 51% of its real estate subsidiary for 61 million RMB in September 2010 to 
avoid excessive risk exposure to the real estate market that was affected by the government cooling measures. 
(Source: http://www.cninfo.com.cn/finalpage/2010-07-10/58156093.PDF?www.cninfo.com.cn.) 
83 An example is Shaanxi International Trust & Investment Co., Ltd. which sold 100% of its real estate subsidiary 
for 95 million RMB in March 2011 in response to the China Banking Regulatory Commission’s regulatory policy to 
promote restructuring and development of specialized financial institutions. (Source: 
http://www.cninfo.com.cn/finalpage/2011-03-12/59111741.PDF?www.cninfo.com.cn.) 
84 A case example of this would be Xiamen Insight Investment Co., Ltd. which sold 65% of their real estate 
subsidiary for 19.6 million RMB in 2010 due to the subsidiary’s poor performance 
(http://www.cninfo.com.cn/finalpage/2010-01-04/57461600.PDF?www.cninfo.com.cn). 
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between related parties. For the latter, we have to depend on self-reporting by the firms as this 
was a policy requirement arising from the implementation of the new financial reporting 
standards in 2007.  More than 70% of the sell-offs were appraised and had an accompanying 
appraisal report.  The property subsidiaries seem to be sold at a price higher than the book 
value – there is an average accounting profit that is equivalent to about 2% of the firm’s market 
capitalization. In terms of holding dual positions by one person, this happens only in 13% of 
the sell-offs.  This indicates that managerial control motivation for the sell-offs would not be 
a pressing issue in the analysis.  35% of the sell-offs were between related parties. Out of the 
142 sell-offs, the buyers can be identified for 128 of these sell-offs. Unfortunately, only one of 
the buyers is a publicly listed firm.  As a result, this research could not obtain further 
information for a more detailed analysis of the buyers.  
 
4.5 Empirical Results 
4.5.1 Divergent Reactions to Announcement 
Panel A of Figure 4-1 presents the movements of the average cumulative abnormal returns 
(CAR) over the period (-20, +20) and Panel A of Table 4-3 summarizes the stock price reactions 
around the date of divestiture announcements, using a range of event windows. Overall, the 
returns exhibit negative market reactions between twelve days prior to the announcement and 
two days post-announcement. This is consistent with the findings of Alexander et al. (1984)  
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Table 4-3  Cumulative abnormal returns for various intervals 
 
Panel A: Cumulative abnormal return for full sample 
This table summarizes the cumulative abnormal returns for various intervals using the full sample of 142 events. The 
peak of reaction corresponds to the difference between the highest and the lowest point in the CAR curve in Panel A 
of Figure 4-1. *, **, *** stand for level of significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level. 
 
  Interval (࢚૚, ࢚૛) ۱ۯ܀തതതതതത܂    Sig 
a. the peak of reaction  (3,17) 2.21% 2.5911***  
b. immediate reactions (-4,0) -0.28% -0.41651  
 (-3,0) -0.31% -0.75812  
 (-2,0) -0.26% -0.58834  
 (-1,-1) -0.18% -0.8163  
 (-1,0) -0.42% -1.3126  
  (0,1) -0.44% -1.2576  
c. reactions in symmetric intervals (-20,-16) 0.13% 0.1136  
 (-15,-11) -0.59% -1.3296  
 (-10,-6) -0.27% -0.1679  
 (-5,0) 0.03% 0.31017  
 (0,5) -0.20% -0.1034 
 (6,10) 0.28% 0.7426  
 (11,15) 0.64% 1.3748  
  (16,20) 0.38% 0.9125  
d. reactions in full event window (-20,20) 0.64% 0.7599  
e. combination of prior and after intervals (-5,20) 1.37% 1.56792  
 (-5,15) 1.49% 1.70181*  
 (-5,10) 0.35% 0.78415  
 (-5,5) 0.07% 0.46345  
 
Panel B: Cumulative abnormal return for subsamples of SOEs and non-SOEs 
This table compares the cumulative abnormal returns in various intervals for SOEs (sample size=86) 
and non-SOEs (sample size=56). *, **, *** stand for level of significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level. 
 
 SOE (86 samples) Non-SOE (56 samples) SOE vs. Non-SOE 
Interval (࢚૚, ࢚૛) ۱ۯ܀തതതതതത܂ Sig ۱ۯ܀തതതതതത܂ Sig SOE minus non-SOE Sig 
a. peak of reaction 
(3,17) 1.79% 1.5015  2.85% 2.2654** -1.06% -0.8201  
b. immediate intervals around the day of announcement 
(-4,0) -0.91% -1.2999  0.70% 0.9634  -1.62% -1.5661  
(-3,0) -1.04% -1.8931* 0.81% 1.1456  -1.84% -2.0804** 
(-2,0) -0.82% -1.6721* 0.63% 1.1906  -1.45% -1.9766** 
(-1,0) -0.78% -2.0048** 0.12% 0.3744  -0.90% -1.5503  
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(Table 4-3 Panel B Continued) 
(-1,-1) -0.40% -1.4264  0.13% 0.3943  -0.53% -1.2027  
(0,1) -0.59% -1.3995  -0.23% -0.2834  -0.37% 0.6583  
c. reactions in symmetric intervals 
(-20,-16) -0.54% -0.8523  1.15% 1.2471  -1.69% -1.5057  
(-15,-11) -0.44% -0.8080  -0.85% -1.1482  0.41% 0.3861  
(-10,-6) -0.16% 0.0874  -0.44% -0.3812  0.28% 0.3515  
(-5,0) -0.83% -0.9122  1.36% 1.6455*  -2.19% -1.8496*  
(0,5) -0.43% -0.5441  0.15% 0.5189  -0.58% -0.7455  
(6,10) -0.05% 0.2207  0.80% 0.9256  -0.85% -0.5817  
(11,15) 0.71% 1.1682  0.57% 0.7893  0.14% 0.1193  
(16,20) 0.40% 0.3615  0.37% 1.0155  0.04% -0.5633  
d. full window 
(-20,20) -0.95% -0.2659  3.07% 1.5396  -4.02% -1.3652  
e. combination of prior and after intervals 
(-5,20) 0.17% 0.3161  3.21% 2.1050** -3.04% -1.4397  
(-5,15) -0.22% 0.1911  2.84% 1.8812*  -3.06% -1.3439  
(-5,10) -0.91% -0.4057  2.28% 1.7515*  -3.20% -1.6178  
(-5,5) -0.86% -0.6363  1.50% 1.5265  -2.36% -1.5875  
 
that sell-offs appear to be announced after a period of generally negative abnormal returns, 
suggesting that sell-offs are sometimes announced after negative information about the firm is 
released. The market only starts to react positively at day (+3) after the divestiture 
announcement. However, contrary to extant findings in the literature, this study generally does 
not find a statistically strong market reaction.  A closer analysis with a range of event windows 
(Panel A of Table 4-3) shows persistently neutral market reactions. There are exceptions for 
periods (-5, +15) and (+3,+17).  The longer event windows may be due to the market being 
less efficient in China, giving rise to a longer period of adjustment (Ma, 2004). There could be 
a variety of reasons for this neutral market reactions: (1) market reactions may be economically 
small, such that at an aggregate level, these responses become statistically insignificant, (2) the 
markets may not perceive the sell-offs to have a real economic value to the firm, and/or (3) the  
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Figure 4-1  Movements of the average cumulative abnormal returns (CAR)  
Panel A: Average cumulative abnormal return for full sample 
This figure presents the movements of the average cumulative abnormal returns over the event window (-20, +20) 
using the full sample of 142 events. 
 
 
Panel B: Average cumulative abnormal return for subsamples of SOEs and non-SOEs 
Note: This figure presents the movements of the average cumulative abnormal returns over the event window (-20, 
+20), for SOEs (sample size =86) in solid line and non-SOEs (sample size=56) in dashed line. 
 
 
contrasting market reactions for SOEs and non-SOEs combined to result in a neutralized 
response from the market. Subsequently, the sample is divided into SOE sell-offs and non-SOE 
sell-offs to examine if there may be conflicting market reactions related to the different 
institutional ownership structure between these two groups.   
Panel B of Figure 4-1 shows a persistently negative market reaction to SOE sell-offs, while 
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initial support to the hypothesis that the market reacts negatively to sell-offs by SOEs. Panel B 
of Table 4-3 shows that for SOE sell-offs, there are statistically negative abnormal returns for 
the immediate period surrounding the sell-off announcement: -0.78% (CAR-1,0), -0.82% (CAR-
2,0) and -1.04% (CAR-3,0).  For the non-SOE sell-offs, in the immediate period prior to the 
announcement day, there is a statistically positive abnormal return of 1.36% (CAR-5,0).  
Statistically positive abnormal returns are also seen for longer intervals: 2.28% (CAR-5,+10), 
2.84% (CAR-5,+15) and 3.21% (CAR-5,+20). The findings are consistent with findings from Fan 
et al. (2007).  In their study, they find that first day IPO returns have a negative relationship 
with the firm’s CEO political connectivity.  They suggest that the market pay a lower price for 
these stocks because the investors expect negative influences arising from government 
interventions. In contrast, firms with politically unconnected CEOs underprice their IPO shares 
in order to signal to investors that they are subjected to less intervention by the state. 
We propose that the reasons for this divergent reaction are linked to the institutional 
ownership structure of the firm and the degree of managerial agency conflicts. Earlier in this 
chapter, it is hypothesized that since SOEs have access to more favourable financing options 
and may face soft budget constraints, their sell-offs are unlikely to be due to either the asset 
allocation efficiency theory or the financing theory. The data shows that for SOE sell-offs, only 
1% was due to financial constraints, while 8% was due to regulations. For non-SOEs, 14% was 
due to financial constraints, while only 2% was due to regulations imposed by the state. For 
non-SOEs, firms do not have a competitive advantage nor do they have favourable financing, 
hence, the motivation of the sell-off may be more aligned with shareholders’ interests. In 
addition, SOEs, compared to non-SOEs, tend to conduct more than one property subsidiary 
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sell-offs. Glascock et al. (1989) suggest that the market react less positively if a seller conducts 
more than one divestiture. The reasons for the divergent reaction will be elaborated in the next 
section. 
4.5.2 Multivariate Analysis 
Table 4-4 summarizes the results of the multivariate regression (Equation 8). We are primarily 
interested in the indicators for agency conflicts but we have control variables for the price 
components, the valuation error, the synergy component and other firm characteristics. The 
dependent variables are cumulative abnormal returns estimated over three event windows: 
(CAR-1,0), (CAR-1,-1) and (CAR+3,+17). The first two event windows are the usual windows 
chosen in extant studies and specifically examine the market reactions immediately surrounding 
the announcement. The last event window provides the most salient price effect for the study 
and is used as a robustness check. 
Focusing on the variables of interest related to agency conflicts and analyzing results from 
the conventional event windows (CAR-1,-1 and CAR-1,0), we find significant negative abnormal 
returns ranging from -1.4% to -2.4% if the sell-offs were conducted by a SOE. Thus, compared 
to non-SOE sell-offs, the market reacts more negatively to a SOE sell-offs. This negative 
reaction is consistent with the findings of negative abnormal returns associated with SOE sell-
offs in the previous section. Negative abnormal returns are associated with RPT (related-party 
transactions), but these reactions are not statistically significant. RPT is a dummy variable with 
a value of one if the buyer of the property subsidiary is related to the seller.85 There are 
                                                     
85 Since the introduction of the new Chinese Accounting Standards on 1 Jan 2007, firms are required to make public 
any related party transaction and its value. According to the new standards, a related party transaction occurs, “when 
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significant positive abnormal returns ranging from 2.3% to 4.2% when there are net insider 
purchases at least six months prior to the announcements of the sell-offs. This finding is 
consistent with the results in Hirschey and Zaima (1989) who find favourable market reactions 
with increased insider ownership. The stock market reacts positively to the provision of an 
appraisal report, there is a positive abnormal return of 1.4% that is statistically significant at the 
10% level. Though statistically insignificant, the multivariate analysis finds that the stock 
market reacts negatively to managers holding dual positions within the firm and firms with 
higher levels of insider ownership. The control variables for the price components, the valuation 
error, the synergy component and other firm characteristics are statistically insignificant. This 
implies that the market may be more concerned about the agency costs related to managerial 
discretion. Referring to the results obtained from the event window of CAR+3,+17, we find 
similar results with two additional statistically significant variables: related-party transaction 
and the percentage of shares of the property subsidiary sell-off. The negative estimated 
coefficient on RPT is consistent with the literature, such as Jiang et al. (2010), that controlling 
shareholders may engage in favourable asset-related transfers to “prop up” the earnings of a 
firm to meet key performance targets set by market regulators, often at the expense of the  
                                                     
a party controls, jointly controls or exercises significant influence over another party, or when two or more parties 
are under the control, joint control or significant influence of the same party, the affiliated party relationships are 
constituted.”  This new definition broadened “related party transaction” to include dealings with the firm managers 
and their close family members. 
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Table 4-4  Multivariate analysis with different intervals 
This table presents the results of multivariate analysis with different intervals. The dependent variables are cumulative 
abnormal return in interval (-1, -1), (-1, 0) and (3, 17). The independent variables are specified according to Table 
3-1. Robust standard errors are used in parentheses. *, **, *** stand for level of significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% 
level. 
 
     (1)       (2) (3) 
VARIABLES ۱ۯ܀തതതതതതሺି૚,ି૚ሻ ۱ۯ܀തതതതതതሺି૚,૙ሻ ۱ۯ܀തതതതതതሺ૜,૚ૠሻ 
(Agency Conflicts)    
SOE seller  -0.0149** -0.0243*** -0.0325* 
 (0.00648) (0.00902) (0.0186) 
RPT -0.00737 -0.00570 -0.0533** 
 (0.00657) (0.00919) (0.0238) 
Duality -0.0116 -0.000554 -0.0241 
 (0.00772) (0.0118) (0.0276) 
Appraisal 0.0140* 0.0113 0.0390 
 (0.00842) (0.0101) (0.0240) 
Net insider purchase 0.0261*** 0.0419*** 0.0238* 
 (0.00510) (0.00532) (0.0142) 
D/A ratio -0.00207 0.00813 -0.0562 
 (0.0142) (0.0221) (0.0522) 
Repayment of debt 0.00119 -0.00336 0.0268 
 (0.00925) (0.0169) (0.0329) 
Insider ownership -2.50e-05 -0.000948 -0.00696 
 (0.00357) (0.00724) (0.0140) 
(Price Components)    
OCF/asset 0.00226 -0.0531 -0.0901 
 (0.0349) (0.0515) (0.106) 
Industry seller 0.00483 0.0112 0.00368 
 (0.00676) (0.0101) (0.0204) 
Multiple sell -0.00661 -0.00233 -0.00809 
 (0.00754) (0.0113) (0.0237) 
Industry buyer 0.00235 0.00458 0.0124 
 (0.00654) (0.00935) (0.0183) 
(Valuation Error or Tax Component)   
Accounting profit -0.0658 0.0999 -0.0968 
 (0.0589) (0.108) (0.231) 
(Synergy Component)    
Focus86 -0.00569 -0.00823 0.0312 
 (0.00695) (0.00938) (0.0260) 
Regulation -0.00517 -0.00508 0.0371 
                                                     
86 We have tried alternative proxy of focus using change in the Herfindahl index of revenue makeup prior to and 
after divestitures. The results are consistent and robust. 
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(Table 4-4 Continued) 
 (0.0163) (0.0241) (0.0459) 
Unwanted -0.00865 -0.00507 0.00611 
 (0.00843) (0.0115) (0.0265) 
Shares -0.0124 -0.0204 0.0548* 
 (0.0110) (0.0155) (0.0300) 
Size 0.0316 -0.0106 0.00383 
 (0.0260) (0.0440) (0.119) 
(Other Controls)    
sh 0.00335 0.0109 -0.00220 
 (0.00646) (0.00881) (0.0216) 
main 0.000505 0.0177 -0.00615 
 (0.0162) (0.0243) (0.0635) 
developer 0.000443 -0.00485 -0.0544 
 (0.0111) (0.0137) (0.0390) 
Constant 0.0246 -0.00224 0.0631 
 (0.0251) (0.0365) (0.0859) 
Year Fixed Y Y Y 
Observations 120 120 120 
R-squared 0.199 0.262 0.184 
 
minority shareholders.87 
Our multivariate results show that the market reacts positively to net insider purchase and 
this reaction is statistically significant. The positive reaction to higher levels of net insider 
purchase can be attributed to managers’ actions are more aligned with shareholders’ interest for 
closely held firms. Correspondingly, the market reacts negatively to SOE sell-offs and this 
reaction is statistically significant. Thus, one natural question arises from the above results: 
“Why does the market react negatively to sell-offs by SOEs?” empirical answer is “Because it 
is a SOE.” However, a deeper thought analysis would throw up questions like: are all SOEs’ 
                                                     
87 One serious incidence associated with related-party transaction was the D’Long Crisis in April 2004.  D'Long 
was once the largest conglomerate in China. Listed subsidiaries of D'Long were manipulated to obtain bank loans, 
the proceeds of which were later channelled to other non-listed sector of the D'Long group through complicated 
RPTs. D'Long also constructed a network of loan-guarantee among seemingly unrelated firms which were in fact 
under the control of D'Long through complicated ownership structures. The incidence escalated into a credit crisis 
when commercial banks and brokerage firms announced they were mired in the D’Long’s chain of bad loans.   
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sell-offs bad? The answer is likely to be no. Are all SOEs susceptible to poor managerial efforts 
and high incidences of self-dealing? Again, the answer is likely to be no. To analyze further, 
this chapter compares the characteristics of the divestitures made by SOEs and non-SOEs.  
Table 4-5 presents the descriptive statistics and compares the differences between these 
two groups. It is interesting to see that SOEs have better corporate governance than non-SOEs 
for several indicators. Non-SOEs engage in higher levels of related-party transactions, 45% 
versus 27%. For managers holding dual positions (General Manager and Chairman of the 
Board), non-SOEs hold higher levels of this duality, 21% versus 8%. But SOEs are more likely 
to suffer from free cash flow problem: 14% of non-SOEs use the sale proceeds from the sell-
offs to pay debt, while only 1% of SOEs did so. It is also noted that non-SOEs have higher 
levels of insider ownership (0.36%) whereas SOEs only have an insignificant level (0.003%), 
signaling potential misalignment of interest for SOE managers. Compared with non-SOEs, a 
larger portion of SOEs conducts more than one sell-off, 29% versus 7%. SOEs and non-SOEs 
face different regulation requirements: 8% of the SOE sell-offs was imposed by the regulators, 
while it is only 2% for the non-SOE sell-offs.  66% of the SOEs were listed on the SHSE, 
while only 44% of the non-SOEs were listed on SHSE. 
In summary, there are significant differences between the two groups in indicators for 
agency conflicts and firm characteristics. To further examine how these differences may affect 
the market reaction to the firm’s divestment decisions, the multivariate regressions are repeated  
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Table 4-5  Sell-Offs comparison between SOEs and non-SOEs 
This table provides difference in mean comparison of characteristics of sell-offs by SOEs and non SOEs. 
For the variable net insider purchase and insider ownership, the unit of measurement is percentage. *, 
**, *** stand for level of significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level. 
 






RPT 0.2740 0.4545 -0.1806 -2.1811**  
Duality 0.0814 0.2143 -0.1329 -2.1169**  
Appraisal 0.7674 0.6964 0.0710 0.9211  
Net insider purchase (%) 0.0005 -0.1065 0.1070 1.3741  
D/A ratio 0.5705 0.5565 0.0140 0.4556  
Repayment of debt 0.0116 0.1429 -0.1312 -2.7004***  
Insider ownership (%) 0.0029 0.3612 -0.3583 -2.6489***  
Price 
components 
OCF/asset -0.0024 -0.0093 0.0068 0.5148  
Industry seller 0.3256 0.2500 0.0756 0.9764  
Multiple sell 0.2907 0.0714 -0.2086 -3.2420***  
Industry buyer 0.4795 0.4182 0.0613 0.7138  
Cooling measure 0.6512 0.6607 -0.0096 -0.1163  
Valuation 
error or tax 
component 
Accounting profit 0.0213 0.0192 0.0021 0.3407  
Synergy 
component 
Herfindahl index (chg) 0.0170 0.0407 -0.0237 -1.1118  
Focus 0.7326 0.7679 -0.0353 -0.4740  
Regulation 0.0814 0.0179 0.0635 1.8353*  
Unwanted 0.1279 0.1964 -0.0685 -1.0596  
Shares 0.6466 0.6571 -0.0104 -0.1868  
Size 0.0481 0.0404 0.0077 0.6064  
Other 
controls 
Sh 0.6628 0.4464 0.2164 2.5637**  
Main 1.0000 0.8929 0.1071 2.5690**  
Developer 0.9651 0.9821 -0.0170 -0.6368  
 
by adding an interaction term (each of the agency-related variables on SOE). Note that each 
interaction term is tested individually to avoid an over-fitted regression model.88 In general, 
the regression coefficients for the agency-related variables are robust (as reported in Table 4-4). 
In particular, the coefficient for SOE is consistently negative and statistically significant. 
                                                     
88 In total, we ran 21 regressions to test the interaction terms (7 agency-related variables) for intervals (-1, 0) (-1, -
1) and (3, 17).  
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Among the models, insignificant effects are observed for the interaction terms for SOE x RPT 
(related party transaction), SOE x duality (managers holding dual positions), SOE x appraisal 
(appraisal report of the target assets), and SOE x D/A ratio (debt-to-asset ratio of the seller).89  
However, we have some interesting insights for three interaction terms, namely SOE x 
repayment of debt, SOE x insider ownership and SOE x net insider purchase. In Panel A of 
Table 4-6, the estimated coefficient on SOE x repayment of debt is positive and significant, 
suggesting that the market reacts more positively to property subsidiary sell-offs by SOEs if the 
sale proceeds from the sell-offs are utilized to repay debt, which is consistent with the findings 
by Lang et al. (1995). Conversely, if the sale proceeds are retained within the SOE, the stock 
market response is negative due to the higher agency costs related to managerial discretion on 
the free cash flow. In Panel B of Table 4-6, the estimated coefficient on SOE x insider ownership 
is positive and significant. This result implies that agency issues associated with SOEs could 
be attributed to the low level of ownership by the managers, i.e. the misalignment of interests 
between managers and the shareholders. In Panel C of Table 4-6, we can see that the 
shareholding pattern of the managers prior to the divestment is a credible signal to the market. 
The stock market reacts more positively if the managers, presumably by possessing better 
information, have increased their shareholding in the SOE prior to the announcement of the 
property subsidiary sale, and vice-versa.  
  
                                                     
89 The tables of the regression results are not reported here, but are available on request. 
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Table 4-6  Multivariate analysis with interactions of SOEs and agency variables 
Panel A: Interaction of SOEs and the repayment of debt. 
This table reports robustness check with interaction of SOEs and the repayment of debt. The dependent 
variables are cumulative abnormal return in interval (-1, -1), (-1, 0) and (3, 17). The independent variables 
are specified according to Table 4-1. Robust standard errors are used in parentheses. *, **, *** stand for 
level of significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES ۱ۯ܀തതതതതതሺି૚,ି૚ሻ ۱ۯ܀തതതതതതሺି૚,૙ሻ ۱ۯ܀തതതതതതሺ૜,૚ૠሻ 
(Agency Conflicts)    
SOE seller -0.0171** -0.0284*** -0.0333* 
 (0.00657) (0.00875) (0.0198) 
SOE ൈ Repayment of debt 0.0449*** 0.0838*** 0.0164 
 (0.0129) (0.0190) (0.0531) 
RPT -0.00808 -0.00704 -0.0536** 
 (0.00655) (0.00913) (0.0238) 
Duality -0.0117 -0.000905 -0.0242 
 (0.00779) (0.0118) (0.0278) 
Appraisal 0.0145* 0.0121 0.0391 
 (0.00837) (0.0102) (0.0241) 
Net insider purchase 0.0271*** 0.0438*** 0.0242 
 (0.00514) (0.00514) (0.0147) 
D/A ratio -0.00398 0.00456 -0.0569 
 (0.0142) (0.0223) (0.0523) 
Repayment of debt -0.00461 -0.0142 0.0247 
 (0.00881) (0.0150) (0.0379) 
Insider ownership 0.00139 0.00169 -0.00645 
 (0.00368) (0.00635) (0.0151) 
(Price Components)    
OCF/asset 0.00706 -0.0441 -0.0884 
 (0.0354) (0.0512) (0.108) 
Industry seller 0.00550 0.0124 0.00392 
 (0.00683) (0.0102) (0.0208) 
Multiple sell 0.00274 0.00531 0.0125 
 (0.00650) (0.00925) (0.0184) 
Industry buyer -0.00605 -0.00127 -0.00788 
 (0.00756) (0.0113) (0.0237) 
(Valuation Error or Tax Component)    
Accounting profit -0.0692 0.0935 -0.0981 
 (0.0618) (0.108) (0.233) 
(Synergy Component)    
Focus -0.00727 -0.0112 0.0306 
 (0.00684) (0.00910) (0.0266) 
Regulation -0.00296 -0.000949 0.0379 
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(Table 4-6 Panel A Continued) 
 (0.0161) (0.0237) (0.0467) 
Unwanted -0.00917 -0.00605 0.00592 
 (0.00841) (0.0113) (0.0267) 
Shares -0.0132 -0.0217 0.0545* 
 (0.0109) (0.0155) (0.0302) 
Size 0.0343 -0.00552 0.00483 
 (0.0276) (0.0456) (0.120) 
(Other Controls)    
Sh 0.00302 0.0103 -0.00232 
 (0.00646) (0.00884) (0.0218) 
Main 0.00416 0.0245 -0.00481 
 (0.0161) (0.0224) (0.0657) 
Developer -0.00198 -0.00936 -0.0553 
 (0.0112) (0.0137) (0.0392) 
Constant 0.0276 0.00330 0.0641 
 (0.0251) (0.0357) (0.0856) 
Year Fixed Y Y Y 
Observations 120 120 120 
R-squared 0.216 0.287 0.184 
 
Panel B. Interaction of SOEs and insider ownership 
Note: This table reports robustness check with interaction of SOEs and insider ownership. The dependent variables 
are cumulative abnormal return in interval (-1, -1), (-1, 0) and (3, 17). The independent variables are specified 
according to Table 4-1. Robust standard errors are used in parentheses. *, **, *** stand for level of significance at 
10%, 5%, and 1% level. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES ۱ۯ܀തതതതതതሺି૚,ି૚ሻ ۱ۯ܀തതതതതതሺି૚,૙ሻ ۱ۯ܀തതതതതതሺ૜,૚ૠሻ 
(Agency Conflicts)    
SOE seller -0.0161** -0.0256*** -0.0348* 
 (0.00655) (0.00927) (0.0189) 
SOE ൈInsider ownership 0.281** 0.321* 0.555 
 (0.124) (0.173) (0.387) 
RPT -0.00595 -0.00409 -0.0505** 
 (0.00662) (0.00945) (0.0242) 
Duality -0.0113 -0.000255 -0.0236 
 (0.00762) (0.0118) (0.0278) 
Appraisal 0.0140 0.0113 0.0390 
 (0.00848) (0.0102) (0.0242) 
Net insider purchase 0.0263*** 0.0422*** 0.0243* 
 (0.00500) (0.00529) (0.0141) 
D/A ratio -0.00294 0.00714 -0.0579 
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(Table 4-6 Panel B Continued) 
 (0.0143) (0.0223) (0.0524) 
Repayment of debt 0.000979 -0.00360 0.0264 
 (0.00946) (0.0170) (0.0335) 
Insider ownership -3.41e-05 -0.000958 -0.00698 
 (0.00359) (0.00728) (0.0139) 
(Price Components)    
OCF/asset -0.00921 -0.0662 -0.113 
 (0.0347) (0.0529) (0.109) 
Industry seller 0.00553 0.0119 0.00506 
 (0.00663) (0.0101) (0.0207) 
Multiple sell 0.00318 0.00553 0.0140 
 (0.00662) (0.00951) (0.0184) 
Industry buyer -0.00557 -0.00115 -0.00603 
 (0.00748) (0.0112) (0.0236) 
(Valuation Error or Tax Component)    
Accounting profit -0.0613 0.105 -0.0880 
 (0.0605) (0.107) (0.232) 
(Synergy Component)    
Focus -0.00636 -0.00899 0.0299 
 (0.00700) (0.00945) (0.0264) 
Regulation -0.00473 -0.00458 0.0379 
 (0.0168) (0.0246) (0.0467) 
Unwanted -0.0112 -0.00794 0.00115 
 (0.00845) (0.0114) (0.0274) 
Shares -0.0132 -0.0213 0.0532* 
 (0.0111) (0.0157) (0.0303) 
Size 0.0310 -0.0113 0.00269 
 (0.0269) (0.0442) (0.119) 
(Other Controls)    
Sh 0.00243 0.00984 -0.00400 
 (0.00645) (0.00874) (0.0219) 
Main 0.00179 0.0191 -0.00362 
 (0.0163) (0.0243) (0.0637) 
Developer 0.000607 -0.00466 -0.0541 
 (0.0109) (0.0136) (0.0389) 
Constant 0.0245 -0.00245 0.0627 
 (0.0249) (0.0365) (0.0858) 
Year Fixed Y Y Y 
Observations 120 120 120 
R-squared 0.213 0.270 0.190 
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Panel C. Interaction of SOEs and net insider purchase 
Note: This table reports robustness check with interaction of SOEs and net insider purchase. The dependent variables 
are cumulative abnormal return in interval (-1, -1), (-1, 0) and (3, 17). The independent variables are specified 
according to Table 4-1. Robust standard errors are used in parentheses. *, **, *** stand for level of significance at 
10%, 5%, and 1% level. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES ۱ۯ܀തതതതതതሺି૚,ି૚ሻ ۱ۯ܀തതതതതതሺି૚,૙ሻ ۱ۯ܀തതതതതതሺ૜,૚ૠሻ 
(Agency Conflicts)    
SOE seller -0.0162** -0.0261*** -0.0345* 
 (0.00649) (0.00907) (0.0188) 
SOE ൈNet insider purchase 2.542*** 3.641** 3.801 
 (0.676) (1.456) (2.389) 
RPT -0.00574 -0.00337 -0.0509** 
 (0.00652) (0.00936) (0.0243) 
Duality -0.0111 0.000109 -0.0234 
 (0.00751) (0.0118) (0.0279) 
Appraisal 0.0138 0.0109 0.0386 
 (0.00841) (0.0101) (0.0242) 
Net insider purchase 0.0266*** 0.0426*** 0.0245* 
 (0.00488) (0.00511) (0.0141) 
D/A ratio -0.00219 0.00795 -0.0564 
 (0.0142) (0.0219) (0.0526) 
Repayment of debt 0.000759 -0.00398 0.0261 
 (0.00943) (0.0169) (0.0334) 
Insider ownership -4.83e-05 -0.000981 -0.00700 
 (0.00357) (0.00720) (0.0139) 
(Price Components)    
OCF/asset -0.0140 -0.0764 -0.114 
 (0.0343) (0.0520) (0.110) 
Industry seller 0.00594 0.0127 0.00534 
 (0.00654) (0.0100) (0.0207) 
Multiple sell 0.00330 0.00594 0.0138 
 (0.00656) (0.00933) (0.0184) 
Industry buyer -0.00534 -0.000501 -0.00617 
 (0.00741) (0.0111) (0.0236) 
(Valuation Error or Tax Component)    
Accounting profit -0.0583 0.111 -0.0856 
 (0.0614) (0.105) (0.233) 
(Synergy Component)    
Focus -0.00669 -0.00966 0.0297 
 (0.00698) (0.00937) (0.0261) 
Regulation -0.00409 -0.00353 0.0387 
 (0.0168) (0.0247) (0.0462) 
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(Table 4-6 Panel C Continued) 
Unwanted -0.0120 -0.00984 0.00114 
 (0.00836) (0.0116) (0.0270) 
Shares -0.0139 -0.0225 0.0526* 
 (0.0110) (0.0155) (0.0303) 
Size 0.0304 -0.0123 0.00209 
 (0.0272) (0.0438) (0.119) 
(Other Controls)    
Sh 0.00176 0.00861 -0.00457 
 (0.00638) (0.00860) (0.0220) 
Main 0.00222 0.0201 -0.00358 
 (0.0161) (0.0240) (0.0635) 
Developer -8.64e-05 -0.00561 -0.0552 
 (0.0113) (0.0139) (0.0379) 
Constant 0.0256 -0.000809 0.0645 
 (0.0248) (0.0363) (0.0852) 
Year Fixed Y Y Y 
Observations 120 120 120 
R-squared 0.228 0.287 0.190 
In summary, the analyses indicate that shareholders wealth associated with sell-offs 
increases more when there are less agency issues present. As to the on-going SOE reform in 
the economy of China, the results suggest that agency issues with SOEs could be moderated by 
reducing free cash flow available to SOEs, and by aligning the interest of managers and 
shareholders through increases in insider ownership. 
4.6 Robustness Tests and Additional Insights 
Around two-third of the events happened after Jan 2010, when a series of cooling measures 
were subsequently launched by the Chinese government. Non-real estate SOEs under the 
central government were required to retreat from the over-heated real estate market. The 
negative market reactions to sell-offs by SOEs can thus be attributed to the regulatory pressure  
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Table 4-7  Robustness check with interaction of SOEs and the cooling measures 
This table reports robustness check with interaction of SOEs and the cooling measures. The dependent variables are 
cumulative abnormal return in interval (-1, -1), (-1, 0) and (3, 17). The independent variables are specified according 
to Table 4-1. Robust standard errors are used in parentheses. *, **, *** stand for level of significance at 10%, 5%, 
and 1% level. 
 
     (1)       (2)        (3) 
VARIABLES ۱ۯ܀തതതതതതሺି૚,ି૚ሻ ۱ۯ܀തതതതതതሺି૚,૙ሻ ۱ۯ܀തതതതതതሺ૜,૚ૠሻ 
(Agency Conflicts)    
SOE seller -0.0246** -0.0482*** -0.0227 
 (0.0109) (0.0133) (0.0323) 
SOE ൈ cooling measures 0.0164 0.0406** -0.0165 
 (0.0138) (0.0177) (0.0446) 
RPT -0.00816 -0.00768 -0.0525** 
 (0.00673) (0.00925) (0.0241) 
Duality -0.00998 0.00335 -0.0257 
 (0.00760) (0.0111) (0.0280) 
Appraisal 0.0152* 0.0142 0.0378 
 (0.00856) (0.0106) (0.0237) 
Net insider purchase 0.0261*** 0.0420*** 0.0238 
 (0.00490) (0.00511) (0.0147) 
D/A ratio -0.00266 0.00666 -0.0556 
 (0.0139) (0.0211) (0.0524) 
Repayment of debt -0.00238 -0.0122 0.0304 
 (0.00955) (0.0159) (0.0350) 
Insider ownership 0.000639 0.000694 -0.00763 
 (0.00352) (0.00608) (0.0144) 
(Price Components)    
OCF/asset -0.000237 -0.0593 -0.0876 
 (0.0337) (0.0490) (0.107) 
Industry seller 0.00487 0.0112 0.00365 
 (0.00693) (0.00994) (0.0207) 
Multiple sell -0.0101 -0.0110 -0.00454 
 (0.00817) (0.0120) (0.0249) 
Industry buyer 0.00295 0.00607 0.0117 
 (0.00661) (0.00941) (0.0182) 
(Valuation Error or Tax Component)   
Accounting profit -0.0797 0.0653 -0.0827 
 (0.0622) (0.112) (0.233) 
(Synergy Component)    
Focus -0.00665 -0.0106 0.0322 
 (0.00689) (0.00914) (0.0269) 
Regulation -0.00825 -0.0127 0.0402 
 (0.0158) (0.0243) (0.0456) 
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(Table 4-7 Continued) 
Unwanted -0.00815 -0.00385 0.00561 
 (0.00814) (0.0104) (0.0267) 
Shares -0.0129 -0.0215 0.0552* 
 (0.0111) (0.0156) (0.0302) 
Size 0.0351 -0.00184 0.000253 
 (0.0262) (0.0427) (0.118) 
(Other Controls)    
Sh 0.00441 0.0135 -0.00327 
 (0.00658) (0.00897) (0.0221) 
Main 0.000435 0.0175 -0.00608 
 (0.0150) (0.0208) (0.0648) 
Developer 0.00156 -0.00207 -0.0555 
 (0.0109) (0.0138) (0.0380) 
Constant 0.0200 -0.0138 0.0678 
 (0.0246) (0.0342) (0.0849) 
Year Fixed Y Y Y 
Observations 120 120 120 
R-squared 0.214 0.300 0.186 
to sell.90 However, a closer look at the sample shows that SOEs account for 61% and 60% of 
sellers prior to and after the year 2010, indicating no additional regulatory pressure for SOEs 
to leave the real estate industry after 2010. But we decide to test possible heterogeneous market 
reactions towards sell-offs by SOEs caused by the cooling measures. Table 4-7 conducts 
robustness check with interactions on SOEs and the cooling measures. The coefficient 
estimations for the variable SOE seller is still highly negative for CAR-1, 0 and CAR-1,-1. 
Interestingly, the coefficients become more negative after separating the impact of the cooling 
measures. The estimated coefficient on the interaction variable SOE ൈ cooling measures is 
positive and significant during the interval (CAR-1, 0). These results imply that prior to the 
cooling measures, the market is wary that SOEs sell-offs may likely arise from managerial 
                                                     
90  In the extant literature, voluntary divestiture announcements are associated with unusually positive price 
movements and vice versa for involuntary divestiture announcements (Alexander et al., 1984; Boudreaux, 1975; 
Hite et al., 1987; Jain, 1985; Rosenfeld, 1984). 
Chapter 4                                                                         Divestitures 
127 
 
motives.  However, after the introduction of the cooling measures (2010 to 2012), we find that 
the overall SOE effect is insignificant during this period, indicating that after 2010, sell-offs are 
likely to be due to both market and managerial reasons. 
Real estate firms and non-real estate firms are not on the same knowledge base when 
dealing with real estate assets. As noted by Ambrose (1990), real estate are specialized assets. 
Furthermore, for the current owner (seller) to gain from a property sell-off, the new owner 
(buyer) must have the ability to extract additional income out of the property (over and above 
the current use) through active asset management, and hence is willing to pay a premium price 
for the property. Here, it would be interesting to investigate the market assessment of property 
subsidiary sell-offs given different industrial background of the seller and buyer.  
Table 4-8 presents a robustness check with interactions on the industries of the seller and 
buyer. The additional variables for interaction are: REseller vs. REbuyer (real estate firms 
selling to real estate firm), REseller vs. nonREbuyer (real estate firm selling to non-real estate 
firm), and nonREseller vs. REbuyer (non-real estate firm selling to real estate firm). The key 
variable SOE is still negative and significant. We have additional insights from the estimated 
coefficient on the variable REseller vs. REbuyer. Interestingly, during the interval (-1, 0), the 
estimated coefficient on REseller vs. REbuyer is positive and significant. If both transacting 
parties are real estate firms, the market may think that since both parties are familiar or experts 
in the area, the probability of arriving at a fair or favourable market assessment of the 
transaction is higher; it is unlikely that the asset in question will be undervalued.  
Consequently, the market reacts more positively to sell-offs by real estate firms.   
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Table 4-8  Robustness check with interaction of the industry of the seller and the buyer 
This table reports robustness check with interaction of the industries of the seller and buyer. The dependent variables 
are cumulative abnormal return in interval (-1, -1), (-1, 0) and (3, 17). The new variables are REseller vs. REbuyer 
(=1 for real estate firms selling to real estate firm), REseller vs. nonREbuyer (=1 for real estate firm selling to non-
real estate firm), and nonREseller vs. REbuyer (=1 for non-real estate firm selling to real estate firm). The independent 
variables are specified according to Table 4-1. Robust standard errors are used in parentheses. *, **, *** stand for 
level of significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level. 
 
      (1)       (2)      (3) 
VARIABLES ۱ۯ܀തതതതതതሺି૚,ି૚ሻ ۱ۯ܀തതതതതതሺି૚,૙ሻ ۱ۯ܀തതതതതതሺ૜,૚ૠሻ 
(Agency Conflicts)    
SOE seller  -0.0152** -0.0250*** -0.0324* 
 (0.00653) (0.00911) (0.0187) 
RPT -0.00766 -0.00641 -0.0532** 
 (0.00670) (0.00918) (0.0240) 
Duality -0.0118 -0.00105 -0.0240 
 (0.00764) (0.0117) (0.0277) 
Appraisal 0.0150* 0.0136 0.0386 
 (0.00853) (0.0104) (0.0247) 
Net insider purchase 0.0278*** 0.0459*** 0.0232 
 (0.00510) (0.00565) (0.0154) 
D/A ratio -0.00162 0.00921 -0.0564 
 (0.0143) (0.0218) (0.0527) 
Repayment of debt 0.00130 -0.00309 0.0267 
 (0.00942) (0.0172) (0.0329) 
Insider ownership -0.000522 -0.00214 -0.00678 
 (0.00342) (0.00707) (0.0142) 
(Price Components)    
OCF/asset 0.00130 -0.0554 -0.0898 
 (0.0339) (0.0488) (0.107) 
REseller vs. REbuyer 0.0105 0.0236* 0.0148 
 (0.00885) (0.0141) (0.0294) 
REseller vs. nonREbuyer -0.00140 -0.00378 0.00603 
 (0.00920) (0.0127) (0.0300) 
nonREseller vs. REbuyer -0.00109 -0.00366 0.0136 
 (0.00790) (0.0110) (0.0210) 
Multiple sell -0.00717 -0.00366 -0.00788 
 (0.00758) (0.0107) (0.0246) 
(Valuation Error or Tax Component)   
Accounting profit -0.0591 0.116 -0.0993 
 (0.0641) (0.103) (0.236) 
(Synergy Component)   
Focus -0.00578 -0.00844 0.0312 
 (0.00693) (0.00928) (0.0261) 
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(Table 4-8 Continued) 
Regulation -0.00559 -0.00608 0.0372 
 (0.0162) (0.0238) (0.0460) 
Unwanted -0.00847 -0.00465 0.00605 
 (0.00830) (0.0108) (0.0266) 
Shares -0.0140 -0.0240 0.0553* 
 (0.0111) (0.0150) (0.0316) 
Size 0.0270 -0.0215 0.00553 
 (0.0294) (0.0454) (0.122) 
(Other Controls)    
Sh 0.00330 0.0108 -0.00218 
 (0.00657) (0.00877) (0.0217) 
Main -8.64e-05 0.0162 -0.00592 
 (0.0157) (0.0234) (0.0638) 
Developer -0.00250 -0.0119 -0.0533 
 (0.0128) (0.0173) (0.0395) 
Constant 0.0316 0.0144 0.0604 
 (0.0254) (0.0381) (0.0879) 
Year Fixed Y Y Y 
Observations 120 120 120 
R-squared 0.208 0.284 0.184 
This argument is also proposed by Glascock et al. (1989). They suggest that real estate 
companies have special knowledge on real estate assets, and are more likely to sell at a better 
price, since knowing what you are selling is extremely important from a negotiation standpoint. 
4.7 Conclusions 
This chapter looks at the effects of firms’ divestiture decisions on shareholders’ wealth, 
using data from China. The institutional features peculiar to China brings a more interesting 
analysis to the problem. We are faced with two relatively different segments of the market –
SOEs and non-SOEs. SOEs have favourable and preferential access to financing from state-
owned banks, favourable tax treatments, and a relatively favourable competitive environment 
compared to other firms. The top executives of SOEs are also more likely to prioritize state 
goals over maximizing shareholders’ wealth. Moreover, given the large cash flows available to 
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the firm after the sell-off and the high level of managerial discretion, shareholders may view 
that agency costs are higher for SOEs. For non-SOEs, they face a comparatively less favourable 
financing and business environment than the SOEs. Thus, the reasons that motivate their 
divestiture decisions may be more in line with reasons such as asset allocation efficiency and 
financing theory. 
Consistent with the previous prediction, this research finds divergent results between the 
market reactions to SOEs and non-SOEs announcements. While the market reacts positively to 
sell-offs by non-SOEs, this study finds consistent evidence of negative market reactions to sell-
offs by SOEs. The results are in-line with the agency hypothesis of SOEs. A closer look at the 
result provides additional insights that sell-offs of property subsidiary is more positively valued 
when both the seller and buyer are real estate firms. The presence of the cooling measures 
highlights the economic motive of SOE sell-offs.  Before 2010, there are statistically negative 
market reactions from the sell-offs, but during the cooling measure period, the overall SOE 
effect is insignificant.  Overall, the findings support the hypothesis that sell-offs in the 
presence of agency issues are negatively valued. As China continues its transit to a market 
economy, reforms on the SOEs have started to see some results. Indeed, this study shows that 
in a number of aspects, the corporate governance of SOEs are better than non-SOEs. However, 
due to close ties with the central government and misalignment of the interests of politically 
appointed senior executives, the market remains generally suspicious of property subsidiary 
sell-offs by SOEs - as reflected by the negative abnormal market returns. Possible areas that 
could improve the market’s perception include delinking the appointment and promotion of key 
executives from politics, reducing free cash flow, and aligning the interest of the managers with 
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Chapter 5      Conclusions 
This thesis comprises three essays on the growth of REITs and REOCs. The first two essays 
focus on the dramatic growth of the US REIT industry in the recent decades. The third essay 
examines divestitures of real estate subsidiaries in the market of China. 
5.1 Survey of Main Findings 
Looking at the asset pricing implication of firm growth, Chapter 2 examines the impact of firm 
asset growth rate on subsequent stock market returns using a sample of Public US equity REITs. 
The results show that slow growing REIT (“tortoises”) tend to outperform fast growing REIT 
(“hares”) over a longer horizon. Compared to common stocks, the growth effect is weaker in 
REIT markets due to the constrained environment in which REITs operate. On the asset 
investment side, the negative asset growth effect is associated with growth in non-real estate 
assets. This is consistent with the notion that firms that grow outside of their competency areas 
are penalized by the market. On the asset financing side, growth activities funded by taking on 
more debt are associated with negative stock performance over the next 12 to 36 months. 
Further analysis indicates that the negative effect is associated primarily with the issuance of 
long-term unsecured debt to fund asset growth. This suggests that the provision of collateral 
associated with secured debt and the refinancing frequency associated with short-term loans are 
effective in restricting firms from engaging in sub-optimal growth. 
Chapter 3 studies the role of corporate watchdogs in preventing REITs managers from 
pursuing value-destroying growth. While REITs have expanded rapidly over the last two 
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decades, not all corporate growth is beneficial to shareholders. Tracking the growth of a sample 
of public US equity REITs since their IPO, this chapter observes that 44.5% of the growth 
between 1992 and 2012 resulted in the firms operating at decreasing returns to scale. The 
monitoring role of three corporate watchdogs are evaluated, including the institutional investors, 
the independent directors, and the external creditors. The evidence suggests that institutional 
investors are the most effective watchdog in disciplining the managers from undertaking bad 
investments. The results are robust to alternative ways of identifying good and bad growth, and 
to different strategies to control for possible endogeneity and reverse causality. 
Examining a recent divestitures wave of real estate subsidiaries in the market of China, 
Chapter 4 shows that the overall response from the stock market to divestitures announcements 
is neutral. However, detailed analysis reveals that the market reacts differently to property 
subsidiary sell-off announcements by state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and non-SOEs. 
Consistent with findings from extant literature, statistically positive market returns are found 
in non-SOE sell-off announcements. However, statistically negative market returns are found 
in SOE sell-off announcements. The divergent market reaction is influenced by the institutional 
feature of the Chinese market and is consistent with the high agency costs associated with state 
ownership. Further analysis suggests that the agency issue with SOEs during property 
subsidiary selloffs is related to the use of fund after the sale and can be alleviated through 
increasing insider ownership in SOEs. 
5.2 Contributions and Practical Implications 
Firm expansion and contraction is among the most commonly observed firm activities. Chapter 
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2 contributes to the asset pricing literature by studying the impact of asset growth rate on 
subsequent stock market returns from experience of REIETs. Examining firm growth using the 
scale efficiency framework, Chapter 3 contributes to the literature by connecting two strands 
of literature, namely scale efficiency in the context of corporate growth, and the role of 
monitoring in the context of corporate governance. Chapter 4 provides a recent contribution to 
the limited literature that examines real estate subsidiary sell-offs. Aside from academia 
contributions, this thesis also provides practical implications to various participants in the 
economy.  
Firstly, this thesis will be interesting to investors in the public equity market. Examining 
the implication of asset growth rate on subsequent stock market returns, Chapter 2 shows that 
fast growing REITs (the “hares”) do not underperform the slower growing REITs (the 
“tortoises”), which is contrary to the experience of general firms. In particular, some REITs 
may grow through aggressive asset acquisitions, while others may choose to grow at a slower 
“organic” pace. The difference experience of REITs is attributable to the unique operating 
environment of the REIT industry. While some investors may prefer the blue chips, Chapter 3 
shows that it is actually more difficult for bigger REITs to engage in good growth in terms of 
operating efficiency. While some investors are concerned that rapid growth of firms may 
worsen its subsequent performance, Chapter 3 suggests that rapid growth of REITs does not 
harm operating efficiency. Although the above conclusions are based on publicly listed REITs, 
these findings will have wider implications for private real estate equity funds. Examining the 
announcement effect of real estate subsidiary selloffs in the market of China, Chapter 4 will be 
useful for investors and asset managers who are interested in the equity market of China. 
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Secondly, this thesis is of value to firm managers and regulators. Focusing on the 
monitoring role of corporate “watchdogs” in preventing REIT managers from value-destroying 
growth, Chapter 3 shows that institutional investors, through their active monitoring, play an 
important role in mitigating the agency cost of managerial opportunism. 
Thirdly, this thesis is also meaningful to policy makers. In Chapter 4, the institutional 
background of China provides a new look at the issue of “separation of ownership and control” 
during divestitures. This study offers far-reaching implications to the on-going SOE reforms in 
China by empirically linking the issue of SOEs with agency conflicts. Potential remedies to the 
SOE issue include delinking the appointment and promotion of key executives from politics, 
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Appendix to Chapter 2 
Listed below are individual REITs that have consistently been allocated to Q1 (“tortoises”) and Q5 (“hares”). The 
selection is based on the average quintile of each REIT over the sample period. REIT “tortoises” have an average 















Appendix to Chapter 3 
This table shows the frequency and ranking of “bad growth” for a sample of 176 equity REITs used in Chapter 3. 
Ranks descend with increases in the frequency of “bad growth”. Bad growth is identified as growth in inflation 
adjusted total assets that lead to declining returns to scale. Bad contractions are identified as negative growth in 
inflation adjusted total assets that lead to increasing returns to scale. The sample is from NAREIT data set, which 
lists the individual REITs, their IPO year, and the asset sector they are operating in.  
 
Company name Sector 
IPO 
year
a. Growth and 
Contraction b. Growth Only
obs
%bad 
growth rank obs 
%bad  
growth rank
Acadia Realty Trust Retail 1993 18 44% 86 12 25% 98 
Agree Realty Corporation Retail 1994 17 29% 124 14 14% 118
Alexandria Real Estate Equities, Inc. Industrial/Office 1997 14 36% 109 14 36% 87 
AMB Property Corp. Industrial/Office 1997 8 75% 11 6 100% 1 
Ambassador Apartments, Inc. Residential 1994 2 50% 51 2 50% 43 
American Assets Trust, Inc. Diversified 2011 1 0% 146 1 0% 125
American Campus Communities, Inc. Diversified 2004 7 43% 90 7 43% 78 
American c Realty Trust Diversified 2003 3 67% 18 1 0% 125
Amli Residential Properties Trust Residential 1994 9 22% 131 8 13% 121
Apartment Invt and Management Co. Residential 1994 17 24% 130 8 38% 85 
Arden Realty Group, Inc. Industrial/Office 1996 8 63% 30 5 40% 81 
Associated Estates Realty Corp. Residential 1993 9 33% 112 5 20% 110
Avalon Properties, Inc. Residential 1993 4 75% 11 4 75% 23 
AvalonBay Communities Inc. Residential 1994 16 75% 11 14 79% 20 
Beacon Properties Corporation Industrial/Office 1994 2 100% 1 2 100% 1 
BioMed Realty Trust Industrial/Office 2004 7 57% 39 7 57% 39 
Boston Properties, Inc. Industrial/Office 1997 14 71% 16 11 91% 12 
Boykin Lodging Company Diversified 1996 8 50% 51 3 33% 88 
Cabot Industrial Trust Industrial/Office 1998 1 100% 1 1 100% 1 
Camden Property Trust Residential 1993 18 56% 45 10 60% 34 
Campus Crest Communities, Inc. Residential 2010 1 0% 146 1 0% 125
Capital Automotive REIT Diversified 1998 5 60% 34 5 60% 34 
Capstone Capital Corp. Health Care 1994 2 50% 51 2 50% 43 
Captec Net Lease Realty, Inc. Diversified 1997 3 67% 18 1 0% 125
CarrAmerica Realty Corp. Industrial/Office 1993 9 22% 131 4 25% 98 
CBL and Associates Properties, Inc. Retail 1993 18 56% 45 13 77% 21 
Center Trust, Inc. Retail 1993 6 50% 51 2 50% 43 
CenterPoint Properties Trust Industrial/Office 1993 11 45% 83 10 40% 81 
Chateau Communities, Inc. Residential 1993 9 44% 86 7 43% 78 
Chatham Lodging Trust Lodging/Resorts 2010 2 50% 51 1 0% 125
Chelsea Property Group, Inc. Retail 1993 9 22% 131 9 22% 107




Cogdell Spencer Inc. Health Care 2005 5 60% 34 3 33% 88 
Colonial Properties Trust Diversified 1993 18 61% 33 12 58% 37 
Columbus Realty Trust Residential 1993 2 0% 146 2 0% 125
CoreSite Realty Corpo. Diversified 2010 2 50% 51 1 0% 125
Cornerstone Properties Inc. Industrial/Office 1997 2 50% 51 1 100% 1 
Cornerstone Realty Income Trust Residential 1997 6 33% 112 4 0% 125
Corporate Office Properties Trust Retail 1991 14 36% 109 12 33% 88 
Crescent Real Estate Equities Comp. Industrial/Office 1994 11 45% 83 4 75% 23 
Crocker Realty Trust, Inc. Industrial/Office 1993 1 0% 146 1 0% 125
Crown American Realty Trust Retail 1993 8 75% 11 4 50% 43 
Cube Smart Self Storage 2004 6 17% 137 5 20% 110
DCT Industrial Trust Inc. Industrial/Office 2006 5 20% 134 2 50% 43 
DDR Corporation Retail 1993 17 65% 28 12 92% 11 
DeBartolo Realty Corporation Retail 1994 1 0% 146 0 NA NA
DiamondRock Hospitality Comp. Lodging/Resorts 2005 6 0% 146 5 0% 125
Digital Realty Trust Inc. Industrial/Office 2004 7 86% 8 7 86% 15 
Douglas Emmett, Inc. Industrial/Office 2006 5 20% 134 2 50% 43 
DuPont Fabros Technology, Inc. Diversified 2007 4 50% 51 3 33% 88 
Eagle Hospitality Properties Trust Lodging/Resorts 2004 2 50% 51 2 50% 43 
Education Realty Trust, Inc. Residential 2005 6 50% 51 3 67% 27 
ElderTrust Health Care 1998 4 75% 11 1 0% 125
Entertainment Properties Trust Diversified 1997 14 7% 145 12 8% 122
Equity Inns, Inc. Diversified 1994 11 45% 83 7 29% 97 
Equity Lifestyle Properties, Inc. Residential 1993 15 53% 48 8 25% 98 
Equity Office Properties Trust Industrial/Office 1997 8 25% 127 3 67% 27 
Equity One, Inc. Retail 1998 13 38% 104 10 20% 110
Equity Residential Residential 1993 19 68% 17 14 86% 15 
Essex Property Trust, Inc. Residential 1994 18 56% 45 16 56% 41 
Evans Withycombe Residential, Inc. Residential 1994 2 50% 51 2 50% 43 
Excel Trust, Inc. Retail 2010 1 0% 146 1 0% 125
Extra Space Storage Inc. Self Storage 2004 7 57% 39 6 67% 27 
FelCor Lodging Trust Incc. Diversified 1994 16 31% 122 4 50% 43 
First Industrial Realty Trust, Inc. Industrial/Office 1994 16 38% 106 5 80% 18 
First Potomac Realty Trust Industrial/Office 2003 7 29% 125 5 20% 110
First Washington Realty Trust, Inc. Retail 1994 4 50% 51 4 50% 43 
GandL Realty Corporation Industrial/Office 1993 5 40% 97 3 0% 125
Gables Residential Trust Residential 1994 9 33% 112 5 20% 110
General Growth Properties, Inc. Retail 1993 13 8% 143 7 14% 118
Gladstone Commercial Corp. Diversified 2003 8 0% 146 6 0% 125
Glimcher Realty Trust Retail 1994 17 41% 95 8 25% 98 
Global Signal, Inc. Diversified 2004 1 0% 146 1 0% 125
GMH Communities Trust Diversified 2004 2 50% 51 1 0% 125
Golf Trust of America, Inc. Diversified 1997 4 25% 127 1 0% 125




Government Properties Trust Industrial/Office 2004 1 0% 146 1 0% 125
Great Lakes REIT Industrial/Office 1997 5 40% 97 3 0% 125
Grove Property Trust Residential 1994 4 50% 51 3 33% 88 
Healthcare Realty Trust Inc. Health Care 1993 19 53% 50 10 50% 43 
Heritage Property Investment Trust Retail 2002 2 0% 146 2 0% 125
Hersha Hospitality Trust Lodging/Resorts 1999 12 8% 142 10 0% 125
Highland Hospitality Corp. Lodging/Resorts 2003 2 0% 146 2 0% 125
Highwoods Properties, Inc. Industrial/Office 1994 17 41% 95 7 71% 26 
Hilltop Holdings, Inc. Residential 2004 1 100% 1 0 NA NA
Home Properties of New York, Inc. Residential 1994 17 53% 49 14 50% 43 
Horizon Group Properties, Inc. Retail 1993 3 67% 18 2 50% 43 
Hospitality Properties Trust Diversified 1995 13 8% 143 7 14% 118
Host Funding, Inc. Diversified 1996 5 80% 10 2 50% 43 
Hudson Pacific Properties, Inc. Industrial/Office 2010 2 50% 51 2 50% 43 
Innkeepers USA Trust Diversified 1994 9 44% 86 5 20% 110
Irvine Apartment Communities Residential 1993 5 40% 97 4 50% 43 
Jameson Inns, Inc. Diversified 1994 8 50% 51 3 0% 125
JDN Realty Corp. Retail 1994 6 33% 112 4 25% 98 
JP Realty, Inc. Retail 1994 6 50% 51 4 50% 43 
Keystone Property Trust Residential 1993 10 60% 34 6 50% 43 
Kilroy Realty Corp. Industrial/Office 1997 11 64% 29 8 63% 32 
Kimco Realty Corp. Retail 1991 17 47% 81 12 67% 27 
Kimsouth Realty Retail 1993 7 57% 39 4 50% 43 
Kite Realty Group Trust Retail 2004 7 14% 140 6 17% 116
Kranzco Realty Trust Retail 1992 5 40% 97 3 0% 125
LaSalle Hotel Properties Lodging/Resorts 1998 13 38% 104 9 22% 107
Liberty Property Trust Industrial/Office 1994 16 63% 30 13 77% 21 
Macerich Company, The Retail 1994 17 12% 141 12 8% 122
Mack-Cali Realty Corp. Industrial/Office 1994 16 50% 51 9 89% 13 
Malan Realty Investors, Inc. Retail 1994 6 67% 18 1 0% 125
McArthur/Glen Realty Corp. Retail 1993 1 0% 146 1 0% 125
Medical Properties Trust Health Care 2005 6 50% 51 6 50% 43 
MeriStar Hospitality Corp. Diversified 1996 8 25% 127 2 50% 43 





18 50% 51 13 38% 84 
Mid-Atlantic Realty Trust Retail 1993 5 40% 97 4 50% 43 
Mills Corporation, The Retail 1994 10 30% 123 8 38% 85 
MPG, Inc. Industrial/Office 2003 8 63% 30 2 100% 1 
National Golf Properties, Inc. Diversified 1993 6 33% 112 4 50% 43 
New Plan Excel Realty Trust, Inc. Diversified 1993 9 67% 18 4 75% 23 
Oasis Residential, Inc. Residential 1993 4 50% 51 4 50% 43 
Omega Healthcare Investors, Inc. Health Care 1992 15 40% 97 9 22% 107




Pan Pacific Retail Properties, Inc. Retail 1997 7 57% 39 7 57% 39 
Paragon Group, Inc. Residential 1994 2 100% 1 1 100% 1 
Paragon Real Estate Equity Residential 1995 9 67% 18 1 0% 125
Pebblebrook Hotel Trust Lodging/Resorts 2009 2 0% 146 2 0% 125
Philips International Realty Corp. Retail 1998 1 0% 146 1 0% 125
Piedmont Office Realty Trust, Inc. Industrial/Office 2010 2 50% 51 0 NA NA
Pinnacle Holdings Inc. Diversified 1999 2 100% 1 1 100% 1 
Post Properties, Inc. Residential 1993 15 33% 112 9 33% 88 




1 0% 146 1 0% 125
Prentiss Properties Trust Industrial/Office 1996 7 43% 90 6 50% 43 
Price REIT, Inc. Retail 1991 3 67% 18 3 67% 27 
Prime Group Realty Trust Industrial/Office 1997 6 67% 18 2 100% 1 
Prime Retail, Inc. Retail 1994 6 33% 112 2 50% 43 
Prison Realty Trust, Inc. Diversified 1997 1 0% 146 1 0% 125
ProLogis Trust Industrial/Office 1994 14 36% 109 8 63% 32 
Reckson Associates Realty Corp. Industrial/Office 1995 9 33% 112 6 33% 88 
Regency Centers Corp. Retail 1993 18 39% 103 9 56% 42 
Republic Property Trust Industrial/Office 2005 1 0% 146 1 0% 125
RFS Hotel Investors, Inc. Diversified 1993 7 43% 90 3 0% 125
RLJ Lodging Trust, Inc. Lodging/Resorts 2011 1 100% 1 0 NA NA
ROC Communities, Inc. Residential 1993 1 0% 146 1 0% 125
Saul Centers, Inc. Retail 1993 18 17% 137 15 7% 124
Security Capital Atlantic Residential 1996 1 0% 146 1 0% 125
Simon Property Group, Inc. Retail 1993 14 57% 39 9 89% 13 
SL Green Realty Corp. Industrial/Office 1997 14 50% 51 12 58% 37 
South West Property Trust, Inc. Residential 1992 1 0% 146 1 0% 125
Sovran Self Storage Industrial/Office 1995 16 38% 106 13 31% 96 
Spieker Properties, Inc. Diversified 1993 6 83% 9 6 83% 17 
STAG Industrial, Inc. Industrial/Office 2011 1 0% 146 1 0% 125
Storage Trust Realty Industrial/Office 1994 2 50% 51 2 50% 43 
Storage USA, Inc. Industrial/Office 1994 4 50% 51 2 50% 43 
Strategic Hotel Capital, Inc. Lodging/Resorts 2004 6 17% 137 2 50% 43 
Summit Hotel Properties, Inc. Lodging/Resorts 2011 1 0% 146 1 0% 125
Summit Properties Inc. Residential 1994 8 38% 106 5 40% 81 
Sun Communities, Inc. Residential 1993 17 47% 81 12 42% 80 
Sunstone Hotel Investors Lodging/Resorts 2004 7 43% 90 3 100% 1 
Sunstone Hotel Investors, Inc. Diversified 1995 1 0% 146 1 0% 125
Supertel Hospitality, Inc. Diversified 1994 15 60% 34 6 17% 116
Tanger Factory Outlet Centers, Inc. Retail 1993 18 44% 86 13 23% 106
Taubman Centers, Inc. Retail 1992 19 47% 80 11 45% 77 
Terreno Realty Corp. Industrial/Office 2010 1 0% 146 1 0% 125
Tower Realty Trust Inc. Industrial/Office 1997 1 0% 146 1 0% 125




Trade Street Residential Inc. Retail 2004 6 67% 18 2 50% 43 
TriNet Corporate Realty Trust, Inc. Diversified 1993 5 60% 34 5 60% 34 
Tucker Properties Corp. Retail 1993 1 0% 146 1 0% 125
United Investors Realty Trust Retail 1998 2 50% 51 1 0% 125
Urban Shopping Centers, Inc. Retail 1993 5 20% 134 4 25% 98 
Vornado Realty Trust Retail 1993 18 67% 18 15 80% 18 
Walden Residential Properties, Inc. Residential 1994 3 0% 146 3 0% 125
Weeks Corporation Industrial/Office 1994 3 33% 112 3 33% 88 




3 33% 112 2 50% 43 
Westfield America, Inc. Retail 1997 2 100% 1 1 100% 1 
Whitestone REIT Diversified 2010 1 0% 146 1 0% 125
Windrose Medical Properties Trust Health Care 2002 2 0% 146 2 0% 125
Winston Hotels Diversified 1994 8 50% 51 4 25% 98 






Appendix to Chapter 4 
In property subsidiary sell-offs, where there are transaction parties (buyer and seller) and cash 
settlements, this business environment is conducive to self-dealing or tunneling by managers. 
The followings are two cases of agency conflicts during property subsidiary divestitures in 
China. 
 
Case 1: Chen Tonghai, the former GM and Chairman of the board of CPCC91 received life 
sentence with a two-year reprieve for bribery of 195.73 million CNY. In year 2004, CPCC sold 
75% share of Taishan Real Estate Co., Ltd., a second-tier subsidiary, to Shouchuang Investment 
Co., Ltd. for 123.36 million CNY. The interesting story is that only two months later, 
Shouchuang Investment resold Taishan Real Estate to another party, but for 325.50 million CNY. 
And around 200 million were lost by CPCC. Investigations revealed that the owner of 
Shouchuang Investment was the mistress of Chen.  
 
Case 2: During 2006 and 2007, NJXB92 sold 100% shares of a real estate subsidiary, Zhujiang 
NO.1 Real Estate Development Co., Ltd., to Xinpeng Real Estate Development for 128.79 
million CNY. The buyer was claimed to be an unrelated party. NJXB received 128.79 million 
and made accounting profit of 35 million in the process. This divestiture did not arouse 
suspicion until 23th march 2009, when an announcement by NJXB let the cat out of the bag. 
                                                     
91 China Petroleum and Chemical Corporation/ Zhongguo Shihua, listed on Shanghati Stock Exchange 
(firm code:  600028) 




The announcement revealed an acquisition plan to solve the intra-industry competition between 
NJXB and its holding company, Golden Eagle Group Co., Ltd.. The acquisition package 
includes the 100% shares of Zhujiang NO.1, which was originally owned by NJXB. In less than 
three years, the price for the 100% shares of Zhujiang NO.1 jumped from 128.79 million to 
1635 million without substantive changes in its assets. Chances are that NJXB sold Zhujiang 
NO.1 for less than its value in 2006 and 2007, even though 35 million accounting profit was 
realized. Another doubt is how Zhujiang NO.1 became an asset of Golden Eagle Group. A 
rectification notice by China Securities Regulatory Commission solved the mystery: Xinpeng 
Real Estate is a related party of NJXB that is under the same control of the chairman of NJXB 
and the Golden Eagle Group. NJXB concealed the identity of Xinpeng Real Estate as a related 
party in 2006 and 2007. 
 
 
 
